Why Talk Tough? Explaining Japanese Prime Ministers’ Proactiveness in National Defense Rhetoric

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Liu

Abstract What explains variations in the proactiveness of Japanese Prime Ministers (PMs) toward national defense? Although the Japanese Constitution renounces the use of force, leaders sometimes speak assertively over national security. Drawing on competing international relations and Japanese foreign policy theories, this study seeks to quantitatively model and analyze predictors of political rhetoric in PMs’ speeches and statements from 2009 to 2019. Each statement is coded into four sets of binary dependent variables through content analysis and tested against five competing hypotheses. The main finding reveals that leaders become more likely to advocate for specifically assertive national security policy when Chinese vessel intrusion increases, but not when North Korea missile tests and aircraft scrambles increase. Instead of a diversionary use of words, an emboldening effect is evident in rhetoric that evokes responsibility in international defense, moderated by ruling government strength. The findings advance academic understandings of Japanese national security policy messaging and highlight the effect of external threat perception on political rhetoric.

2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krastyu Ivanov Krastev

Abstract The EU membership of Bulgaria has created new opportunities for enhancing the country’s role and prestige in the international community. Bulgaria is actively involved in the efforts to reform the world’s organisations to increase its efficiency and the further democratisation of the system of international relations. In the present paper some determinants of the external influence on the Bulgarian national security policy are analyzed and described.


Worldview ◽  
1965 ◽  
Vol 8 (9) ◽  
pp. 8-12
Author(s):  
Donald S. Bussey

The classic conflict in society is between liberty on one hand and order on the other. The conflict has been made more acute by the challenges we face in the contemporary world, whether the challenge be that of automation, the explosion of the new nations, or the problems associated with national defense in the nuclear age.I wish to discuss some of the dilemmas that we face in military strategy, where—just as in the classic conflict between order and freedom—we are forced to choose between conflicting and sometimes incompatible objectives. The problem in both cases is to achieve the proper balance between desirable ends. It is my hope that by examining some of these hard choices, it will be possible to provide some insight into the considerations that enter into the development of national security policy.


Author(s):  
Alexander A. Guerrero

This chapter has a negative thesis and a positive thesis. The negative thesis is that, at least in the arena of national security, electoral representative democracy is incompatible with popular sovereignty, a prerequisite of political legitimacy. The incompatibility arises due to five distinct but interrelated factors. First, confidentiality: strategic requirements of confidentiality and secrecy undermine meaningful political accountability. Second, ignorance: national security policy is technical and complicated to an extent that the average voter lacks the information and competence required to hold elected political officials meaningfully accountable for enacting responsive policy. Third, voter psychology: national security policy is an area in which low information leads to easy psychological distortion. Fourth, electoral pathology: national security policy is an area where elected officials have dramatically and inappropriately circumscribed policy options, given the electoral repercussions of appearing :weak” on security and given that many of the most significant costs of ineffective policy are borne by others—either people in other countries or future generations of Americans. Fifth, money: national security policy is a policy arena where there is a lot of money to be made by a relatively small number of individuals and corporations, making lobbying and electioneering for certain political outcomes a very high-value proposition for those entities. These five factors work together and overlap in complex ways. The end result is that national security policy created by elected officials (and their appointees) is (1) largely unresponsive to the core beliefs, values, and preferences of those in whose name it is enacted; and (2) bad policy for those in whose name it is enacted. Thus, in the arena of national security policy, we have at most nominal popular sovereignty, not real popular sovereignty. The positive thesis of this chapter is that there may be institutional reforms that could be made which would help us reclaim popular sovereignty in the arena of national security policy. In particular, we should consider the use of lottocratic institutions, which employ randomly selected citizens in policymaking roles. The chapter introduces and briefly defends these institutions as a possible solution to the problem of popular sovereignty in the national defense context.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document