Analysing intra-party power: Swedish selection committees over five decades

Unlike political parties in many other countries, Swedish ones have not adopted more inclusive methods for choosing their election candidates and party leaders. While the party congress formally selects important party offices, the process is managed, prior to the formal vote, by a selection committee vested with the task of filtering the pool of potential leaders and proposing one of them as the new leader. In this article, we survey the composition of these selection committees over time to investigate the extent to which change has taken place. Specifically, we investigate whether the composition of these powerful committees, which decide who joins the ranks of the country’s political leaders, has developed over time in relation to what prominent theories of intra-party power might lead us to expect. We derive testable expectations from prominent conceptualisations of intra-party power and apply these empirically. Specifically, we study the composition of party selection committees in Sweden over 50 years, 1969–2019. In total, this includes 40 different selection committees and almost 400 individuals. Contrary to conventional wisdom on intra-party power relations, the empirical analysis reveals a surprising degree of stability, raising questions about common claims of general power shifts within parties.

Members, leaders, and the distribution of power within parties

This chapter explores intra-party power. How far are British political parties elitist top-down institutions? What roles do grassroots members play and how much power do they wield? How much do leaders and members have in common ideologically, and does that matter in the competition for votes? In reviewing a wealth of empirical evidence that bears on these questions, the chapter draws on various classic models of party organization from cadre party to cartel party and finds that, notwithstanding their analytical usefulness, none of these models truly captures the complex reality of contemporary British party politics.

Minority Party Capacity in Congress

When, and under what circumstances, are congressional minority parties capable of influencing legislative outcomes? We argue that the capacity of the minority party to exert legislative influence is a function of three factors: constraints on the majority party, which create opportunities for the minority party; minority party cohesion on the issue at hand; and sufficient motivation for the minority to engage in legislating rather than electioneering. Drawing on data on every bill considered in the House of Representatives between 1985 and 2006 and case examples of notable lawmaking efforts during the same period, we show that our theory helps predict which bills are considered on the House floor, which bills become law, and the substance of policy-making outcomes. Our findings have important implications for theories of congressional party power and our understanding of minority party influence on Capitol Hill.

Palestinians inside Israel

The Palestinian student movement inside the Israeli academy was established within hostile universities. Palestinian students were not engaged in any institutional production of knowledge and therefore could not develop an alternative, anti-colonial framework within the Israeli academy. These conditions made the national student movement into a mirror of the traditional political parties in Israel, marked by the uncritical adoption of the traditional parties' positions. The student movement was administered by party power at all levels and was denied any organizational or intellectual autonomy. The parties remained dominant over student politics, and we have not seen any radical breaks with them. This strong tie has weakened the potential for a revolutionary, anti-Zionist approach within the Palestinian student movement and has resulted in its gradual collapse.

Sistemas de votación preferencial. Efectos en la competición interna de los partidos y en el comportamiento electoral

Este artículo examina los efectos del voto preferencial en la competencia electoral intrapartidaria y en el comportamiento del voto. Mediante los datos recogidos en 19 países y más de 200 elecciones, este estudio arroja luz en un aspecto ciertamente olvidado de los sistemas electorales. El autor demuestra que la capacidad de los votantes de influir en la selección y el descarte de parlamentarios en los sistemas de voto preferencial no es tan importante como se suele señalar. En cambio, su capacidad para dar forma a la elección de un determinado candidato depende enormemente del equilibrio entre poder de partido y poder del votante. De esta manera, este trabajo avanza en la compresión del efecto del voto preferencial en las dinámicas intrapartidarias, en la rotación parlamentaria y en el comportamiento del votante.This article examines the effects of preferential voting on intraparty electoral competition and voting behavior. Using data covering 19 countries and over 200 elections, this study sheds light on a somewhat neglected aspect of electoral systems. The author demonstrates that the ability of voters to influence the selection and deselection of MPs under preferential voting systems is not as important as is often assumed. Instead, their ability to shape the election of a given candidate depends heavily on the balance between party power and voter power. In this way, this work advances the understanding of the effect of preferential voting on intra-party dynamics, parliamentary turnover, and voter behavior.

Dialogical power negotiations in conflict mediation

In this study, mediator – party power dynamics in workplace disputes mediation dialogues are examined. Adopting Gramsci’s concept of hegemony (e.g. 2005) and Foucault′s notion that power is not fixed in dialogues, but constantly negotiated by participants (e.g. Foucault 1980), the analyses show that the power dynamics shift in the mediation setting when mediators subordinate dominant parties and enforce their own formalized power as procedural guides to design (Aakhus 2003, 2007) a favorable context for conflict resolution. When their procedural power is threatened, mediators may use specific devices in their interventions that correlate with the four devices – interruption, enforcing explicitness, topic control, and formulation – Fairclough (1989, 135–137) states can be used by dominant participants to control weaker parties in dialogues.