From rhetoric to record: linking tweets to legislative agendas in congress

Author(s):  
Annelise Russell ◽  
Jiebing Wen
Keyword(s):  
2022 ◽  
pp. 009539972110699
Author(s):  
Tracey Bark

Bureaucracies often provide information to legislatures in an effort to influence the agenda. This paper assesses whether data affects this influence, arguing quantitative support can increase the likelihood of legislative discussion and passage of bills related to a given topic. I also assess the impact of centralization on an agency’s ability to provide information and shape legislative agendas. I find including data in bureaucratic reports can significantly increase an agency’s influence on the legislature, but this effect is only present in a centralized setting. These results suggest centralized agencies are better equipped to marshal quantitative support for arguments to legislatures.


2013 ◽  
pp. 55-93
Author(s):  
Peter John ◽  
Anthony Bertelli ◽  
Will Jennings ◽  
Shaun Bevan
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 443-466 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane Green ◽  
Will Jennings

Election-oriented elites are expected to emphasize issues on which their party possesses ‘issue ownership’ during campaigns. This article extends those theories to the content of executive and legislative agendas. Arguing that executives have incentives to pursue their party’s owned issues in the legislature, it theorizes three conditions under which these incentives are constrained: when governments are responsive to issues prioritized by the public, when a party has a stronger electoral mandate and under divided government. The theory is tested using time-series analyses of policy agendas of US congressional statutes and State of the Union addresses (1947–2012) and UK acts of Parliament and the Queen’s Speech (1950–2010). The results offer support for the theory, and are particularly strong for the US State of the Union address, providing insights into institutional differences. The implications provide reassurance concerning the conditions under which governments focus attention only on their partisan issue priorities.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
James M. Curry ◽  
Frances E. Lee

Majority leaders of the contemporary Congress preside over parties that are more cohesive than at any point in the modern era, and power has been centralized in party leadership offices. Do today’s majority parties succeed in enacting their legislative agendas to a greater extent than the less-cohesive parties of earlier eras? To address this question, we examine votes on all laws enacted from 1973–2016, as well as on the subset of landmark laws identified by Mayhew. In addition, we analyze the efforts of congressional majority parties to pass their agendas from 1985 to 2016. We find that enacting coalitions in recent congresses are nearly as bipartisan as they were in the 1970s. Most laws, including landmark enactments, continue to garner substantial bipartisan support. Furthermore, majority parties have not gotten better at passing their legislative programs. Contemporary congressional majorities actually fail on their agenda items at somewhat higher rates than the less-cohesive majority parties of the 1980s and 1990s. When majority parties succeed on their agenda priorities, they usually do so with support from a majority of the minority party in at least one chamber and with the endorsement of one or more of the minority party’s top leaders.


AORN Journal ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 78 (2) ◽  
pp. 303-306
Author(s):  
Burke Beu
Keyword(s):  

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