Incorporation Rules

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Adi Ayal ◽  
Yaad Rotem
Keyword(s):  
Capital Structure ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Liability Rule ◽  
Heterogeneous Preferences ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
And Control ◽  
Property Rule

AbstractFollowing Calabresi and Melamed, legal theory has employed the property rule/liability rule distinction in order to hone our understanding of existing norms, as well as suggest new ones. This paper suggests an addition to the pantheon in the form of a protocol that we call an “Incorporation Rule”. It is a novel mechanism allowing private parties and courts to combine property rule and liability rule protection where both apply to the same entitlement. Incorporation Rules allow for separating the effects of intertwined property and liability rules, focusing on ex-ante voluntary determination of levels of protection usually adjudicated ex-post. Under the protocol, the entitlement is transferred to a special-purpose corporate vehicle, which then issues tailor-made securities to the owner of the entitlement and to the potential buyer or rivalrous user. In this manner, the entitlement is split along the contours of three basic corporate instruments – heterogeneous capital structure, separation of ownership and control, and an independent legal personality. By relying on these known-and-tested corporate mechanisms, risk and transaction costs are minimized, enforcement is improved, and heterogeneous preferences of individuals can be accommodated. The Incorporation Rule protocol thus allows for flexibility in protecting entitlements while facilitating efficient exchange.

Crime and Punishment

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Adelstein
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Liability ◽  
Court Case ◽  
Efficient Allocation ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Crime And Punishment ◽  
The Past ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Supreme Court Case

This chapter elaborates the operation of criminal liability by closely considering efficient crimes and the law’s stance toward them, shows how its commitment to proportional punishment prevents the probability scaling that systemically efficient allocation requires, and discusses the procedures that determine the actual liability prices imposed on offenders. Efficient crimes are effectively encouraged by proportional punishment, and their nature and implications are examined. But proportional punishment precludes probability scaling, and induces far more than the systemically efficient number of crimes. Liability prices that match the specific costs imposed by the offender at bar are sought through a two-stage procedure of legislative determination of punishment ranges ex ante and judicial determination of exact prices ex post, which creates a dilemma: whether to price crimes accurately in the past or deter them accurately in the future. An illustrative Supreme Court case bringing all these themes together is discussed in conclusion.

Overview and General Preconditions

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Schillig
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Framework ◽  
Financial Contracts ◽  
Resolution Process ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
And Control

The chapter provides an overview of the available resolution tools and powers in the jurisdictions under consideration. The remainder of the chapter focuses on the general preconditions for and effects of resolution proceedings, It covers the resolution triggers, notably the so-called ‘regulatory threshold’, and discusses the institutional framework for the initiation and control of the resolution process. Further key considerations are the independent ex ante and ex post valuations of the institution at issue and the write-down and conversion of capital instruments, as well as the general effects of resolution proceedings on the financial contracts to which the institution is a party.

Property Rules, Liability Rules and Externalities

2006 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-126
Author(s):  
Antonio Nicita ◽  
Matteo Rizzolli
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Property Right ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
Liability Rule ◽  
Liability Rules ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Court Intervention ◽  
Property Rule

Abstract In this paper we argue that traditional explanations of the dichotomisation of property rules and liability rules are somehow misleading, since they tend to neglect the evolutionary complementarity between die two rules in a world of incomplete property rights characterised by sizeable ex-ante transaction costs in rights’ definition. When rights are a complete bundle of well-defined uses, the application of a property rule reaffirms and reinforces the correlation between rights and duties. In a world of incomplete rights, externalities over undefined uses call for a court intervention aimed at defining a new property right through either a property rule or a liability rule. Independently of whether new rights are created by property or liability rules, die nature and die extent of future externalities over conflicting undefined uses could generate new processes of rights’ definition. The emergence of an externality always implies an evolutionary complementarity between property rules and liability rules whose boundaries actually depend, in alternative legal systems, on die degree of incompleteness of original rights.

The New Old Efficiency Theories of Causation and Liability

2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (1-2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard W. Wright
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Fundamental Problem ◽  
Tort Law ◽  
Tort Liability ◽  
Liability Rule ◽  
Actual Causation ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
The One ◽  
Ex Post Analysis

AbstractFor the last 40 years, efficiency theorists have attempted to demonstrate that tort liability in general and negligence liability in particular can best/only be explained by the hypothesis that judges are trying to maximize aggregate social welfare. Thirty years ago I published a pair of articles criticizing these attempts, noting especially the efficiency theorists’ inability to explain and justify the factual causation requirement in tort law. Nevertheless, the efficiency theorists have continued to make the same arguments. In this paper, I canvass the old arguments and their current restatements, including the attempts by some of the leading theorists to equate ex post analysis of actual causation with ex ante analysis of negligent conduct and attempts by others to explain the actual negligence liability rules. None of the rules proposed by the efficiency theorists is consistent with the practice of the courts, and none of them would promote efficient deterrence. Worse yet, the least descriptively plausible negligence liability rule proposed by the efficiency theorists is the one likely to be the least inefficient in actual practice, while the one assumed by most efficiency theorists will be the most inefficient. The fundamental problem with the efficiency theories is that they assume that the focus of law should be and is on the maximization of aggregate social welfare, rather than justice – the promotion of everyone’s equal external freedom in their interactions with others.

