scholarly journals Reshaping Liability – The Concept of Undertaking Applied to Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benedikt Freund
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Minor Importance ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Recent Developments

Abstract It is undeniable that a ‘follow-on damages claim culture’ is on the rise in Europe. The case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union has been acting as a catalyst to ensure that victims of cartel infringements are in a position to effectively enforce their right to damages. Although the path followed by the Court removed many obstacles for cartel victims it has also departed from traditional concepts of tort law, including liability for civil damages. By extending concepts which were traditionally confined to public enforcement to private enforcement – such as the notion of undertaking – national courts will be faced with new challenges. It is inevitable that questions which were previously of minor importance in public proceedings will carry a different weight in civil litigation. This article focuses on recent developments and explores possible consequences on the imputation of liability in private enforcement of EU competition law.

The Role of Private Enforcement within EU Competition Law

2014 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 143-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niamh Dunne
Keyword(s):  
Hard Core ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
The Right

AbstractPrivate enforcement is an increasingly prominent element of EU competition law. The forthcoming Directive on damages actions aims to strengthen and, to a degree, harmonise procedures for private competition litigation, while recent case law of the Court of Justice reaffirms the centrality of the right to claim compensation for losses stemming from breach of the competition rules. Moreover, this right has been presented as an essentially unitary one, whereby any victim of any type of competition infringement has, in principle, the right to claim damages. This chapter reviews the evolving framework, and considers, specifically, the role for private enforcement within the overall system of EU competition law. Taking into account the Commission’s efforts to facilitate and increase private enforcement, the emerging EU public enforcement framework, as well as the substantive EU competition rules more generally, this chapter argues that, contrary to the rhetoric, private enforcement is a mechanism best adapted, and arguably most appropriate, for use only in the context of hard-core cartels. It is further suggested that the gap between rhetoric and reality is not problematic as such, yet difficulties may arise insofar as these divergences conflict with the principle of effectiveness.

scholarly journals Antitrust Damage Claims: A View From Efta Court

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-170
Author(s):  
Agata Jurkowska-Gomułka
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Point Of Interest ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Damage Claims

Articles 101 and 102 TFEU have become a pattern for competition rules provided in Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement, which entered into force on 1 January 1994. Both EU competition law and EEA competition law can be enforced before national courts. Lodging damage claims in the EU was facilitated by Directive 2014/104/EU. The so-called Antitrust Damages Directive was highly inspired by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Although Directive 2014/104/EU has not been incorporated into the EEA law, damage claims resulting from violations of EEA competition rules are judged by national courts in the EEA Member States, which is why some aspects of private enforcement of competition law have become a point of interest for the EFTA Court, being – together with the Court of Justice of the European Union – the EEA court. Firstly, the article aims at checking if the EFTA Court jurisprudence on antitrust damage claims follows the guidelines formulated in the case law of the Court of Justice. Since the positive answer to this question is highly probable, secondly, the article aims at identifying the extent of the impact of EU jurisprudence in private enforcement cases on judgments of the EFTA Court. The article concludes that the EFTA Court’s activities regarding antitrust damage claims follow the route indicated by the Court of Justice of the European Union. Four identified judgments regarding – directly or indirectly – antitrust damage claims (Nye Kystlink, Fjarskipti, Schenker I and Schenker V), delivered by the EFTA Court, seem to strengthen its position as an institution that is able to guarantee a coherence between EEA and EU competition law. EFTA Court’s judgments in private enforcement cases are also a point of interest and reference for EU Advocates General and can become an inspiration for both EU and national case law.

scholarly journals The Economic Succession Doctrine in Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law: 'Nothing Extraordinary' After Skanska Industrial?

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-186
Author(s):  
Marco Botta
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Corporate Restructuring ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Economic Entity ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Broad Concept ◽  
Damage Claims

The article analyses the recent judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Skanska Industrial. In its preliminary ruling, the CJEU recognised for the first time the so-called “economic succession doctrine” in damage claims concerning a breach of EU competition rules. In the judgment, the CJEU relied on its well-established case law. From this point of view, the ruling is “nothing extraordinary”. Nevertheless, the judgment represents an important milestone that contributes to the development of damage claims in Europe. The article first discusses the origins of the economic succession doctrine, which derives from the broad concept of “undertaking” developed by the CJEU case law and the so-called “single economic entity” doctrine. Afterwards, the article discusses the Skanska Industrial case, in particular by comparing the opinion of Advocate General (AG) Wahl with the CJEU ruling in the case. The article concludes by discussing the potential consequences of the CJEU ruling in Skanska Industrial on private enforcement of EU competition law, as well as the questions that remain open after the judgment. After Skanska Industrial, it remains unclear how the disclosure of evidence will take place in practice in the context of a damage claim following a corporate restructuring. Secondly, the limits of the economic succession doctrine remain unclear: it is unclear when a corporate restructuring indeed leads to the establishment of a “new” undertaking, free from the antitrust liability acquired by its predecessor. Finally, it remains unclear whether Skanska Industrial case law could also be extended to other remedies besides damage claims, such as actions requesting a court injunction, compensation for unjust enrichment, or a declaration that a contract is null and void. The article argues that in the coming years the CJEU will probably be called to clarify SkanskaIndustrial case law in order to answer these remaining questions.

scholarly journals Lower Instance National Courts and Tribunals in Member States and Their Judicial Dialogue with the Court of Justice of the European Union

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 19-36
Author(s):  
Graham Butler
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Reference Procedure ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Recent Developments

