Climate change and right-wing populism in the United States

2022 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Daniel J. Fiorino
2021 ◽  
pp. 073112142110246
Author(s):  
Adam Mayer

In the last few decades, the United States has experienced several related and significant societal trends—the transition of the energy system away from coal, the intensification of partisan polarization, and the rise of a populist right-wing political ideology, perhaps best exemplified by the election of Donald Trump. We build Gramling and Freudenberg’s little-explored concept of “development channelization” to argue that nostalgic right-wing populism, grievances directed toward the federal government, and partisanship converge to potentially thwart efforts to transition and diversify rural economies. Populist nostalgia and blame are associated with support for expanding the collapsing coal industry but do not predict support for other types of development. There are patterns of partisan polarization in support for extractive industries and wind power, but many development options appear to be relatively nonpartisan. We discuss these findings in terms of populism, nostalgia, partisan polarization, and the potential for rural renewal in the United States.


Significance Trudeau’s government has been held up as a bulwark of liberalism given the surge of anti-immigration populist candidates and parties in Europe and the United States. However, two leadership candidates in the Conservative race have sought to ape the political style and policy agenda that brought Donald Trump to power in the United States. Mainstream Canadian political actors are seeking to either counter or benefit electorally from rising distrust in government, fears over immigration and integration, and communitarian focus on Islam within right-wing politics. Impacts Opposition to the Trump presidency may help unify fractious left-leaning Canadian voters behind the Liberals. However, the social-democratic New Democratic Party will cite Trudeau-Trump cooperation to peel off progressive voters. Alienation of anti-immigration Conservatives will increase under libertarian or pro-business leadership.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 683-699 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shelley Boulianne ◽  
Karolina Koc-Michalska ◽  
Bruce Bimber

Many observers are concerned that echo chamber effects in digital media are contributing to the polarization of publics and, in some places, to the rise of right-wing populism. This study employs survey data collected in France, the United Kingdom and the United States (1500 respondents in each country) from April to May 2017. Overall, we do not find evidence that online/social media explain support for right-wing populist candidates and parties. Instead, in the United States, use of online media decreases support for right-wing populism. Looking specifically at echo chamber measures, we find offline discussion with those who are similar in race, ethnicity and class positively correlates with support for populist candidates and parties in the United Kingdom and France. The findings challenge claims about the role of social media and the rise of populism.


October ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 81-99
Author(s):  
John Hulsey

Abstract In this conversation, Andrea Fraser discusses her recent book, 2016 in Money, Museums, and Politics, which considers the imbricated relationships between plutocracy, political power, and cultural institutions in the United States. She discusses the 2016 election of Donald J. Trump and the rise of right-wing populism; the history of private philanthropy and museum patronage; recent activist campaigns demanding the resignation of museum trustees, such as Warren B. Kanders at the Whitney Museum of American Art; and the concept of “reflexive resistance.”


Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 254
Author(s):  
Tobias Cremer

Right-wing populists across many western countries have markedly intensified their references to Christianity in recent years. However, Christian communities’ reactions to such developments often vary significantly, ranging from disproportionate support in some countries to outspoken opposition in others. This paper explores the role of structural factors, and in particular of Church–State relations, in accounting for some of these differences. Specifically, this article explores how Church–State relations in Germany and the United States have produced different incentives and opportunity structures for faith leaders when facing right-wing populism. Based on quantitative studies, survey data, and 31 in-depth elite interviews, this research suggests that whereas Germany’s system of “benevolent neutrality” encourages highly centralised churches whose leaders perceive themselves as integral part and defenders of the current system, and are therefore both willing and able to create social taboos against right-wing populism, America’s “Wall of separation” favours a de-centralised religious marketplace, in which church leaders are more prone to agree with populists’ anti-elitist rhetoric, and face higher costs and barriers against publicly condemning right-wing populism. Taking such structural factors into greater account when analysing Christian responses to right-wing populism is central to understanding current and future dynamics between politics and religion in western democracies.


Subject Italy's new government. Significance The threat of an immediate general election from which Matteo Salvini’s League would emerge at the head of a nationalist alliance appears to have been avoided. His former allies, the Five Star Movement (M5S), have shifted their alliance leftwards, going into government with the Democratic Party (PD) and the smaller Free and Equal party. The coalition should be more pro-EU and more fiscally responsible than its populist predecessor. Its durability, however, is very fragile. Impacts The new government will adopt a pro-EU stance when it comes to relations with such countries as Russia, China and the United States. The EU will likely be more accommodating towards Italy’s concerns with immigration policy, now that a pro-EU government is in Rome. The fall of the League is for now a blow to momentum for right-wing populism across the EU.


2021 ◽  
pp. 233-248
Author(s):  
John S. Dryzek

This chapter analyzes an anti-environmental discourse that can be understood as a profound reaction against environmentalism in its entirety. This anti-environmental “gray radicalism,” especially prominent under the Trump presidency in the United States, entails climate change denial, but is much more than that, drawing on populism, extreme conservatism, nationalism, and (in the US) evangelical Christianity. It is opposed to technological progress that would for example replace coal with renewable energy. This chapter locates gray radicalism in relation to right-wing partisan identity, expands on its differences with Promethean discourse, and details how it can be enmeshed in broader “culture wars.” Because gray radicalism is a matter of fundamental identity for its subscribers, it can be difficult to engage through evidence and argument.


Populism ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilles Ivaldi ◽  
Oscar Mazzoleni

Abstract This article aims to develop a conceptual framework to address the economic dimension of right-wing populism. Moving beyond classic left-right economics and the divide between economic and cultural approaches, it argues that the political economy of right-wing populists is intertwined with cultural values in the construction of the ‘true’ people as an economic community whose well-being is in decline and under threat, and therefore needs to be restored. Looking at populist traditions across Europe and the United States, the paper emphasizes the significance of ‘producerist’ frames in economic populism. This is illustrated through an empirical analysis of differences and similarities in the economic policies and discourses of three established right-wing populist parties based in Europe (FN, SVP and UKIP), and the Tea Party and Donald Trump in the United States. We find that economic populist frames are common to all of the parties under scrutiny, albeit subject, however, to different interpretations of the producerist antagonism and groups. Our findings confirm that the intersection between economic populism and producerism provides a new—and fruitful—perspective on right-wing populism, while simultaneously demonstrating the relevance of a transatlantic approach to the study of the populist phenomenon.


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