scholarly journals Victim Pays Damages to Tortfeasor: The When and Wherefore

2016 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-331
Author(s):  
Benjamin Shmueli ◽  
Yuval Sinai
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Economic Value ◽  
Comparative Perspective ◽  
Legal Tradition ◽  
Liability Rule ◽  
New Model ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
The Right ◽  
Potential Use

Is there a reality in which the victim pays damages to the tortfeasor? This article analyzes Calabresi and Melamed’s liability rule for the damaging party (Rule 4), where the damaged party has the right to prevent pollution if the polluter is compensated first. Under the conventional application of this rule, the victim first collects the money and compensates the injurer, and only then is the injurer required to eliminate the nuisance (ex ante). There is no reference to a possibility of the injurer first eliminating the nuisance and only then receiving compensation (ex post). We argue that the timing of the payment should be changed when the activity causing the nuisance has social and economic value. Each version of the rule advances the aggregate welfare in some sense, but also harms it in another. The primary aim of the present article is to introduce a new model for Rule 4 that would guide legislators, regulators, and judges in deciding when to order compensation as a condition for eliminating the nuisance and when to order the injurer to remove the nuisance first and only then collect the funds. This article also introduces a comparative perspective that reveals the potential use of the ex post version of Rule 4, as manifest in sources of the Jewish legal tradition. This comparison further bolsters our proposal in favour of a division between ex ante and ex post versions of the rule. Ultimately, offering two versions for the implementation of Rule 4 would better enable the adaptation of a suitable solution according to the circumstances and thus would widen the possibilities for the rule’s use.

scholarly journals Legal aspects of health implications caused by environmental distress

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-51
Author(s):  
Rajko Knez
Keyword(s):  
General Rule ◽  
Legal Aspects ◽  
Health Implications ◽  
Control Approach ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Industrial Risks ◽  
And Control ◽  
Post Industrial ◽  
Environmental Distress

The article tries to explore legal consequences in cases where the environmental distress causes health implications for individuals. The author begins with the observations from two different angles, that is ex ante and ex post actions. Both approaches differ substantively, since the ex ante approach is applied by state authorities (command-and-control approach, de iure imperii acts), while the ex post approach is by a general rule initiated by individuals against polluters/state. Both approaches are discussed considering the application of EU rules and beyond (ECHR, Aarhus convention). The main emphasis is given to one of the biggest problems, that is the issue of causality, which discourages many plaintiffs from claiming damages. For the so-called post–industrial risks the conventional rules of causality do not suffice, which is why certain courts proposed that changes in this respect are necessary. In addition, the role of NGOs is emphasised, since the NGO can, especially in the ex ante approach, achieve better effects, especially when locus standi is assured.

scholarly journals Steering International NGOs through Time: The Influence of Temporal Structuring in Government Accountability Requirements

2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Grace Chikoto
Keyword(s):  
Nonprofit Organizations ◽  
Qualitative Interview ◽  
Government Accountability ◽  
International Nongovernmental Organizations ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
International Ngos ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Temporal Structures ◽  
And Control ◽  
Accountability Practices

AbstractRelying on qualitative interview data from three U.S.-based government-funded international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), this article explores the temporal structuring, that is, the timing of governmental accountability requirements and their impact on nonprofit organizations. The article reports that, entrenched within government accountability requirements and expectations are temporal structures that serve as powerful levers for influencing, ensuring, and verifying INGOs’ financial integrity and stewardship of the federal dollars awarded to them. The article draws the following conclusion: that government’s accountability practices are operationalized through ex ante, mid-course, and ex post temporal structures, all of which, combined with verification and explanatory accountability processes, effectively serve to steer, direct, and control the managerial and operational decisions of INGOs.

EX-ANTE and EX-POST Model Applied to the Portuguese Air Force Flying Regime

2012 ◽  
pp. 164-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Páscoa ◽  
António Alves ◽  
José Tribolet
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Air Force ◽  
Operational Experience ◽  
Academic Knowledge ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Business Applications ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
And Control

In order to be able to plan, execute, and control its activities to achieve the desired results, it is essential that organizations tie together the academic knowledge and the operational experience by utilizing proven scientific theories in the organization executables. There are several theories about how to frame the models of corporate governance according to different perspectives; there are advantages and disadvantages in the adoption of each of them. The more or less complete dimension when related to the scope of each model is also an important aspect in its use and disclosure. The EX-ANTE and EX-POST model proposes a set of concepts that allow for the co-existence of mechanisms of access control and registration and validation, being the governance of the system based on four architectures: strategic, business, applications and technology. The model that the Portuguese Air Force uses for the definition of its annual flying hours regime includes five well-defined phases that may improve the level of coverage if the listed security mechanisms, control and audit, recommended in the Model EX-ANTE and EX-POST, are considered.

Political Activism and the Provision of Dynamic Incentives: Growing the Pie in the Battle for Redistribution

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antoine Camous ◽  
Russell Cooper
Keyword(s):  
Capital Accumulation ◽  
Optimal Allocation ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Political Activism ◽  
Income Taxes ◽  
Human Capital Accumulation ◽  
Dynamic Setting ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante

Abstract This paper studies the determination of income taxes in a dynamic setting with human capital accumulation. The goal is to understand the factors that support an outcome without complete redistribution, given a majority of relatively poor agents and the inability to commit to future taxes. All agents agree ex ante that limiting tax and transfers is beneficial but a majority favors large redistribution, ex post, at the time of the vote. In a political influence game, group activism limits the support for expropriatory taxation and preserves incentives. In some cases, the outcome corresponds to the optimal allocation under commitment.

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