Busting the myth of the ‘greedy elderly’
Abstract Background The politics of ageing are both personal, involving judgements about specific family members as well as broad social groups. This chapter evaluates the argument that governments implement packages of policies that are favorable to the elderly, but that are societally sub-optimal, because of political pressure from the elderly. It begins by laying out the core premises of the “greedy geezer” narrative: because pension transfers, high-cost medical care, and policies that protect transferable assets like housing are highly salient to the elderly and their advocates, intense preferences for these types of policies communicated to politicians and policy-makers will eventually crowd out other, more societally-optimal policies. Methods Looking at public opinion data on ageing, intergenerational transfers, and the welfare state this chapter wants to understand both how different publics understand and frame ageing and health as well as what priorities these publics identify, and why? Results The elderly and their organized representatives (e.g. pensioner parties, pensioner unions, and advocacy groups) in some contexts do push for policies that are “greedy” in the sense of being beneficial for the elderly or their own children, but not for society as a whole. However, this phenomenon is far from universal: It is especially pronounced in the US and the UK, but much less so in other national contexts. Moreover, the policy packages adopted by national governments are generally motivated by concerns other than appeasing the elderly. Conclusions Characterizing the elderly as uniformly “greedy” obscures the fact that inequality among the elderly means that many need more support than they actually receive.