Nash Equilibrium—Existence and Refinements

2005 ◽  
pp. 55-64
Author(s):  
James Bergin
2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zahra Al-Rumaih ◽  
Souhail Chebbi ◽  
Hong Kun Xu

We prove an equilibrium existence result for vector functions defined on noncompact domain and we give some applications in optimization and Nash equilibrium in noncooperative game.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 62-79
Author(s):  
Юлия Васильевна Чиркова ◽  
Julia Chirkova

The Machine Load Balancing Game with linear externalities is considered. A set of jobs is to be assigned to a set of machines with different latencies depending on their own loads and also loads on other machines. Jobs choose machines to minimize their own latencies. The social cost of a schedule is the maximum delay among all machines, i.e. {\it makespan. For the case of two machines in this model an Nash equilibrium existence is proven and of the expression for the Price of Anarchy is obtained.


2016 ◽  
pp. 116-128
Author(s):  
O.P. Ignatenko ◽  

This paper deals with modeling of network’s dynamic using game theory approach. The process of interaction among players (network users), trying to maximize their payoffs (e.g. throughput) could be analyzed using game-based concepts (Nash equilibrium, Pareto efficiency, evolution stability etc.). In this work we presented the model of TCP network’s dynamic and proved existence and uniqueness of solution, formulated payoff matrix for a network game and found conditions of equilibrium existence depending of loss sensitivity parameter. We consider influence if denial of service attacks on the equilibrium characteristics and illustrate results by simulations.


2011 ◽  
pp. 65-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Rubinstein

The article considers some aspects of the patronized goods theory with respect to efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods as well as their connection with market failures, and conjectures that they are related to the emergence of Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. The key problem is the analysis of the opportunities for transforming inefficient Nash equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy issues.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document