Parcel Size and Land Value: A Comparison of Approaches

Abstract The heavily forested landscape of Massachusetts is dominated by nonindustrial private ownerships. Statistics indicate that parcel size has decreased to a most recent average of 10.6 ac. Professional loggers were queried to determine if there was a timber sale size (expressed in eithervolume or area) below which they would not bid. Respondents indicated that they had operated on a timber sale as small as an average of 7.8 ac and 20.4 mbf, and would purchase one as small as an average of 5.3 ac and 17.1 mbf. The single most important factor in deciding to bid on a smallsale was the quality and value of the timber. In the future, small parcels with a preponderance of low-quality timber resulting from high-grading may be deemed inoperable by loggers. The importance of high quality timber on small parcels emphasizes the need for stand improvement measures toensure small parcels are feasible to commercially operate in the future. North. J. Appl. For. 13(2):00-00.

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Why Should We Be Beggars with the Ballot in Our Hand? Veto Players and the Failure of Land Value Taxation in the United Kingdom, 1909–14

British Journal of Political Science ◽

10.1017/s0007123406000317 ◽

2006 ◽

Vol 36 (4) ◽

pp. 575-591 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

IAIN McLEAN ◽

JENNIFER NOU

Keyword(s):

United Kingdom ◽

Welfare States ◽

Veto Players ◽

Temporary Increase ◽

British Politics ◽

Land Value ◽

Fiscal Discipline ◽

Veto Player ◽

The United Kingdom ◽

Entire History

Recent veto player work argues that majoritarian regimes such as the United Kingdom have better fiscal discipline and smaller welfare states than proportional regimes with more veto players. An analytic narrative of the failure of land value taxation in the United Kingdom between 1909 and 1914 shows, however, that it failed not because of previously advanced reasons, but because the number of veto players in British politics was sharply increased. This increase in veto player numbers prevented a tax increase. All seven of the conventional reasons for characterizing the United Kingdom as a low-n veto player regime failed to hold between 1906 and 1914. Observable implications discussed include the need to review the entire history of British politics in this period in the light of the temporary increase in veto players; and the ambiguous implications of number of veto players for fiscal discipline.

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Understanding the geography of affordable housing provided through land value capture: Evidence from England

Urban Studies ◽

10.1177/0042098021998893 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 004209802199889

Author(s):

Alexander Lord ◽

Chi-Wan Cheang ◽

Richard Dunning

Keyword(s):

Affordable Housing ◽

Theory And Practice ◽

Land Values ◽

Land Value ◽

Local Planning ◽

Development Activity ◽

Value Capture ◽

Dual Approach ◽

The Right ◽

Community Infrastructure

Governments the world over routinely undertake Land Value Capture (LVC) to recover some (or all) of the uplift in land values arising from the right to develop in order to fund infrastructure and public goods. Instruments to exact LVC are diverse but are usually implemented independently. However, since 2011 England has been experimenting with a dual approach to LVC, applying both a tariff-style levy to fund local infrastructure (the Community Infrastructure Levy) and negotiated obligations, used primarily to fund affordable housing (Section 106 agreements). In this article we employ a difference-in-differences (DID) method to identify the interaction of these two instruments available to local planning authorities. We explore the question of whether the Community Infrastructure Levy ‘crowds out’ affordable housing secured through Section 106 planning agreements. In so doing we show that the interaction of these two approaches is heterogeneous across local authorities of different types. This raises questions for understanding the economic geography of development activity and the theory and practice of Land Value Capture.

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