Propaganda in the History of US Foreign Relations

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura A. Belmonte
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
World War I ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
Public Information ◽  
The United States ◽  
World War ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Good Neighbor Policy ◽  
Good Neighbor ◽  
The U.S

From the revolutionary era to the post-9/11 years, public and private actors have attempted to shape U.S. foreign relations by persuading mass audiences to embrace particular policies, people, and ways of life. Although the U.S. government conducted wartime propaganda activities prior to the 20th century, it had no official propaganda agency until the Committee on Public Information (CPI) was formed in 1917. For the next two years, CPI aimed to generate popular support for the United States and its allies in World War I. In 1938, as part of its Good Neighbor Policy, the Franklin Roosevelt administration launched official informational and cultural exchanges with Latin America. Following American entry into World War II, the U.S. government created a new propaganda agency, the Office of War Information (OWI). Like CPI, OWI was disbanded once hostilities ended. But in the fall of 1945, to combat the threats of anti-Americanism and communism, President Harry S. Truman broke with precedent and ordered the continuation of U.S. propaganda activities in peacetime. After several reorganizations within the Department of State, all U.S. cultural and information activities came under the purview of the newly created U.S. Information Agency (USIA) in 1953. Following the dissolution of USIA in 1999, the State Department reassumed authority over America’s international information and cultural programs through its Office of International Information Programs.

From “Color” to “Rainbow”: U.S. Strategic Planning for Latin America, 1919-1945

1979 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Child
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Latin American ◽  
Strategic Thinking ◽  
World War ◽  
Good Neighbor Policy ◽  
Strategic Plans ◽  
National Archives ◽  
Bilateral Cooperation ◽  
Good Neighbor ◽  
The U.S

A series of recently declassified documents in the National Archives provide striking evidence of the shift of United States military strategic thinking away from the nineteenth and early twentieth century unilateral interventionist approaches to the bilateral approaches taken in World War II under the multilateral framework of the Good Neighbor Policy.It is also significant to note that, despite the multilateral thrust of this Good Neighbor Policy promulgated by President Roosevelt and the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Military Departments— War and Navy—made no provisions for multilateral strategic plans in World War II.But even as U.S. military planners prepared for bilateral cooperation with Latin American allies in the war, they continued to draft and update unilateral plans for intervention and invasion of key Latin American countries if cooperative approaches should fail.

The 1906 Intervention in Cuba

2021 ◽  
pp. 61-81
Author(s):  
Payam Ghalehdar
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Economic Policy ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
The United States ◽  
Western Hemisphere ◽  
Cuban Revolution ◽  
World War ◽  
Good Neighbor Policy ◽  
Good Neighbor ◽  
The Cold War

This chapter serves as an introduction to the first three case studies of the book’s empirical analysis, which comprise Part I. It sketches the evolution of US attitudes toward states in the Western Hemisphere. It shows how US interpretations of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine became more hegemonic with the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary and how US expectations toward hemispheric states were relaxed in the interwar years, culminating in the Good Neighbor Policy. The chapter briefly illustrates how the attenuation of hegemonic expectations allowed Franklin D. Roosevelt to abstain from intervening in the 1933 Cuban Crisis. The aftermath of World War II put an end to the Good Neighbor Policy. Following the 1959 Cuban Revolution, John F. Kennedy expanded hegemonic expectations again, now to include domestic economic policy decisions of hemispheric states. The chapter concludes by showing that after the end of the Cold War, the United States has continued to harbor hegemonic expectations toward the Western Hemisphere.

Legacy, 1926–1929

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas I. Faith
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
World War I ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Chemical Warfare ◽  
Chemical Weapons ◽  
Foreseeable Future ◽  
World War ◽  
The Military ◽  
The U.S

This chapter evaluates the successes and failures of the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) during the second half of the 1920s, in light of the organization's ultimate incapacity to influence foreign policy. By 1926, the CWS was a well-established organization capable of supporting the continuation of poison gas work into the foreseeable future. It had successfully influenced public policy to continue chemical warfare research after World War I. However, the CWS and its supporters failed to convince people to believe that gas warfare was humane. Public hostility toward chemical weapons ultimately led to the signing of international agreements prohibiting chemical warfare. This chapter discusses the CWS's sustained accomplishment during the period 1926–1929, with particular emphasis on its new chemical weapons initiatives in partnership with other departments and branches of the military; the United States' continued support for international efforts to prevent chemical warfare; and the CWS's reorganization into the U.S. Army Chemical Corps after World War II.

