Dui Guonei Zhanzhengzui de Pubian Guanxia yu Guojifa [Universal Jurisdiction over War Crimes in Non-International Armed Conflicts and International Law]

2008 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 586-590
Author(s):  
G. BAI
2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 365-388
Author(s):  
Pablo Kalmanovitz

Abstract Over the past 25 years, criminal prosecutions for war crimes have become a central element in the long-standing project of governing hostilities in international law. According to many, the threat of criminal prosecutions can be a general deterrent against violations of the laws of war, and can contribute more broadly to the diffusion and domestic appropriation of humanitarian norms. This article discusses some unintended effects of this “anti-impunity turn” in the laws of war in the context of non-international armed conflicts. Specifically, it examines the consequences of the fact that states typically have a monopoly over the means of legitimate criminal investigation for alleged crimes committed in their territory. Far from operating on a level playing field, criminal investigations in war contexts must be undertaken under institutional conditions that tend to favor state agents over non-state opposition groups. The article spells out some implications of this form of state bias and argues that it can contribute to exacerbate conflict and prolong violence in war.


2018 ◽  
Vol 101 (910) ◽  
pp. 357-363

States party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I of 1977 have an obligation to take measures necessary to suppress all acts contrary to their provisions. Moreover, States must investigate war crimes allegedly committed by their nationals or on their territory, and other war crimes over which they have jurisdiction, such as on the basis of universal jurisdiction, and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects. In accordance with these obligations and the limits they impose, States may adopt certain measures during and in the aftermath of armed conflicts to promote reconciliation and peace, one of which is amnesties. International humanitarian law (IHL) contains rules pertaining to the granting and scope of amnesties. Specifically, Article 6(5) of Protocol II additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) provides that, at the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict. Importantly, under customary IHL (as identified in Rule 159 of the ICRC customary IHL study), this excludes persons suspected of, accused of, or sentenced for war crimes in NIACs.


2007 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 895-908 ◽  
Author(s):  
ELIES VAN SLIEDREGT

In the early 1990s, two former members of the Afghan secret service applied for a residence permit in the Netherlands. Their request was denied on the basis of the exclusion clause of Article 1F(a) of the Vienna Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. There were serious reasons for suspecting that the men had committed war crimes during the Afghan civil war of 1979–92. In 2000, the immigration authorities transmitted the files of the two men to the public prosecution office, which initiated prosecutions in 2003. At the trial, defence counsel raised various preliminary challenges. They argued that the case should be declared inadmissible since relying on the immigration files would violate the nemo tenetur principle and the right against self-incrimination enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Furthermore, the court had no universal jurisdiction over violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions since there was no international rule mandating a right to universal jurisdiction over war crimes committed in non-international armed conflicts. The Hague District Court dismissed the defence challenges and eventually convicted the Afghan nationals to 9 and 12 years' imprisonment. The Hague Appeal Court endorsed most of the findings of the District Court and confirmed the convictions and sentences. The reasoning underlying the decisions, both at first instance and at appeal, raise questions particularly with regard to universal jurisdiction. In this article the defence arguments are explored and the reasoning of the courts is analysed.


Author(s):  
Giovanni Boggero ◽  
Karin Oellers-Frahm

AbstractIn this chapter we focus on the consequences of Sentenza 238/2014 for the Italian judiciary. The judgment of the Corte Costituzionale obliges the Italian tribunals to admit claims for the reparation of victims or the heirs of victims and to decide on the merits. In this context, a series of difficult legal questions arise that require consistent answers. The practice shows, however, that consistent answers cannot be taken for granted as long as the decision is in the hands of lower-level tribunals. The questions to be solved concern, firstly, who can bring a claim: the victims only or—in cases where they are no longer alive—also their spouses, children, or even grandchildren and other family members? This raises a second question namely whether there is any time limit for bringing claims, which of course touches upon more general concerns, such as intertemporal law, statutory limitations, prescriptions, forfeiture and inadmissibility due to reparation agreements. Thirdly, there is the question as to the specific nature of the reparations: for example, financial reparations and their calculation standards, or satisfaction only? A further question arising from all decisions granting reparation relates to the execution of the judgments, as it seems rather illusory that Germany will comply voluntarily with such judgments. An additional aspect the chapter addresses is the broader impact of the decisions of the Italian judiciary: the non-recognition of state immunity before Italian tribunals will make Italy an attractive forum for similar claims, evidence of which has already emerged. Furthermore, the decisions of the tribunals will serve—although certainly involuntarily—as precedents in similar cases not only in Italy. Such effects will concern issues such as (a) the reparation of war-related claims on an individual basis and (b) their consequences for the readiness of states to terminate armed activities by concluding peace treaties and reparation agreements on a lump sum basis. With a view to actual armed conflicts that are mostly not international armed conflicts the question has then to be asked (c) whether individual reparation claims will lead to discriminatory consequences as reparation will probably only be realizable for victims of war crimes committed by state organs and not those committed by non-state actors. The chapter will then conclude by trying to assess more in general the task of constitutional and/or supreme courts to balance the consequences flowing from their decisions against their power or intent to enhance the development of (international) law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-311
Author(s):  
Eki Yemisi Omorogbe

