scholarly journals Active but not independent: the legal personhood of children

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Visa Kurki
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Christian List

AbstractThe aim of this exploratory paper is to review an under-appreciated parallel between group agency and artificial intelligence. As both phenomena involve non-human goal-directed agents that can make a difference to the social world, they raise some similar moral and regulatory challenges, which require us to rethink some of our anthropocentric moral assumptions. Are humans always responsible for those entities’ actions, or could the entities bear responsibility themselves? Could the entities engage in normative reasoning? Could they even have rights and a moral status? I will tentatively defend the (increasingly widely held) view that, under certain conditions, artificial intelligent systems, like corporate entities, might qualify as responsible moral agents and as holders of limited rights and legal personhood. I will further suggest that regulators should permit the use of autonomous artificial systems in high-stakes settings only if they are engineered to function as moral (not just intentional) agents and/or there is some liability-transfer arrangement in place. I will finally raise the possibility that if artificial systems ever became phenomenally conscious, there might be a case for extending a stronger moral status to them, but argue that, as of now, this remains very hypothetical.


Author(s):  
Craig M. Kauffman

With the onset of climate change, the prospect of mass extinction, and the closing window of opportunity to take meaningful action, a growing number of activists, lawyers, scientists, policy-makers, and everyday people are calling for Rights of Nature (RoN) to be legally recognized as a way to transform human legal and governance systems to prioritize ecological sustainability. Over the past decade, RoN has gone from being a radical idea espoused only by a handful of marginalized actors to a legal strategy seriously considered in a wide variety of domestic and international policy arenas. In January 2021, at least 185 legal provisions recognizing RoN existed in 17 countries spanning five continents, and 50 more RoN laws were pending in a dozen other countries. RoN is also recognized in numerous international policy documents. After defining RoN, this chapter examines how different kinds of actors have organized in global networks to advance RoN in different policy arenas through distinct pathways. This has caused RoN to be structured and implemented differently in distinct contexts. The chapter examines this variation, comparing cases from around the world. It highlights the implications of structuring RoN as a set of unique substantive rights for ecosystems versus extending legal personhood (a set of rights designed for humans). It concludes by examining the relationship between RoN and human rights—including environmental rights, Indigenous rights, and economic rights—and the implications for reconceptualizing sustainable development to prioritize ecological sustainability.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Michelle Worthington ◽  
Peta Spender
Keyword(s):  

2022 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diana Mădălina Mocanu

What I propose in the present article are some theoretical adjustments for a more coherent answer to the legal “status question” of artificial intelligence (AI) systems. I arrive at those by using the new “bundle theory” of legal personhood, together with its accompanying conceptual and methodological apparatus as a lens through which to look at a recent such answer inspired from German civil law and named Teilrechtsfähigkeit or partial legal capacity. I argue that partial legal capacity is a possible solution to the status question only if we understand legal personhood according to this new theory. Conversely, I argue that if indeed Teilrechtsfähigkeit lends itself to being applied to AI systems, then such flexibility further confirms the bundle theory paradigm shift. I then go on to further analyze and exploit the particularities of Teilrechtsfähigkeit to inform a reflection on the appropriate conceptual shape of legal personhood and suggest a slightly different answer from the bundle theory framework in what I term a “gradient theory” of legal personhood.


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