Development and Transformation of the Indian Nuclear Doctrine

Indian rationale for developing nuclear weapons is embedded in Article 51 of United Nations (UN) Charter. After analyzing the changes in Indian defence procurements, a huge defence spending and public statements issued by the former and incumbent Indian government official authors presume India is changing its nuclear posture. New Delhi is discarding earlier publicly stated No-First Use (NFU) posture with ready or super ready status. It is replacing Credible Minimum Deterrent (CMD) posture with overkill capacity. India revived earlier announced Cold Start Doctrine (CSD). The objective of this paper is to review changes in Indian nuclear doctrine and capabilities and implications for Pakistan security. However a qualitative method is used for the completion of this research. Paramount aim of nuclear signaling is to avoid outbreak of violence. The findings of this paper include dividing Indian strategic community into leftists/rightists. Further, abovementioned changes can result in Indian preemptive strike against Pakistan or inadvertent or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. The region is ripe for nuclear exchange. South Asia is nuclear flashpoint. In conclusion, Pakistan needs to expedite its diplomatic efforts to highlight changes introduced by India. Islamabad should follow North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategy to solidify its conventional and nuclear armed force structure to deter militarily powerful enemy

Stochastic preemptive goal programming of Air Force weapon systems mix

We demonstrate a new approach to conducting a military force structure study under uncertainty. We apply the stochastic preemptive goal program approach, described by Ledwith et al., to balance probabilistic goals for military force effectiveness and the force’s cost. We use the Bayesian Enterprise Analytic Model (BEAM), as described in “Probabilistic Analysis of Complex Combat Scenarios,” to evaluate effectiveness, expressed in terms of the probability of achieving campaign objectives, in three hypothetical scenarios. We develop cost estimates along with their uncertainty to evaluate the force’s research and development, production, and annual operating and support costs. Our summary depicts how the trade-off between various prioritized goals influences the recommended robust force. Our approach enables defense leaders to balance risk in both force effectiveness in various scenarios along with risk in different types of cost categories.

Military Pain Medicine: Sustaining the Fighting Force

ABSTRACT Active duty military service members (ADSMs) suffer disproportionately from chronic pain. In the USA, military pain physicians serve an important role in the treatment of pain conditions in addition to the maintenance of the fighting force. Expanding roles for pain physicians, including novel therapies, consulting roles for opioid policy, and usefulness in a deployed setting create enormous value for military pain physicians. Ongoing force structure changes, including proposed reduction in the U.S. Military’s healthcare workforce may significantly impact pain care and the health of the fighting forces. Military pain physicians support a variety of different roles in the military healthcare system. Ultimately, maintaining a robust faculty of pain physicians allows for both preservation of the fighting forces and a ready medical force.

Research on Structural–Mechanical Properties during the Castor Episperm Breaking Process

Products from castor seeds have been widely used in various fields. In order to study the breaking behavior and rupture mechanism of castor seed episperm during coat shelling process, the force-structure property of coating castor seed was investigated by a self-developed texture analyzer with in situ optical microscopic observation. Influences of compression distance, velocity and working temperature were studied. The results showed that castor seed episperm rupture commonly happened from the tail end to the first end. Compression distance effect can change the episperm cracking degree. Under pressing distance 2–3 mm, the episperm easily cracked into two flaps, and the breaking force stabilized at 77 N. Pressing velocity has no significant effect on episperm breaking. Temperature changes the physical property. With an increase in temperature, breaking force presents a “slope” decline; under a temperature of 120 ℃, temperature effect on the breaking force decreased significantly and the breaking force fell to about 52 N. The research results can provide theoretical basis for the castor episperm peeling.

“Make More Offensive Moves”

Chapter 8 focuses on the military components of China’s grand strategy to build regional order. It argues that the Global Financial Crisis accelerated a shift in Chinese military strategy away from a singular focus on blunting American power through sea denial to a new focus on building order through sea control. China now sought the capability to hold distant islands, safeguard sea lines, intervene in neighboring countries, and provide public security goods. For those missions, China needed a different force structure, one that it had previously postponed for fear it would be vulnerable to the United States and unsettle its neighbors. These were risks a more confident Beijing was now willing to accept. China promptly stepped up investments in aircraft carriers, capable surface vessels, amphibious warfare, marines, and overseas bases—all with the goal of building regional order.

Countering the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Arising from Malicious Insiders

Nuclear theft from malicious insiders is a significant threat to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal. Pakistan is a member of the Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which is an international agreement that adheres to the protection of nuclear materials and the recovery of stolen nuclear materials. However, this agreement does not specifically take into account the risk of security breaches arising from malicious insiders due to Pakistan’s rapidly growing nuclear arsenal. The purpose of this paper is to examine the heightened risk of insider threats in conjunction with Pakistan’s increasing nuclear force structure. The first section of the paper examines the history of the development of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme and discusses Pakistan’s current nuclear force structure. The second section examines the international and domestic policies that Pakistan follows to address the issue of insider threats to Pakistan’s nuclear facilities. The final section proposes two policy alternatives to address Pakistan’s growing insider threat risks and outlines how the Design Basis Threat assessment is the most effective solution for Pakistan’s growing insider threat.

Defense Budgeting and Resource Allocation

This chapter dissects the US defense budget, as well as various matters in the broader field of defense economics. It provides methodologies for understanding how different defense strategies and military force postures affect that budget. The chapter also explores various ways the defense budget can be categorized, broken down, and defined. It examines issues like military readiness — how the Department of Defense ensures that its forces are ready-to-go for crises that may emerge quickly. The chapter then looks into the economics of military bases, at home and abroad. It discusses military acquisition, modernization, and innovation. The chapter then shifts to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) figures, and analyses how they provide the backbone of the cost estimates. It highlights the core of this section — understanding the costs of US Department of Defense's (DoD) force structure by type of unit. This is probably the core of defense budgeting methodology for those seeking to understand the fiscal implications of a given defense strategy and force structure. Ultimately, the chapter investigates how two different concepts of grand strategy and/or military policy might be translated into force structure, weapons acquisition, and budget plans.

Cyber offense in NATO: challenges and opportunities

As a response to the Russian invasion of Crimea, NATO returned to the core military concepts of deterrence and collective defence. This NATO adaption has recently come to include attempts to integrate offensive cyber effects into NATO force structure and response doctrine. The article argues—counter to what is publicly declared—that such an integration does little to strengthen NATO's deterrence posture and is unlikely to deter non-military, hybrid cyber activity below the threshold of collective defence. The article identifies several practical challenges to the current integration effort, which include the temporal dimension of developing exploits, battle damage assessment and deconfliction. With these challenges in mind, the article suggests that deploying minor and less resourceful cyber effects that cause persistent ‘cyber annoyances’ holds an unappreciated potential as they can drain opponent resources, disturb vital IT-systems and complicate decision-making. The article ends by arguing that NATO should not adapt its collective defence clause to cyberspace. A more active NATO in cyberspace risks undermining the cyber-intelligence norm that so far has prevented escalation and thereby increasing the likelihood that Russia misinterprets intelligence and active cyber defence activities as military preparation, armament or an attack in the making.