Abstract This article considers the African Union’s (AU) proposal for a regional court for international crimes under the Malabo Protocol 2014 (Protocol). It places that within the AU’s rejection of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrants for African Heads of States that are not party to the Rome Statute and a more general protection of incumbents. It argues that the enthusiasm for establishing a regional criminal court, which lacks jurisdiction to prosecute incumbents, has not been sustained and African states remain committed to the ICC. It shows that nevertheless the Protocol’s provisions on genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, although imperfect, better address the specific character of armed conflicts in Africa than current international law, including the Rome Statute of the ICC. It concludes that the regional court for international crimes is unlikely to be established unless the ICC takes further action against incumbent leaders but that the Protocol’s provisions could be used in the development of a more Africa-centric international law.


Author(s):  
Alovsat Allahverdiyev

The article is dedicated to the overview of the scope and application of international prosecution on war crimes. Although theterm “war crimes” is not a new concept in international law, different approaches exist in defining the precise limits of it. War crimesare always considered as one of the primary challenges and pecularities minimizing the whole efficiency of international law. Nevertheless,not all known prosecutions on war crimes ended with success. In traditional international law war crimes are always related tomilitary or armed conflicts what may be international or non-international conflict. History of international humanitarian law demonstratesthat almost all of the military conflicts were associated with war crimes. However, international law was not able to buil upstrong judicial mechanisms for the prosecution of war crimes for a long time. Modern type of international prosecution over war crimescan be linked to military tribunals established after World War I. At the same time, we should not forget that most of war crimes committedbefore and during WWI still remain unpunished. These problems demand new conceptual approach to the understanding of warcrimes as well as methodology of international prosecution. We know that first military tribunals were of quasi-international character.Although modern international law contains fully international military tribunals, still there are a lot of cases of failure to punish warcrimes. We need to understand that being a type of international crimes against peace and humanity, war crimes can be committed outsidethe active period of war. Thus, there is a need to re-define again the scope and subject matter of war crimes. On the other hand,prosecution of war crimes should be studied apart from other international law violations, human rights in particular.


Author(s):  
Hauck Pierre

At first sight, transnational organised crime (TOC) and international criminal law (ICL) are completely separate: the four ICL core crimes constitute the most heinous crimes, committed by political and military leaders of armed conflicts, whereas TOC as lower-level deviance being committed by private individuals falls short of that. This chapter takes a closer look at this relationship and discovers the lines between these two areas to be blurred: because, as international crimes, they have already been discussed in that context (e.g. while drafting the Rome Statute), and nowadays TOC can even amount to one of the four core crimes de lege lata in individual cases. Apart from that, TOC can also evolve into international crimes de lege ferenda once universal jurisdiction can be established. The chapter concludes that although TOC typically characterizes crime that is different to the four core ICL crimes, both areas approximate greatly in different ways.


2011 ◽  
Vol 105 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Máximo Langer

Under universal jurisdiction, any state in the world may prosecute and try the core international crimes— crimes against humanity, genocide, torture, and war crimes—without any territorial, personal, or national-interest link to the crime in question whenit was committed.The jurisdictional claim is predicated on the atrocious nature of the crime and legally based on treaties or customary international law. Unlike the regime of international criminal tribunals created by the United Nations Security Council and the enforcement regime of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the regime of universal jurisdiction is completely decentralized.


1999 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 177-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Djamchid Momtaz

International humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed conflicts has long been characterized by the absence of universal competence to suppress serious violations of its provisions. This failure has been due to the reluctance of states – which are naturally prone to consider any limitation of their exclusive competence in this field as a threat to their sovereignty – to criminalize such acts under international law.The first attempt at remedying such a situation was seen in the Draft Statute of an International Criminal Court (ICC), which was prepared by the International Law Commission (ILC) in 1994, and inspired by the draft articles of the Code of Crimes against the Peace and International Security of Mankind, provisionally adopted by the ILC in 1991 at first reading. Under the Draft Statute of the ICC, serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts would be under the jurisdiction of the Court. The ILC had in mind exceptionally serious war crimes, such as those described in the pertinent article of the draft code referred to by the Commission, constituting an extremely grave violation of the principles and laws of international law applicable in armed conflicts. In the commentary on this article, the ILC took care to specify that the expression ‘armed conflict’ covered the non-international armed conflicts that are the focus of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, as well as international armed conflicts.This first step was of very limited scope. In fact, according to the ILC, in order to be criminalized, the laws and customs of war had to find their origin in general customary international law.


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