Political Activism and the Provision of Dynamic Incentives: Growing the Pie in the Battle for Redistribution

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antoine Camous ◽  
Russell Cooper
Keyword(s):  
Capital Accumulation ◽  
Optimal Allocation ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Political Activism ◽  
Income Taxes ◽  
Human Capital Accumulation ◽  
Dynamic Setting ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante

Abstract This paper studies the determination of income taxes in a dynamic setting with human capital accumulation. The goal is to understand the factors that support an outcome without complete redistribution, given a majority of relatively poor agents and the inability to commit to future taxes. All agents agree ex ante that limiting tax and transfers is beneficial but a majority favors large redistribution, ex post, at the time of the vote. In a political influence game, group activism limits the support for expropriatory taxation and preserves incentives. In some cases, the outcome corresponds to the optimal allocation under commitment.

Crime and Punishment

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Adelstein
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Liability ◽  
Court Case ◽  
Efficient Allocation ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Crime And Punishment ◽  
The Past ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Supreme Court Case

This chapter elaborates the operation of criminal liability by closely considering efficient crimes and the law’s stance toward them, shows how its commitment to proportional punishment prevents the probability scaling that systemically efficient allocation requires, and discusses the procedures that determine the actual liability prices imposed on offenders. Efficient crimes are effectively encouraged by proportional punishment, and their nature and implications are examined. But proportional punishment precludes probability scaling, and induces far more than the systemically efficient number of crimes. Liability prices that match the specific costs imposed by the offender at bar are sought through a two-stage procedure of legislative determination of punishment ranges ex ante and judicial determination of exact prices ex post, which creates a dilemma: whether to price crimes accurately in the past or deter them accurately in the future. An illustrative Supreme Court case bringing all these themes together is discussed in conclusion.

Incentive for innovation and the optimal allocation of patents

2017 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 692-707 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kojun Hamada
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Optimal Allocation ◽  
Ownership Structures ◽  
Specific Investment ◽  
Specific Investments ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Joint Ownership

This article theoretically investigates how different ownership structures of patents affect ex ante and ex post incentives for innovation by applying a property rights approach. We explore a model in which two research laboratories invest in R&D to obtain an innovative patent, and after successfully obtaining the patent they determine an ownership structure for the patent. The two parties consider how the determined patent ownership would affect their noncontractible relation-specific investments for commercialisation. We demonstrate that joint ownership of a patent between two parties is optimal. More concretely, if a selfish (altruistic) relation-specific investment is more important than an altruistic (selfish) investment, a joint ownership with no (bilateral) veto is optimal to maximise the joint value. Moreover, when both parties do not commit themselves to joint ownership in advance, they have greater incentive to invest in R&D than committing, even if they understand that joint ownership is desirable ex post.

Incorporation Rules

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Adi Ayal ◽  
Yaad Rotem
Keyword(s):  
Capital Structure ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Liability Rule ◽  
Heterogeneous Preferences ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
And Control ◽  
Property Rule

AbstractFollowing Calabresi and Melamed, legal theory has employed the property rule/liability rule distinction in order to hone our understanding of existing norms, as well as suggest new ones. This paper suggests an addition to the pantheon in the form of a protocol that we call an “Incorporation Rule”. It is a novel mechanism allowing private parties and courts to combine property rule and liability rule protection where both apply to the same entitlement. Incorporation Rules allow for separating the effects of intertwined property and liability rules, focusing on ex-ante voluntary determination of levels of protection usually adjudicated ex-post. Under the protocol, the entitlement is transferred to a special-purpose corporate vehicle, which then issues tailor-made securities to the owner of the entitlement and to the potential buyer or rivalrous user. In this manner, the entitlement is split along the contours of three basic corporate instruments – heterogeneous capital structure, separation of ownership and control, and an independent legal personality. By relying on these known-and-tested corporate mechanisms, risk and transaction costs are minimized, enforcement is improved, and heterogeneous preferences of individuals can be accommodated. The Incorporation Rule protocol thus allows for flexibility in protecting entitlements while facilitating efficient exchange.

Political Influence and the Renegotiation of Government Contracts

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Brogaard ◽  
Matthew Denes ◽  
Ran Duchin
Keyword(s):  
Firm Value ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Government Contracts ◽  
Detailed Data ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Local Politicians

Abstract This paper provides novel evidence that corporate political influence operates through renegotiations of existing government contracts. Using detailed data on contractual terms and renegotiations around sudden deaths and resignations of local politicians, the estimates show that politically connected firms initially bid low and successfully renegotiate contract amounts, deadlines, and incentives. The effects hold across different industries and contract types, enhance firm value, and persist around the exogenous increase in contract supply due to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Overall, this paper establishes an unexplored link between political influence, ex post renegotiations, and ex ante bidding of government contracts.

Human Capital Accumulation and Resource Abundance

2011 ◽  
pp. 66-77
Author(s):  
O. Vasilieva
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Human Capital ◽  
Capital Accumulation ◽  
Relevant Literature ◽  
Harmful Effect ◽  
Human Capital Accumulation ◽  
Resource Abundance ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Theoretical Predictions ◽  
Crowd Out

Does resource abundance positively affect human capital accumulation? Or, alternatively, does it «crowd out» the human capital leading to the deterioration of economic growth? The paper gives an overview of the relevant literature and discusses both theoretical and empirical results obtained regarding the connection between human capital accumulation and resource abundance. It shows that despite some theoretical predictions about the harmful effect of resource abundance on human capital accumulation, unambiguous evidence of such impact that would be robust with respect to the change of resource abundance parameter has not been obtained yet.

Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Performance of Optimal REIT Portfolios

CFA Digest ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 8-9
Author(s):  
Ann C. Logue
Keyword(s):  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante

Erreurs de prévision ex ante et ex post

1993 ◽  
Vol 108 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-138
Author(s):  
Pierre Malgrange ◽  
Silvia Mira d'Ercole
Keyword(s):  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante
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