Hollywood’s Rogue Neighbor: The Argentine Film Industry during the Good Neighbor Policy, 1939–1945

2006 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamara L. Falicov
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Cultural Policy ◽  
Film Industry ◽  
Raw Materials ◽  
The United States ◽  
Good Neighbor Policy ◽  
War Effort ◽  
Good Neighbor ◽  
The U.S

‘During World War II, the United States created a political, economic, I land cultural policy aimed at improving hemispheric relations between the U.S. and Latin America. Dubbed the “Good Neighbor Policy,” its objectives were twofold: 1) to insure that nations in Latin America were joined in the Allied war effort and were not associated with the Axis or Communist sympathizers, and 2) to allow the U.S. access to Latin America as a source of raw materials and a market for goods, including films. Because Argentina did not side with the Allies, instead preferring neutrality, it was castigated by an economic boycott. Beginning in 1941, the U.S. sold small rations of raw film stock to Argentina, and over time, refused to sell it all together. The film industry in Argentina, at the time considered the most profitable and advanced in Latin America, began to lose its hold on the Spanish-language market.

MAKING DEMOCRACY SAFE FOR THE WWORLD

2004 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. HART
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Civil Rights ◽  
The United States ◽  
World War ◽  
Good Neighbor Policy ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The World ◽  
Good Neighbor

Recent literature has argued that, beginning in the late 1940s, the increasing ideological competition between the Soviet Union and the United States-or, more broadly, between communism and capitalism-transformed America's record of racial discrimination and violence into an international issue with consequences for U.S. foreign policy. This article challenges that historiography by raising questions about both the timing and the cause of the increasing importance of civil rights to the U.S. foreign policy process. It focuses roughly equally upon the damage that discrimination against Latinos in the Southwest did to the Good Neighbor Policy and the dif�culties of the World War II propaganda organization, the Of�ce of War Information, in portraying America's racial practices to the world. To account for these examples requires us to recognize the World War II years-not the Cold War-as the decisive turning point when the history of domestic race relations could no longer be sanguinely ignored by U.S. policymakers.

The Truman Administration and the Separation of Powers: the Case of the Marshall Plan

1965 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Quentin L. Quade
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
World War I ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The United States ◽  
Marshall Plan ◽  
World War ◽  
The Times ◽  
Prompt Action

Presidential responsibility for foreign policy is something of a commonplace today. Indeed, most analysts see Presidential dominance in foreign affairs as a more or less necessary result of the conditions of the times, which often demand the kind of unified and prompt action which only the Presidency is capable of in the American system. Yet it can be argued that the very factors which have brought Presidential conduct of foreign relations into the national spotlight have simultaneously worked to limit the decisiveness of his control over foreign policy. The period since World War I, and particularly since World War II, has seen the United States becoming more deeply involved in what can be called “positive” policy, policy that requires financial support, or new administrative authorizations, or the assignment of new personnel. And the natural corollary of such policies is the growth in significance of that element of government, which must give legislative authorization for any such undertakings. There has been, in a sense, a reassertion of traditional separation of powers in the area of foreign policy.

Between the Wars

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Riley
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
World War I ◽  
The United States ◽  
Food Aid ◽  
World War ◽  
American Government ◽  
The World ◽  
Relief Program ◽  
Bail Out ◽  
The U.S

The years after World War I and before World War II saw famine, death, and revolution in many parts of the world. Russia suffered these calamities and worse. Hoover found himself again caught up in a struggle to feed millions of foreign citizens with American food. This time the supplicant was bolshevist Russia, a hated enemy, where famine had already caused the deaths of millions. The U.S. Congress was even more unwilling than before to aid Russia, wondering out loud why the United States should bail out a country that was so intent on falling to pieces. This chapter recounts how Hoover overcame U.S. legislative resistance and organized a major relief program in a country with an extremely anti-American government, where transport hardly worked, and where social organizations were frozen in indecision. The chapter then sums up the vastly changed character of American food aid over the period 1794–1924.

