The ethical debate on human enhancement and cognitive enhancement by way of biotechnologies

Author(s):  
Ruud ter Meulen
Philosophies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 20
Author(s):  
Marcelo de Araujo

Recent research with human embryos, in different parts of the world, has sparked a new debate on the ethics of genetic human enhancement. This debate, however, has mainly focused on gene-editing technologies, especially CRISPR (Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats). Less attention has been given to the prospect of pursuing genetic human enhancement by means of IVF (In Vitro Fertilisation) in conjunction with in vitro gametogenesis, genome-wide association studies, and embryo selection. This article examines the different ethical implications of the quest for cognitive enhancement by means of gene-editing on the one hand, and embryo selection on the other. The article focuses on the ethics of cognitive enhancement by means of embryo selection, as this technology is more likely to become commercially available before cognitive enhancement by means of gene-editing. This article argues that the philosophical debate on the ethics of enhancement should take into consideration public attitudes to research on human genomics and human enhancement technologies. The article discusses, then, some of the recent findings of the SIENNA Project, which in 2019 conducted a survey on public attitudes to human genomics and human enhancement technologies in 11 countries (France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, and United States).


Author(s):  
Fabrice Jotterand

This chapter considers the use of cognitive enhancers in healthy individuals with cognitive deficits caused by mental impairment. The objectives of this analysis are twofold: (1) to outline some of the problems associated with the attempt to distinguish the concept of enhancement from therapy, and (2) to show the relevance of the distinction between two different categories of cognitive enhancement in the attempt to demonstrate why the notion of human enhancement might become part of the therapeutic language of tomorrow. The various conceptualizations of enhancement found in literature, especially as outlined by Chadwick and Agar, are examined in this chapter and the notion of the clinical ideal to evaluate the concept of enhancement in the context of clinical interventions is introduced. In the final section of the chapter, the implications of the clinical ideal in relation to the use of cognitive enhancers in people with mental impairment are considered.


2013 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-248
Author(s):  
SangMok Lee ◽  
최종현

2017 ◽  
Vol 33 (S1) ◽  
pp. 214-215
Author(s):  
Bjørn Hofmann

INTRODUCTION:Human enhancement technologies need assessments, but they differ from other health technologies. Therefore we may need other methods for their assessment, also with regard to addressing its ethical issues. The objective of this paper is to describe the elaboration of a method for exposing and elucidating ethical issues with human cognitive enhancement. The approach is elaborated in order to support and facilitate open and transparent deliberation and decision making with an emerging type of technology with great potential and formative implications for individuals and society.METHODS:The literature search identified relevant approaches. Conventional content analysis of the identified papers and methods revealed their suitability for assessing human cognitive enhancement. Four selection criteria were applied and followed by method development. Pilot testing on smart-glasses (1) resulted in amendments.RESULTS:A method for exposing and elucidating ethical issues in the assessment of human cognitive enhancement technologies was developed based on three existing approaches in Health Technology Assessment (HTA) (2). The method consists of six steps and a guiding list of forty-three questions. An overview of the approach will be presented.CONCLUSIONS:A method for exposing and elucidating ethical issues in the assessment of human cognitive enhancement has been developed. The method paves the way for context specific ethical assessment and analysis of a new and emerging type of technology.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Adam Kelly

<p>This thesis focuses on what I have called “technological idealisations”, and how they are valuable to many current and future ethical debates. Technological idealisations refer to a methodology of using technology thought experiments to contribute to ethical debates. I do not claim this to be a new idea, and in fact will go on to give many examples of technological idealisation that already exist in the philosophical literature. The term describes the purposeful effort to collate these examples into a specific methodological framework; one which gives a particular kind of evidence which can ignore concerns of practicality and critically focus on the theoretical issues in a given debate.  In order to explore this idea I will first be looking at past, better known, examples of idealisations to facilitate understanding of my own. I will look at Rawlsian ideal theory as a template for my own idealisations, as well as to explain how they can be valuable in contributing to debates (in Rawls’ case political and in my case ethical). Rawls’ split up the field of political theory into ideal and non-ideal theory. Non-ideal theory is practical and works within the constraints of current political reality. Ideal theory idealises the political conditions to allow theorising regarding perfect political theory. The same can be done for ethics and for technology as it relates to ethics, as is my goal. Following on from this, I also examine Johann Roduit’s use of ideal theory in the closely related field of human enhancement, in which he develops an interesting methodology of using ideals to guide human enhancement programmes.  However, rather than being concerned with Roduit’s practical aim, my goal is theoretical. I want to take the ethical principles and theories themselves as ideals for technological development; in doing so technologies will be created, through the use of thought experiments, which agree with the theoretical aims of the theory or principle. These technologies can then be ethically examined and the resulting evidence can contribute (and has in the past contributed) to the ethical debate of those concepts and theories. The kind of evidence I see technological idealisations as offering ignores practical concerns and in doing so is also immune to criticisms of impracticality. This allows for more closely focused scrutiny of the ethical theories and principles themselves, undistracted by appeals to practicality which either argue for accepting a theory due to its utility or argue for rejecting a theory due to its impracticality.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Adam Kelly

<p>This thesis focuses on what I have called “technological idealisations”, and how they are valuable to many current and future ethical debates. Technological idealisations refer to a methodology of using technology thought experiments to contribute to ethical debates. I do not claim this to be a new idea, and in fact will go on to give many examples of technological idealisation that already exist in the philosophical literature. The term describes the purposeful effort to collate these examples into a specific methodological framework; one which gives a particular kind of evidence which can ignore concerns of practicality and critically focus on the theoretical issues in a given debate.  In order to explore this idea I will first be looking at past, better known, examples of idealisations to facilitate understanding of my own. I will look at Rawlsian ideal theory as a template for my own idealisations, as well as to explain how they can be valuable in contributing to debates (in Rawls’ case political and in my case ethical). Rawls’ split up the field of political theory into ideal and non-ideal theory. Non-ideal theory is practical and works within the constraints of current political reality. Ideal theory idealises the political conditions to allow theorising regarding perfect political theory. The same can be done for ethics and for technology as it relates to ethics, as is my goal. Following on from this, I also examine Johann Roduit’s use of ideal theory in the closely related field of human enhancement, in which he develops an interesting methodology of using ideals to guide human enhancement programmes.  However, rather than being concerned with Roduit’s practical aim, my goal is theoretical. I want to take the ethical principles and theories themselves as ideals for technological development; in doing so technologies will be created, through the use of thought experiments, which agree with the theoretical aims of the theory or principle. These technologies can then be ethically examined and the resulting evidence can contribute (and has in the past contributed) to the ethical debate of those concepts and theories. The kind of evidence I see technological idealisations as offering ignores practical concerns and in doing so is also immune to criticisms of impracticality. This allows for more closely focused scrutiny of the ethical theories and principles themselves, undistracted by appeals to practicality which either argue for accepting a theory due to its utility or argue for rejecting a theory due to its impracticality.</p>


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