The vast majority of cases that are submitted to the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court) through the preliminary reference procedure that is contained in Article 267 TFEU come from lower instance national courts and tribunals in EU Member States. As a result, it is not always appellate courts, or higher instance national courts and tribunals, such as courts of final appeal, which make orders for reference. Judicial dialogue between national courts and the Court through this Article 267 TFEU procedure is notable for its particular quality of it being open to receiving orders for reference, for an interpretation of EU law from national courts and tribunals – of any instance – from first instance, to final instance. But can this judicial dialogue between lower instance national courts and tribunals and the Court be impeded by national courts’ more senior national Brethren, with appeals being allowed against orders for reference within national legal orders? The case law of the Court on such an issue has been progressive, in that it developed slowly over time, and the Court, by 2021, becoming increasingly assertive. As will be analysed in this article, the Court’s approach to the arising issue has clearly been an attempt to balance the interests of judicial dialogue on the one hand, and national rules on the other. Yet, with the Court’s broader case law tightening the understanding of who constitutes the European judiciary, and ensuring that all national courts and tribunals remain independent from executive interference in EU Member States, the article commends recent developments, but makes the further plea for an affirmative judgment of the Court to not permit, as a matter of EU law, appeals against orders for reference made by lower instance national courts and tribunals in EU Member States, in the name of preserving judicial dialogue through the preliminary reference procedure.

Anticompetitive Effects in EU Competition Law

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo Ibáñez Colomo
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Time Variable ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Open Questions ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competitive Disadvantage ◽  
Probability Threshold ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Freedom Of Action

Abstract This article examines the meaning and scope of the notion of anticompetitive effects in EU competition law. It does so by bringing together several strands of the case law (and this across all provisions, namely Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and merger control). The analysis is structured around a framework that considers the main variables that shape the notion in practice: the time variable (actual or potential effects); the dimensions of competition and the counterfactual; the meaning of effects and the probability threshold (plausibility, likelihood, certainty). The exercise shows that it is possible to discern a concrete meaning to the notion of anticompetitive effects. Some central questions, including the role and operation of the counterfactual and the threshold of effects, have already been answered by the Court of Justice. In particular, it has long been clear that anticompetitive effects amount to more than a mere competitive disadvantage and/or a limitation of a firm’s freedom of action. The impact on equally efficient firms’ ability and/or incentive to compete would need to be established. At the same time, some open questions and some potential areas of friction (relating, inter alia, to stakeholders’ tendency to conflate appreciability and effects) remain. These are also discussed.

5 Enforcement, Institutions, and Procedure

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Layne-Farrar Anne ◽  
Petit Nicolas
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules

This chapter discusses the enforcement of EU competition law. EU competition law is primarily enforced through a system of ‘public enforcement’, where specialized administrative institutions initiate, decide, and terminate cases. Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are enforced by competition authorities at both the European—by the Commission—and national levels—by national competition authorities (NCAs). Since the adoption of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission and the NCAs form a ‘network’ of competition authorities called the European Competition Network (ECN). A set of specific legal mechanisms have been adopted to ensure a harmonious and effective enforcement of EU competition rules amongst the ECN. In addition, national courts also offer a remedial avenue for plaintiffs seeking to invoke EU competition rules. The chapter then looks at how the Commission and NCAs process competition cases. In general, a competition case goes through four stages: detection, investigation, evaluation, and decision.

LOYALTY REBATES AND ABUSE OF DOMINANCE

2018 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-28
Author(s):  
Mark Friend
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
Missed Opportunity

THE recent judgment of the Court of Justice in Intel v Commission (Case C-413/14 P, EU:C:2017:632) deserves a cautious welcome for signalling a move to a more economics-based approach to the assessment of loyalty rebates under Article 102 TFEU, and for modulating the rigid legal presumptions that have characterised nearly four decades of case law. Yet it also represents a missed opportunity to provide a comprehensive analytical framework for one of the more unsatisfactory areas of EU competition law.

scholarly journals The obligation of national Courts against whose decision there is no judicial remedy to refer questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (31) ◽  
pp. 24-36
Author(s):  
Valentin Paul Neamt
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Reference Procedure ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Judicial Remedy ◽  
The Subject

Abstract The present paper presents the obligation that courts in the member states of the European Union have to refer questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union, with a focus on courts against whose decision there is no judicial remedy under national law. The paper starts by presenting the applicable framework regarding the preliminary reference procedure, then focuses on analyzing the exceptions to national court’s duty under article 267 TFEU, with a focus on the direction in which the case law is heading based on the most recent judgments handed down by the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2015, finally presenting the author’s conclusions and observation on the subject.

scholarly journals Multilingualism in the EU and Consistency of Private Enforcement of Competition Law: Two Examples from CEE Countries

2017 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-180
Author(s):  
Anna Piszcz
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Public Versus Private ◽  
Rule Making ◽  
The Eu

Abstract This paper attempts to address the question of how multilingualism in the EU might affect the consistency of private enforcement of competition law. In the literature, there have been concerns raised about the consistency of public enforcement of competition law, so in this paper attention has shifted to concerns about consistency of private enforcement. For the purposes of this paper, a distinction is drawn between rule-making and the application of competition law. The latter falls outside the scope of this paper. The article starts by going straight into aspects of public versus private enforcement of EU competition law and consistency of private enforcement of competition law. Next, by looking at examples of national rules implementing the EU Damages Directive, the author is going to discern what challenges for consistency of private enforcement of competition law are associated with the multilingualism in the EU.

8. EU competition law: Article 102 TFEU

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Homewood
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Abusive Behaviour ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu

This chapter focuses on Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Article 102 prohibits, as incompatible with the internal market, any abuse by undertakings in a dominant position within the internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. It should be noted at the outset that ‘dominance’ itself is not prohibited, but only when such dominance is accompanied with abusive behaviour that may affect trade. Like Article 101, Article 102 is enforced by the European Commission, national competition authorities, and national courts under powers conferred by Regulation 1/2003.

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