scholarly journals Socks at War: American Hand Knitters and Military Footwear Production for the World Wars

2019 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-92
Author(s):  
Rachel P. Maines
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
World War I ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Option ◽  
Home Front ◽  
Industrial Complex ◽  
Industrial Workers ◽  
World War ◽  
The Military ◽  
The U.S

Abstract In both World Wars, combatant nations, including the United States, Britain, and Germany, learned that inadequate or poorly-maintained footwear produced costly and preventable casualties from trench foot and frostbite. While provision of shoes and boots to troops were major issues in earlier conflicts, no nation before World War I had fully appreciated the significance of warm, dry, well-fitting socks to the effectiveness of soldiers in the field. The large numbers of trench foot casualties in World War I, especially among the French and British, convinced policymakers that this vital commodity must receive a higher priority in military production planning, but few nations in wartime could shift production to knitting mills rapidly enough to make a difference. Thus, in Britain and the U.S, the best policy option proved to be recruiting women and children civilians to knit socks by hand for the military in the first war, and for refugees, prisoners and civilians in the second. This paper discusses the economic and military importance of this effort, including the numbers of pairs produced, and the program’s role in supplementing industrial production. The production of this low-technology but crucial item of military apparel is typical of detail-oriented tasks performed by women under conditions of full mobilization for war, in that they have a high impact on battlefield and home front performance and morale, but very low visibility as significant contributions to national defense. Often, both during and after the emergency, these efforts are ridiculed as trivial and/or wasteful. Unlike women pilots or industrial workers, handcrafters of essential supplies are regarded as performing extensions of their domestic roles as makers and caretakers of clothing and food. This was especially true in the U.S. in and after World War II, a wealthy industrialized nation that took pride in its modern - and thoroughly masculinist - military industrial complex.

Spruille Braden Versus George Messersmith: World War II, the Cold War, and Argentine Policy, 1945-1947

1984 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger R. Trask
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Latin America ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Cold War ◽  
The United States ◽  
Western Hemisphere ◽  
World War ◽  
Good Neighbor Policy ◽  
Good Neighbor ◽  
The Cold War

Between 1945 and 1947, Argentina posed a complex and exasperating problem for the United States as it endeavored to develop policy to guide its relations with Latin America. Among the questions involved were how to deal with an alleged neofascist dictator in Argentina, how to preserve the aura of the so-called Good Neighbor policy, whether to provide arms and economic aid to Latin America, and whether to enter into a collective security agreement for the western hemisphere.

Morality for the “Democracy of God”: George Albert Coe and the Liberal Protestant Critique of American Character Education, 1917–1940

2005 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P. Setran
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
World War I ◽  
Character Education ◽  
Moral Education ◽  
Social Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
Columbia University ◽  
World War ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
American Character

AbstractIn the years between World War I and World War II in the United States, public and religious educators engaged in an extended struggle to define the appropriate nature of character education for American youth. Within a post-war culture agonizing over the sanctions of moral living in the wake of mass violence and vanishing certitudes, a group of conservative educators sought to shore up traditional values through the construction of morality codes defining the characteristics of the “good American.” At the same time, a group of liberal progressive educators set forth a vigorous critique of these popular character education programs. This article analyzes the nature of this liberal critique by looking at one leading liberal spokesperson, George Albert Coe. Coe taught at Union Theological Seminary and Teachers College, Columbia University, and used his platform in these institutions to forge a model of character education derived from the combined influences of liberal Protestantism and Deweyan progressive education. Coe posited a two-pronged vision for American moral education rooted in the need for both procedural democracy (collaborative moral decision making) and a democratic social order. Utilizing this vision of the “democracy of God,” Coe demonstrated the inadequacies of code-based models, pointing in particular to the anachronism of traditional virtues in a world of social interdependence, the misguided individualism of the virtues, and the indoctrinatory nature of conservative programs. He proposed that youth be allowed to participate in moral experimentation, adopting ideals through scientific testing rather than unthinking allegiance to authoritative commands. Expanding the meaning of morality to include social as well as personal righteousness, he also made character education a vehicle of social justice. In the end, I contend that Coe's democratic model of character education, because of its scientific epistemological hegemony and devaluing of tradition, actually failed to promote a truly democratic character.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document