Free Will and the Burden of Proof

2003 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 107-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
William G. Lycan
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Free Action ◽  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Agent Causation ◽  
The Right ◽  
Business As Usual

Here are some things that are widely believed about free will and determinism.(1) Free will is prima facie incompatible with determinism.(2) The incompatibility is logical or at least conceptual or a priori.(3) A compatibilist needs to explain how free will can co-exist with determinism, paradigmatically by offering an analysis of ‘free’ action that is demonstrably compatible with determinism. (Here is the late Roderick Chisholm, in defence of irreducible or libertarian agent-causation: ‘Now if you can analyse such statements as “Jones killed his uncle” into eventcausation statements, then you may have earned the right to make jokes about the agent as cause. But if you haven't done this, and if all the same you do believe such things as that I raised my arm and that Jolns [sic] killed his uncle, and if moreover you still think it's a joke to talk about the agent as cause, then, I'm afraid, the joke is entirely on you.’)(4) Free will is not impugned by quantum indeterminism, at least not in the same decisive way that it is impugned by determinism. To reconcile free will with quantum indeterminism takes work, but the work comes under the heading of metaphysical business-as-usual; to reconcile free will with determinism requires a conceptual breakthrough.And listen to Laura Waddell Ekstrom on the burden of proof.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Evan Franklin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Human Agency ◽  
Causal Role ◽  
Central Question ◽  
Agent Causation ◽  
The Right

This chapter lays out the book’s central question: Assuming agency reductionism—that is, the thesis that the causal role of the agent in all agential activities is reducible to the causal role of states and events involving the agent—is it possible to construct a defensible model of libertarianism? It is explained that most think the answer is negative and this is because they think libertarians must embrace some form of agent-causation in order to address the problems of luck and enhanced control. The thesis of the book is that these philosophers are mistaken: it is possible to construct a libertarian model of free will and moral responsibility within an agency reductionist framework that silences that central objections to libertarianism by simply taking the best compatibilist model of freedom and adding indeterminism in the right junctures of human agency. A brief summary of the chapters to follow is given.

Free Will and the Burden of Proof

2019 ◽  
pp. 48-63
Author(s):  
William G. Lycan
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Free Action ◽  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
Causal Determinism ◽  
Consequence Argument ◽  
Philosophical Assumption ◽  
Set Up

Moore’s method is deployed in favor of the compatibility of free will with causal determinism. It is pointed out that the compatibilism issue has always been set up prejudicially: the compatibilist has been required to offer an analysis of “free action” that both is correct and exhibits the compatibility with determinism. This chapter argues that according to sound dialectical procedure, but contrary to tradition, the incompatibilist bears the burden of proof, and that an incompatibilist argument will contain a bare philosophical assumption that should be rejected on Moorean grounds. (Moreover, a compatibilist not only need not but should not attempt an analysis of “free action.”) All this is illustrated by a close examination of the impressive “Consequence argument” for incompatibilism.

Causation, Action, and Free Will

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred R. Mele
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Free Action ◽  
Philosophy Of Action ◽  
Agent Causation ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Causal Explanations ◽  
Indeterministic Causation

Many issues at the heart of the philosophy of action and of philosophical work on free will are framed partly in terms of causation. The leading approach to understanding both the nature of action and the explanation or production of actions emphasizes causation. What may be termed standardcausalism is the conjunction of the following two theses: firstly, an event's being an action depends on how it was caused; and secondly, proper explanations of actions are causal explanations. Important questions debated in the literature on free will include: is an action's being deterministically caused incompatible with its being freely performed? Are actions free only if they are indeterministically caused? Does the indeterministic causation of an action preclude its being freely performed? Does free action require agent causation? This article concentrates on issues about action and free will that centrally involve causation.

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred R. Mele
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Free Action ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Agent Causation ◽  
Key Concepts ◽  
Standard Terminology

This chapter introduces key concepts and provides a preview of the book. Featured concepts include action, action-individuation, intention, intentional action, and free will. Some standard terminology in the literature on free will is introduced, including agent causation, compatibilism, determinism, incompatibilism, and libertarianism. The notion of free action central to the book is identified as moral-responsibility-level free action—free action of such a kind that if all the freedom-independent conditions for moral responsibility for a particular action were satisfied without that sufficing for the agent’s being morally responsible for it, the addition of the action’s being free to this set of conditions would entail that he is morally responsible for it.

Sincerity and the Reliability of Testimony

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter J. Graham
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Tyler Burge ◽  
P Content ◽  
Epistemology Of Testimony ◽  
Content Preservation

“Content Preservation” by Tyler Burge is one of the most influential articles in the epistemology of testimony. Burge argues for three theses: (1) That we enjoy a prima facie entitlement to take testimony (presentations-as-true) at face value, (2) That this entitlement has an a priori basis, based in the nature of reason, and (3) That in some cases testimony-based beliefs are warranted a priori. Most of the debate in the testimony literature is over the truth of (1). Most of the criticism of Burge’s paper focuses on (3). Burge has since abandoned (3). What about (2)? Burge’s argument for (2) is compressed; the underlying nuts and bolts are difficult to understand. This chapter reconstructs Burge’s overall teleo-functional reliabilist framework and then reconstructs Burge’s overall argument for (2) in some detail. Three criticisms are then offered of the argument. Even granting (1), Burge’s argument does not establish (2).

scholarly journals A Review of Reductionist versus Systems Perspectives towards ‘Doing the Right Strategies Right’ for Circular Economy Implementation

