philosophy of action
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2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 46-60
Author(s):  
Elena Paola Carola Alessiato

Moving from Fichte’s assumption that “the essence of the I is its activity”, this paper tries to analyze the meaning and implications of the idea of “activity” [Tathandlung] in order to explicate the peculiarities of Fichte’s critical, transcendental, and moral idealism. Fichte’s idea of activity will be examined with reference to such basic concepts as collision [Anstoss], interaction [Wechselwirkung], inter-determination [Wechselbestimmung], and striving [Streben]. However, it is freedom which frames and connects the core components of Fichte’s thinking and sets up the goal of his philosophy of action. What freedom accounts for, can be identified both at the transcendental level, in the internal dynamic of infinity and finitude constituting the subjectivity of the I, and at the moral and social levels of Fichte’s thought, as the goal of the human action in history and in the society. In assuming the unitary character of Fichte’s philosophical system, concluding remarks are developed concerning the moral meaning of the act of striving for freedom and, conversely, the immorality of attitudes and feelings such as fear, resignation, and fatigue.


Author(s):  
Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco

AbstractIn this paper, I discuss Goldberg and Zipursky’s Recognizing Wrongs and argue that there is a tension between their philosophy of action as applied to the law of negligence and the idea that the directive-based relationality thesis is central and, therefore, the action and conduct of the defendant should not be part of the core explanation of the tort of negligence.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Emma Barrett Fiedler

Drawing from the analysis of Sartre’s monumental biography of the French writer Gustave Flaubert and Bourdieu’s critical response to it, this article explores anew the dialectics of agency and coercion through the lenses of sartrian philosophy and bourdieusian sociology. From his birth to his childhood and his death in 1880, the biographical elements of the life of Madame Bovary’s author and the contents of his literary works were depicted by Sartre and Bourdieu in a dialogue questioning the writer’s individual goals, strategies, limits and fate. Put in a historical perspective, this socio-philosophical confrontation between the theoretical aims and methods of existentialist psychoanalysis and structuralist socio-analysis reopens the oldest of debates between actor-centered philosophy of action and socio-centered logic of practice, between the transcendence of ego and the transcendence of social, or freedom and determinism. <p> </p><p><strong> Article visualizations:</strong></p><p><img src="/-counters-/edu_01/0875/a.php" alt="Hit counter" /></p>


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Mercedes Valmisa

The Introduction explains the implications of a relational ontology for the conception of agency in Classical Chinese philosophy and how it differs from philosophy of action in contemporary analytical circles. It presents two approaches to relationality: the basic notion that everything exists in interrelation and a stronger account that implies interdependency and oneness. It introduces the notion of adapting in contrast with other models of agency. Adapting is a strategy of efficacious relational action precisely devised to acknowledge and take advantage of a strong account of relationality where acting necessarily is acting along with others or co-acting.


2021 ◽  
pp. 229-246
Author(s):  
Jonathan Dancy

This paper lays out in detail various versions of an argument from illusion in areas of philosophy other than the familiar one in the theory of perception. Those are the philosophy of action (doing vs. trying), the theory of motivation, the theory of knowledge, the theory of justification, and, in the philosophy of action, the distinction between act and agent. The suggestion is that we learn something about the force of such arguments, and about the best way to resist them, by seeing how they function in different contexts. There is also a suggestion (but no more than that) that if you are tempted by one instance, you should be equally tempted by the others. The paper also examines the much less familiar distinction between disjunctivism and non-conjunctivism.


2021 ◽  
pp. 261-280
Author(s):  
Jonathan Dancy

This paper revisits some issues discussed in the author’s Practical Reality. It responds to work by Jennifer Hornsby in particular. It considers various detailed suggestions about which form of disjunctivism is most appropriate in the theory of acting for a reason. Its general conclusion is, in line with what was argued in Practical Reality, that even the best form is unacceptable, but that the reasons why this is so are peculiar to the philosophy of action and so do not do anything to destabilise disjunctivism in the theory of perception. The paper also attempts to contribute to the understanding of disjunctivism more generally.


2021 ◽  
pp. 355-374
Author(s):  
Jonathan Dancy

This paper considers the merits of an important argument of Prichard’s against Sidgwick’s claim that nobody has ever been an intuitionist. Prichard tries to turn the tables on that argument, arguing that nobody has ever been a non-intuitionist. This paper tries to adjudicate. One of the hinge points is the question in the philosophy of action where the distinction between an action and its consequences is supposed to lie. If enough of the consequences are sucked up into the action by understanding the latter as the action of causing those consequences, the structure of the debate changes. The discussion generates a much better understanding of ethical intuitionism and of the distinction between intuitionism and consequentialism.


2021 ◽  
Vol 101 (3) ◽  
pp. 371-387
Author(s):  
Asaf Ziderman
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Piotr Tomasz Makowski

AbstractThe paper explores the topic of organizational routines from a philosophical vantage point to see how the philosophy of action may help improve its understanding in organizational research. The main goal is to show the distinctive complexity of the intentional picture of routines. In this respect, the paper clarifies the interrelations between psychological habits and routines and describes similarities and differences between them. It also highlights the special place of mindfulness as a psycho-cognitive mechanism of action meta-control in intentional explanations of routine complexity.


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