The Supreme Court and Due Process of Law in Florida

1940 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-137
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Due Process ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Due Process Of Law

22. A Revolution by Due Process of Law?

2021 ◽  
pp. 613-648
Author(s):  
Ian Loveland
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Due Process ◽  
Final Part ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Due Process Of Law

This chapter analyses the conduct and constitutional implications of the United Kingdom’s proposed withdrawal from the European Union. The chapter begins by examining the legal basis, conduct, and result of the withdrawal referendum. The chapter then assesses the High Court and Supreme Court decisions in the first of the two Miller judgments. It continues with a discussion on the extreme positions of ‘hard brexit’ and ‘soft brexit’ and the assesses the significance of the results of the unexpected 2017 general election. The chapter goes on to examine the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 and the subsequent fall of the May government and its replacement by an administration led by Boris Johnson. In the final part of the chapter the Miller (No 2) and Cherry litigation and its political aftermath are discussed in full, with a particular focus laid on the controversial way in which the Supreme Court deployed the notion of ‘justiciability’ in its judgment in Miller (No 2).

Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court

1927 ◽  
Vol 40 (7) ◽  
pp. 943 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ray A. Brown
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Due Process ◽  
Police Power ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Due Process Of Law

Neil v. Biggers: The Supreme Court Dismantles the Wade Trilogy's Due Process Protection

1974 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 1097 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles A. Pulaski
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Due Process ◽  
The Supreme Court

scholarly journals The Forgotten Property Right

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 501-528
Author(s):  
Peter Kuylen
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Due Process ◽  
Property Right ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Personal Jurisdiction ◽  
At Home

With its move to the “at home” standard in Goodyear, Daimler, and BNSF, the Supreme Court significantly restricted the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over nonresident corporation defendants. This restriction offers questionable actual benefits to corporate defendants, but its rigid focus on defendant’s rights has impacted the ability of certain plaintiffs to bring a cause of action against those defendants. Because the at home standard infringes on this group of plaintiffs’ ability to assert their property right of redress in violation of the Due Process Clauses of the Constitution (Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments), the Court should return to the previous “continuous and systematic contacts” standard developed under International Shoe. Hundreds of articles have been written in the four years since Daimler erased fifty years of general personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. But because personal jurisdiction analysis is traditionally defendant focused, there is little mention of the plaintiff’s property right in access to the courts in that literature. Personal jurisdiction rules should protect a defendant’s interests, but not to the total forfeiture of a plaintiff’s property right. Recognizing the at home standard as a misstep would resolve this constitutional conflict.

Need for a more Democratic Procedure of Amending the Constitution

1916 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 683-688
Author(s):  
Seba Eldridge
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Due Process ◽  
State Legislatures ◽  
Fourteenth Amendment ◽  
Political Discussion ◽  
Legislative Authority ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
History Of ◽  
Electoral Control ◽  
Democratic Procedure

That final legislative authority in this country is lodged in the letter of a constitution that is amended with the greatest difficulty, and with a supreme court which is entirely independent of electoral control has become a commonplace of political discussion.To quote Professor Goodnow: “Acts of congress and of state legislatures are declared to be unconstitutional ‥‥ because they cannot be made to conform to a conception of the organization and powers of government which we have inherited from the eighteenth century;” and Dr. Blaine F. Moore: “If we may judge from the decisions based on the due process clause in the fourteenth amendment and applying to the States, the court has it in its power to make the similar clause in the fifth amendment cover practically all federal legislation dealing with new problems concerning which there are few or no precedents. If the court does make this entirely possible extension of its power, then the legislation dealing with the more recent and pressing questions is under the control of the popularly inaccessible justices of the supreme court.”Both these quotations are from studies published before the adoption of the sixteenth and seventeenth amendments, but they are only a little less true now than then, as an analysis of the history of those amendments will show.

The Supreme Court, Dr. Jekyll, and the Due Process of Proof

1996 ◽  
Vol 1996 ◽  
pp. 191-217
Author(s):  
Larry Alexander
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Due Process ◽  
The Supreme Court

Constitutional Law in 1917–1918. II: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1917

1919 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-250
Author(s):  
Thomas Reed Powell
Keyword(s):  
Due Process ◽  
The United States ◽  
Eminent Domain ◽  
Fourteenth Amendment ◽  
Turn On ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Due Process Of Law ◽  
Pennsylvania Hospital ◽  
Constitutional Decisions ◽  
Proper Interpretation

There is little or no homogeneity to the questions to be considered under the head of retroactive legislation. A dispute whether a state has passed a law impairing the obligation of contracts may turn on a question as to the proper interpretation or application of language, or on opposing views of what is sufficient consideration or what agreements are against public policy. It was under the obligation-of-contracts clause that the Pennsylvania Hospital case decided that the power of governmental authorities to exercise eminent domain could not be bargained away. The crucial question is more often whether alleged rights existed than whether undoubted rights have been impaired. The Fourteenth Amendment and the doctrine of vested rights combine to make the obligation-of-contracts clause almost superfluous, as it is difficult to think of any impairment of the obligation of contracts which that clause inhibits which could not equally well be held deprivations of liberty or property without due process of law.This is apparent from the fact that retroactive legislation by Congress is questioned under the due-process clause of the Fifth Amendment, a contract being regarded as a property right that can be interfered with only when there is sufficient justification for what is done.

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