Executive pay dispersion: Reconciling the differing effects of pay inequality and pay inequity on firm performance

Author(s):  
Zonghui Li ◽  
Joshua J. Daspit ◽  
Laura E. Marler
2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kin Wai Lee ◽  
Baruch Lev ◽  
Gillian Hian Heng Yeo

GIS Business ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 01-13
Author(s):  
Simon Yang

This paper examines the relative sensitivity of CEO compensation of both acquiring and acquired firms in the top 30 U.S. largest corporate acquisitions in each year for the period of 2003 to 2012. We find that total compensation and bonus granted to executive compensation for acquired companies, not acquiring companies, are significantly related to the amount of acquisition deal even after the size and firm performance are controlled for. Both acquiring and acquired CEOs are found to make the significantly higher compensation than the matched sample firms in the same industry and calendar year. We also find that executives with higher managerial power, as measured by a lower salary-based compensation mix, prior to a corporate acquisition are more likely to receive a higher executive pay in the year of acquisition. The association between executive compensation and managerial power seems to be stronger for acquired firms than for acquiring firms in corporate acquisition. Overall, our findings suggest that corporate acquisition has higher impacts on executive compensation for acquired firm CEOs than for acquiring firm CEOs.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Jachimowicz ◽  
Christopher To ◽  
Oliver P Hauser

Pay dispersion is a core organizational attribute, but its’ relationship to employee turnover is relatively unclear. We propose this is the case because prior research suffers from two limitations: (1) it neglects how pay dispersion impacts employees’ psychological attitudes toward their job, and (2) it assumes that teams are homogenous, disregarding that variations in team characteristics shape how employees experience pay dispersion. The current research addresses these shortcomings by drawing on job demand-control theories to investigate how pay dispersion shapes employees’ job attitudes, and explicitly incorporates one aspect of team heterogeneity, team size variations. More specifically, our core proposition is that team pay inequality, i.e., the pay dispersion of employees within a team, reduces employees’ job control—their perceived capability to control work—particularly when teams are larger. This, in turn, makes it more likely employees in large unequal teams leave their organization. Two unique large-scale archival and survey datasets from a technology (N = 881) and financial services company (N = 22,816) provide support for our hypotheses. The current research thus offers a novel perspective on pay dispersion: salary differences within teams fundamentally shape employees’ job attitudes—particularly their job control—and thus determine important organizational outcomes.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Meriem Ghrab ◽  
Marjène Gana ◽  
Mejda Dakhlaoui

Purpose The purpose of this study is to analyze the CEO compensation sensitivity to firm performance, termed as the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) in the Tunisian context and to test the robustness of this relationship when corporate governance (CG) mechanisms are considered. Design/methodology/approach The consideration of past executive pay as one of the explanatory variables makes this estimation model a dynamic one. Furthermore, to avoid the problem of endogeneity, this study uses the system-GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). For robustness check, this study aims to use a simultaneous equation approach (three-stage least squares [3SLS]) to estimate the link between performance and CEO pay with a set of CG mechanisms to control for possible simultaneous interdependencies. Findings Using a sample of 336 firm-years from Tunisia over the 2009–2015 periods, this study finds strong evidence that the pay-performance relationship is insignificant and negative, and it becomes more negative or remains insignificant after introducing CG mechanisms consistently with the managerial power approach. The findings are robust to the use of alternative performance measures. This study provides new empirical evidence that CEOs of Tunisian firms abuse extracting rents independently of firm performance. Originality/value This study contributes to the unexamined research on PPS in a frontier market. This study also shows the ineffectiveness of the Tunisian CG structure and thus recommends for the legislator to impose a mandatory CG guide.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 1030-1056
Author(s):  
Jin-hui Luo ◽  
Yuangao Xiang ◽  
Ruichao Zhu

ABSTRACTThere is still an ongoing debate regarding the firm performance implications of pay gaps between top executives and subordinate employees. This study integrates relative deprivation theory and tournament theory to investigate the potential nonlinear effects of pay gaps. We expect that at low levels of pay inequality, increased inequality hurts firm productivity, while at higher levels of pay inequality, increased inequality helps firm productivity. Our study of Chinese firms confirms that pay gaps have an approximately U-shaped relationship with firm performance. This nonlinear relationship is weaker in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) than in non-SOEs, suggesting that state ownership is an important moderator in the association. Overall, this study explains previous mixed findings regarding consequences of pay gaps with meaningful implications for policymakers and entrepreneurs in China and other economies with similar cultural and institutional backgrounds.


2014 ◽  
Vol 43 (5) ◽  
pp. 1524-1552 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Jaskiewicz ◽  
Joern H. Block ◽  
Danny Miller ◽  
James G. Combs

Emerging evidence suggests that pay dispersion among non-CEO top management team (TMT) members harms firm performance, which raises questions about why firms’ owners tolerate or even support it. Prior research shows that the key distinction between founder and family owners is that in addition to firm performance and growth goals, family owners pursue socioemotional goals. On the basis of this distinction, we develop and test theory linking founders’ and families’ ownership to TMT pay dispersion. Consistent with our theory, a Bayesian panel analysis of Standard & Poor’s 500 firms shows that founder owners use less TMT pay dispersion and that family owners, relative to founder owners, use more, although that declines across generations. We also provide evidence that TMT pay dispersion harms firm performance. Our theory and results are significant because they help to explain why some owners favor compensation practices that cause TMT pay dispersion, despite evidence that this harms firm performance.


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