Cora Diamond and the Ethical Imagination

2012 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 223-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Moyal-Sharrock
Keyword(s):  
Cora Diamond

scholarly journals SOBRE A SINTAXE LÓGICA NO TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS

2015 ◽  
pp. 128
Author(s):  
Rogério Saucedo Corrêa
Keyword(s):  
Cora Diamond

Neste artigo, complemento uma intuição de Ian Proops para o qual a sintaxe lógica no Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus é teoria do simbolismo. A teoria do simbolismo é a teoria da figuração. Esta é um conjunto de sete condições que uma proposição elementar deve satisfazer. Desse modo, se a teoria do simbolismo é a teoria da figuração, e se a teoria da figuração é um conjunto de condições, então a sintaxe lógica é um conjunto de condições. Estas condições mais a noção de operação formal fornecem o que é necessário para obter-se proposições complexas a partir de proposições elementares. Com isso, também esclareço alguns aspectos da discussão entre Cora Diamond e Peter Hacker sobre a sintaxe lógica no Tractatus.

Reading Wittgenstein with Anscombe, Going on to Ethics by Cora Diamond

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-173
Author(s):  
Brian Welter ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Cora Diamond

Concepts Crisscrossing

2020 ◽  
pp. 275-306
Author(s):  
Veena Das
Keyword(s):  
Old Testament ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Beliefs And Practices ◽  
Concepts Of God ◽  
Cora Diamond ◽  
Ritual Practices ◽  
Idea Of God

This chapter takes up a reading of certain classic texts of British anthropology to ask how are anthropological concepts generated? Looking closely at the terms around which religious beliefs and practices are organized among the Dinka and the Nuer, as described by Lienhardt and Evans-Pritchard respectively, the chapter shows that the idea of God is transported from the Old Testament notions to decide which terms can qualify to be translated as God depending on what is taken to be real and what an illusion. As a thought experiment, the chapter draws on different notions of god(s) and of ritual practices (such as sacrifice) from Vedic texts in the Sanskritic tradition and asks what if gods were seen as entities produced through grammar, brought into existence only for the duration of a ritual, as some texts on ritual hermeneutics in India argued? Would we have thought of the Dinka and Nuer concepts of god or witches or spirits differently? The chapter also offers a way to think of what Cora Diamond called a “crisscross” philosophy as a tapestry of overlapping threads put together patiently and with many hands.

The Human Face of Naturalism: Putnam and Diamond on Religious Belief and the “Gulfs between Us”

The Monist ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 103 (4) ◽  
pp. 404-414
Author(s):  
Sofia Miguens
Keyword(s):  
Religious Experience ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Philosophy Of Religion ◽  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Human Face ◽  
Ethical Life ◽  
Cora Diamond

Abstract Hilary Putnam and Cora Diamond both wrote on Wittgenstein’s Three Lectures on Religious Belief. They did it quite differently; my ultimate aim in this article is to explore this difference. Putnam’s view of religion is largely a view of ethical life; I look thus into his writings on ethics and his proposals to face the relativist menace therein. Still, in his incursions into philosophy of religion, describing religious experience through authors such as Rosenzweig, Buber, or Levinas, Putnam deals with what Diamond calls, after Wittgenstein, “the gulfs between us.” Such gulfs, and the threat of relativism they bring, need to be accounted for. With that purpose in mind I complement Putnam’s reading of the Three Lectures with Diamond’s own reading.

What Might not be Nonsense

Philosophy ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 68 (266) ◽  
pp. 549-557 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas G. Winblad
Keyword(s):  
Cora Diamond

For Wittgenstein, as Cora Diamond interprets him in the essays collected in her recent The Realistic Spirit, there are no logical truths, and a host of other linguistic constructions, such as ‘A is an object’ are, contrary to appearances, nonsensical. In what follows, after outlining Diamond's account I argue that the position she ascribes to Wittgenstein is incoherent. I also reject some possible responses to this charge, among them an appeal to the distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown.

Cora Diamond, Reading Wittgenstein with Anscombe, Going On to Ethics

2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-174
Author(s):  
Megan Fritts
Keyword(s):  
Cora Diamond

Philosophy and Rationality: A Response to Cora Diamond

1983 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 171 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. D. Raphael
Keyword(s):  
Cora Diamond

Reading Virginia Woolf Logically

Poetics Today ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-116
Author(s):  
Megan Quigley
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Virginia Woolf ◽  
Marriage Plot ◽  
Cora Diamond

This article argues for a “resolute reading” of Virginia Woolf’s The Voyage Out, akin to Cora Diamond and James Conant’s reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The resolute approach to the Tractatus contends that we should embrace Wittgenstein’s assertion that the Tractatus is finally nonsense. Accordingly, the Tractatus acts as a kind of therapy, enabling us to dispense with certain types of philosophical, linguistic, and analytical claims. I argue that Woolf’s The Voyage Out takes a similar approach to the nineteenth-century novel, fully investing in the conventions of the bildungsroman and the marriage plot only to ruthlessly dispense with them. Both works use a particular kind of modernist therapeutic pedagogy reliant on logic and form.

Derrida's Cat (Who Am I?)

2008 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 404-423 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald Bruns
Keyword(s):  
Jacques Derrida ◽  
Animal Rights ◽  
Martha Nussbaum ◽  
Human Being ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Cora Diamond

AbstractWhat is it to be seen (naked) by one's cat? In “L'animal que donc je suis” (2006), the first of several lectures that he presented at a conference on the “autobiographical animal,” Jacques Derrida tells of his discomfort when, emerging from his shower one day, he found himself being looked at by his cat. Th experience leads him, by way of reflections on the question of the animal, to what is arguably the question of his philosophy: Who am I? It is not so much that Derrida wants to answer this question as to be free of it. His task here is to determine the sense of it— where it leads, for example, when it comes to the nature of the diff erence between himself and his cat. Unlike animal rights activists (and unlike philosophers Martha Nussbaum and Cora Diamond, who have recently addressed this issue), Derrida does not want to erase this difference but wants to multiply it in order (among other things) to affirm the absolute alterity or singularity of his cat, which cannot be subsumed by any category (such as the animal). His cat is an Other in a way that no human being (supposing there to be such a thing, which Derrida is not prepared to grant) could ever be. And here is where “the question who?” leads as well, namely, to a path of escape from absorption into any identity-machine. As Derrida puts it in A Taste for the Secret: Who am I when I am not one of you? In a hospitable world one would be free not to answer.

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