Active control, agent-causation and free action

2004 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ishtiyaque Haji
Keyword(s):  
Active Control ◽  
Free Action ◽  
Control Agent ◽  
Agent Causation

Causation, Action, and Free Will

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred R. Mele
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Free Action ◽  
Philosophy Of Action ◽  
Agent Causation ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Causal Explanations ◽  
Indeterministic Causation

Many issues at the heart of the philosophy of action and of philosophical work on free will are framed partly in terms of causation. The leading approach to understanding both the nature of action and the explanation or production of actions emphasizes causation. What may be termed standardcausalism is the conjunction of the following two theses: firstly, an event's being an action depends on how it was caused; and secondly, proper explanations of actions are causal explanations. Important questions debated in the literature on free will include: is an action's being deterministically caused incompatible with its being freely performed? Are actions free only if they are indeterministically caused? Does the indeterministic causation of an action preclude its being freely performed? Does free action require agent causation? This article concentrates on issues about action and free will that centrally involve causation.

scholarly journals A phase 1 ascending dose study of a subcutaneously administered factor IXa inhibitor and its active control agent

2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 1303-1311 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. P. VAVALLE ◽  
C. P. RUSCONI ◽  
S. ZELENKOFSKE ◽  
W. A. WARGIN ◽  
J. H. ALEXANDER ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Active Control ◽  
Phase 1 ◽  
Control Agent ◽  
Factor Ixa ◽  
Dose Study

Free Will and the Burden of Proof

2003 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 107-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
William G. Lycan
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Free Action ◽  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Agent Causation ◽  
The Right ◽  
Business As Usual

Here are some things that are widely believed about free will and determinism.(1) Free will is prima facie incompatible with determinism.(2) The incompatibility is logical or at least conceptual or a priori.(3) A compatibilist needs to explain how free will can co-exist with determinism, paradigmatically by offering an analysis of ‘free’ action that is demonstrably compatible with determinism. (Here is the late Roderick Chisholm, in defence of irreducible or libertarian agent-causation: ‘Now if you can analyse such statements as “Jones killed his uncle” into eventcausation statements, then you may have earned the right to make jokes about the agent as cause. But if you haven't done this, and if all the same you do believe such things as that I raised my arm and that Jolns [sic] killed his uncle, and if moreover you still think it's a joke to talk about the agent as cause, then, I'm afraid, the joke is entirely on you.’)(4) Free will is not impugned by quantum indeterminism, at least not in the same decisive way that it is impugned by determinism. To reconcile free will with quantum indeterminism takes work, but the work comes under the heading of metaphysical business-as-usual; to reconcile free will with determinism requires a conceptual breakthrough.And listen to Laura Waddell Ekstrom on the burden of proof.

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred R. Mele
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Free Action ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Agent Causation ◽  
Key Concepts ◽  
Standard Terminology

This chapter introduces key concepts and provides a preview of the book. Featured concepts include action, action-individuation, intention, intentional action, and free will. Some standard terminology in the literature on free will is introduced, including agent causation, compatibilism, determinism, incompatibilism, and libertarianism. The notion of free action central to the book is identified as moral-responsibility-level free action—free action of such a kind that if all the freedom-independent conditions for moral responsibility for a particular action were satisfied without that sufficing for the agent’s being morally responsible for it, the addition of the action’s being free to this set of conditions would entail that he is morally responsible for it.

scholarly journals The Connection between the Averted Infections Ratio and the Rate Ratio in Active-control Trials of Pre-exposure Prophylaxis Agents

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
David T. Dunn ◽  
David V. Glidden
Keyword(s):  
Active Control ◽  
Rate Ratio ◽  
Primary Outcome ◽  
Outcome Measure ◽  
Incidence Rate Ratio ◽  
Primary Outcome Measure ◽  
Control Agent ◽  
Hiv Incidence ◽  
Exposure Prophylaxis ◽  
Mathematical Connection

Abstract The design and analysis of active-control trials to evaluate experimental HIV pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) agents pose serious statistical challenges. We recently proposed a new outcome measure, the averted infections ratio (AIR) – the proportion of infections that would be averted by using the experimental agent rather than the control agent (compared to no intervention). The main aim of the current paper is to examine the mathematical connection between AIR and the HIV incidence rate ratio, the standard outcome measure. We also consider the sample size implications of the choice of primary outcome measure and explore the connection between effectiveness and efficacy under a simplified model of adherence.

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