Systems ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 38
Author(s):  
Raquel Balanay ◽  
Anthony Halog
Keyword(s):  
Circular Economy ◽  
Systems Approach ◽  
Holistic Approach ◽  
Comprehensive Analysis ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Review Reports ◽  
The Right ◽  
Business As Usual ◽  
Analytical Frameworks ◽  
Reductionist Approach

This systematic review examines the importance of a systems/holistic approach in analyzing and addressing the footprints/impacts of business-as-usual activities regarding the development of a circular economy (CE). Recent works on why current CE approaches have to be examined in terms of reductionist vs. systems perspectives are reviewed to tackle questions pertaining to the right or the wrong way of CE implementation. ‘Doing the right thing right’ is essential for sustainability—the ultimate goal of a CE, which must be viewed as a system to begin with. The limited reductionist approach overlooks and thus cannot prognosticate on the formidable unintended consequences that emerge from ‘doing the right things wrong’, consequences that become too costly to undo. The systems approach, being holistic, is complicated and difficult to pursue but open to exciting opportunities to integrate innovations in CE analysis and implementation. Complexity is an inherent downside of the systems approach. However, both approaches are complementary, as reductionist models can be combined to create a system of comprehensive analysis to correct the approach towards implementation of current CE initiatives. This review reports that advancements in systems analytical frameworks and tools are highly important for creating general guidelines on CE analysis and implementation.

On Fourier Series in Eigenfunctions of Elliptic Boundary Value Problems

2003 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-410
Author(s):  
M. S. Agranovich ◽  
B. A. Amosov
Keyword(s):  
Fourier Series ◽  
Boundary Conditions ◽  
Fourier Coefficients ◽  
Elliptic Boundary ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Adjoint Problem ◽  
Elliptic Boundary Value ◽  
Right Hand ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Right

Abstract We consider a general elliptic formally self-adjoint problem in a bounded domain with homogeneous boundary conditions under the assumption that the boundary and coefficients are infinitely smooth. The operator in 𝐿2(Ω) corresponding to this problem has an orthonormal basis {𝑢𝑙} of eigenfunctions, which are infinitely smooth in . However, the system {𝑢𝑙} is not a basis in Sobolev spaces 𝐻𝑡 (Ω) of high order. We note and discuss the following possibility: for an arbitrarily large 𝑡, for each function 𝑢 ∈ 𝐻𝑡 (Ω) one can explicitly construct a function 𝑢0 ∈ 𝐻𝑡 (Ω) such that the Fourier series of the difference 𝑢 – 𝑢0 in the functions 𝑢𝑙 converges to this difference in 𝐻𝑡 (Ω). Moreover, the function 𝑢(𝑥) is viewed as a solution of the corresponding nonhomogeneous elliptic problem and is not assumed to be known a priori; only the right-hand sides of the elliptic equation and the boundary conditions for 𝑢 are assumed to be given. These data are also sufficient for the computation of the Fourier coefficients of 𝑢 – 𝑢0. The function 𝑢0 is obtained by applying some linear operator to these right-hand sides.

Recht und Pflicht – Einschränkungen von Freiheit?

2021 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-113
Author(s):  
Klaus Vieweg
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
The State ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
Emergency Situations ◽  
The Will ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Right

Abstract Can one speak philosophically of a justified limitation of freedom? Hegel’s logically founded definition of free will and his understanding of right and duty can contribute to a clarification of the concept of freedom. Important is a precise differentiation between freedom and caprice (Willkür) – the latter being a necessary but one-sided element of the free will. In caprice, the will is not yet in the form of reason. Rational rights and duties are not a restriction of freedom. Insofar as individual rights can collide (e. g. in emergency situations), there can be a temporary and proportionate restriction of certain rights in favour of higher rights, such as the right to life. Dictatorships are instances of capricious rule which restrict freedom; the rationally designed state, by contrast, restricts only caprice. What is tobe defined are the duties and the rights of the state and the duties and the rights of the citizens.

scholarly journals Realism and Knowledge First. Interview with Timothy Williamson

2022 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 175-204
Author(s):  
I. E. Pris
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Traditional Epistemology ◽  
Timothy Williamson ◽  
Skeptical Problem ◽  
Ill Posed ◽  
The Right ◽  
Metaphysical Realist ◽  
First Interview ◽  
The Gettier Problem

The renowned British philosopher Timothy Williamson talks about his philosophical views and main lines of research. Williamson is a metaphysical realist in a broad sense. Fir him there are true or false answers to questions about all aspects of reality. Classical logic is a universal true theory. Knowledge-first epistemology is an alternative to the traditional belief-first epistemology. The former takes the concept of knowledge as a basic concept, explaining other epistemic concepts, including belief, in its terms, whereas the latter does the opposite. Knowledge, not truth, is the fundamental epistemic good. The Gettier problem and the skeptical problem that arise within traditional epistemology are ill posed and therefore cannot be solved. Hybrid epistemological theories do not satisfy the principles of simplicity and beauty and are refuted by counter-examples. Epistemic contextualism is problematic, and relativism violates the semantics of the phenomena being explained. Knowledge does not entail knowledge about knowledge. Knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. The distinction between a priori and a posteriori is superficial, and there are no analytical truths. The concept of qualia is unhelpful for solving the problems related to consciousness. The so-called “hard problem” of consciousness points to an area of conceptual confusions in which we do not know how to reason properly. Speculative metaphysics is quite a respectable enterprise. But progress in metaphysics is not automatic; it requires the right methodology.

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