Intersectoral Complementarities and Coordination Failures

1999 ◽  
pp. 207-216
Author(s):  
Pranab Bardhan ◽  
Christopher Udry
Keyword(s):  
Coordination Failures

scholarly journals Government policy and the probability of coordination failures

2005 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 939-973 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huberto M. Ennis ◽  
Todd Keister
Keyword(s):  
Government Policy ◽  
Coordination Failures

scholarly journals Multinational Banks and Supranational Supervision

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (8) ◽  
pp. 2997-3035 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giacomo Calzolari ◽  
Jean-Edouard Colliard ◽  
Gyongyi Lóránth
Keyword(s):  
Organizational Structure ◽  
Organizational Structures ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Coordination Failures ◽  
The Public ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Multinational Banks ◽  
Editorial Decision ◽  
Public Costs ◽  
Published Paper

Abstract Supervision of multinational banks (MNBs) by national supervisors suffers from coordination failures. We show that supranational supervision solves this problem and decreases the public costs of an MNB’s failure, taking its organizational structure as given. However, the MNB strategically adjusts its structure to supranational supervision. It converts its subsidiary into a branch (or vice versa) to reduce supervisory monitoring. We identify the cases in which this endogenous reaction leads to unintended consequences, such as higher public costs and lower welfare. Current reforms should consider that MNBs adapt their organizational structures to changes in supervision. Received January 9, 2017; editorial decision September 15, 2018 by Editor Philip Strahan. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

scholarly journals Dictators, Democrats and Development in Southeast Asia: Lessons for the Rest

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-405
Author(s):  
Jomo Kwame Sundaram
Keyword(s):  
High Speed ◽  
Pragmatic Trial ◽  
Northeast Asia ◽  
Coordination Failures ◽  
Developmental States ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
Embedded Autonomy ◽  
The One ◽  
Openness To Trade ◽  
Trade And Investment

Of the ten fastest growing economies since 1960, eight are in East Asia. As Haggard (2018) aptly demonstrates for Northeast Asia, two explanations account for this exceptional regional performance. On the one hand, neo-liberals committed to an Anglo-American night-watchman state (Krueger 1978; Bhagwati 1978; Edwards 1993; World Bank 1993; Pack and Saggi 2006) attribute performance to macroeconomic stability, provision of public goods, and openness to trade and investment. On the other hand, a heterodox group (Johnson 1982; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990/2004; Chang 2002, 1994; Rodrik 1995; Evans 1995; Lin 2009) focuses on market and coordination failures and the need for states to adopt pragmatic, ‘trial and error’ and selective approaches to high-speed growth. In this latter view, the strong developmental states of Northeast Asia used their embedded autonomy viz the private sector to overcome market and coordination failures to usher in rapid growth and technological catch-up.

scholarly journals The Problem that Wasn't: Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings

2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (265) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeromin Zettelmeyer ◽  
Marcos Chamon ◽  
Ran Bi ◽  
◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Coordination Failures

Differentiating Centralization and Coordination in National Intelligence after 9/11

2019 ◽  
pp. 149-170
Author(s):  
Alejandro E. Camacho ◽  
Robert L. Glicksman
Keyword(s):  
Information Management ◽  
Regulatory Authority ◽  
Terrorist Attacks ◽  
Intelligence Community ◽  
Coordination Failures ◽  
Management Function ◽  
Management Context ◽  
Legislative Changes ◽  
Management Functions ◽  
Share Information

This chapter uses legislative changes in the structure of federal intelligence information management in the wake of 9/11 to explore problems that arise from the failure to distinguish the centralization/decentralization and coordination/independence dimensions of regulatory authority. According to the 9/11 Commission, created to investigate the intelligence community's inability to thwart the terrorist attacks, the failure of agencies such as the FBI and the CIA to share information with each other, attributable largely to a lack of coordinated information management, was a major contributing factor. The chapter contends that Congress and the 9/11 Commission's report-on which the former relied in 2004 in enacting the most comprehensive structural reform of the intelligence community in fifty years-erred by seeking to address coordination failures by centralizing aspects of the intelligence community through the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. In addition, neither Congress nor the Commission distinguished clearly among three different information management functions-generation, dissemination, and analysis-in assessing past intelligence failures or selecting reorganizational responses to them. The chapter then uses the intelligence information management context to explore the policy tradeoffs of situating authority along both the centralization/decentralization and coordination/independence dimensions for each information management function.

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