Probabilities

This chapter offers a BST theory of propensities (i.e., of objective single-case probabilities), which builds on the account of indeterministic causation developed in Chapter 6. Propensities are shown to deliver classical (Kolmogorovian) probability spaces. The chapter draws a distinction between propensities and probability measures. The former are assigned to sets of BST transitions, in particular to sets of causae causantes of transitions, and are interpreted as degrees of possibility of these transitions. The latter are defined in terms of propensities and are measures of Komogorovian probability spaces. Features of propensities are derived from a logico-causal analysis. Finally, the chapter discusses how the theory developed here handles well-known objections to propensities due to Humphreys and to Salmon, especially Humphreys’s paradox.

Two Libertarian Theories: or Why Event-causal Libertarians Should Prefer My Daring Libertarian View to Robert Kane's View

Libertarianism about free will is the conjunction of two theses: the existence of free will is incompatible with the truth of determinism, and at least some human beings sometimes exercise free will (or act freely, for short).1 Some libertarian views feature agent causation, others maintain that free actions are uncaused, and yet others – event-causal libertarian views – reject all views of these two kinds and appeal to indeterministic causation by events and states.2 This article explores the relative merits of two different views of this third kind. One is Robert Kane's prominent view, and the other is the ‘daring libertarian’ view that I floated in Free Will and Luck.3 (I labeled the view ‘daring’ to distinguish it from a more modest libertarian view that I floated a decade earlier.)4 I say ‘floated’ because I am not a libertarian. I do not endorse incompatibilism; instead, I am agnostic about it. But if I were a libertarian, I would embrace my daring libertarian view (or DLV, for short). This article's thesis is that event-causal libertarians should prefer DLV to Kane's ‘dual or multiple efforts’ view.5

Free will and probability

The chance objection to incompatibilist accounts of free action maintains that undetermined actions are not under the agent's control. Some attempts to circumvent this objection locate chance in eventsposteriorto the action. Indeterministic-causation theories locate chance in eventspriorto the action. However, neither type of response gives an account of free action which avoids the chance objection. Chance must be located at theact of willif actions are to be both undetermined and under the agent's control. This dissolves the apparent paradox of Frankfurt-type cases as well as the chance objection to incompatibilist free will.

Causation, Action, and Free Will

Many issues at the heart of the philosophy of action and of philosophical work on free will are framed partly in terms of causation. The leading approach to understanding both the nature of action and the explanation or production of actions emphasizes causation. What may be termed standardcausalism is the conjunction of the following two theses: firstly, an event's being an action depends on how it was caused; and secondly, proper explanations of actions are causal explanations. Important questions debated in the literature on free will include: is an action's being deterministically caused incompatible with its being freely performed? Are actions free only if they are indeterministically caused? Does the indeterministic causation of an action preclude its being freely performed? Does free action require agent causation? This article concentrates on issues about action and free will that centrally involve causation.