5 Enforcement, Institutions, and Procedure

Author(s):  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Layne-Farrar Anne ◽  
Petit Nicolas

This chapter discusses the enforcement of EU competition law. EU competition law is primarily enforced through a system of ‘public enforcement’, where specialized administrative institutions initiate, decide, and terminate cases. Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are enforced by competition authorities at both the European—by the Commission—and national levels—by national competition authorities (NCAs). Since the adoption of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission and the NCAs form a ‘network’ of competition authorities called the European Competition Network (ECN). A set of specific legal mechanisms have been adopted to ensure a harmonious and effective enforcement of EU competition rules amongst the ECN. In addition, national courts also offer a remedial avenue for plaintiffs seeking to invoke EU competition rules. The chapter then looks at how the Commission and NCAs process competition cases. In general, a competition case goes through four stages: detection, investigation, evaluation, and decision.

Author(s):  
Matthew J. Homewood

Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibit anti-competitive business practices. The European Commission, national competition authorities, and national courts enforce Articles 101 and 102 under powers conferred by Regulation 1/2003. From time to time, the European Commission issues non-binding notices providing clarification of the competition rules. This chapter focuses on Article 101, but begins with an outline of Articles 101 and 102 and the rules on enforcement. In broad terms, Article 101 prohibits business agreements or arrangements which prevent, restrict, or distort competition within the internal market and affect trade between Member States.


2019 ◽  
pp. 686-698
Author(s):  
Elspeth Berry ◽  
Matthew J. Homewood ◽  
Barbara Bogusz

Titles in the Complete series combine extracts from a wide range of primary materials with clear explanatory text to provide readers with a complete introductory resource. This chapter discusses the enforcement of EU competition law. It covers the enforcement regime; burden of proof; the relationship between Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, and national competition laws; cooperation with national authorities; cooperation with national courts; the powers of the competition authorities of the Member States; the European Commission’s powers; safeguards for undertakings; the 2006 Leniency Notice; and private enforcement.


Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin ◽  
Niamh Dunne

This chapter sketches the history and functions of the EU and its institutions in order to set the EU competition rules in context. It then describes the competition provisions themselves and outlines the way in which the rules are applied and enforced, including the public enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 under Regulation 1/2003, the control of mergers with a European dimension under Regulation 139/2004, public enforcement by the national competition authorities of the Member States, and the role of private enforcement. It discusses the position and powers of the European Commission, particularly the role of the Competition Directorate General (DG Comp); the powers of the EU Courts; the significance of fundamental rights and the general principles of EU law in competition cases; the application of competition rules to particular sectors of the economy; and the application of the EU rules to the EEA.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (19) ◽  
pp. 55-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katalin J. Cseres

In order to facilitate national competition authorities (NCAs) in their application of EU competition rules, the EU legislator adopted Directive 2019/1/EU. The Directive’s aim is to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers of competition law and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market. The so-called ECN+ Directive introduces minimum harmonisation rules allowing competition authorities to have common investigative, decision-making (notably fining decisions) and enforcement powers. The Directive, furthermore, sets minimum safeguards for the NCAs’ independence, accountability and resources as well as harmonizes leniency programmes including the coordination of national leniency programmes with each other and with that of the European Commission. This paper critically analyzes the legal and policy developments that paved the way for the adoption of this Directive. Moreover, it examines the changes the implementation of the Directive is likely to generate in current Hungarian law and policy of competition protection. The focus of the paper’s assessment is on the institutional aspects of the Directive and the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, in particular the mechanisms for ensuring independence and accountability of the NCAs. Through the assessment of the Hungarian implementation, the paper aims to shed light on a broader context of the Directive and the enforcement of EU competition law in EU Member States. The paper shows that the implementation of the Directive may fail to translate into (more) effective enforcement without an effective institutional capacity on the side of the NCAs, and in the broader legal and constitutional context of competition law and its multilevel enforcement


Author(s):  
Katalin J Cseres

This chapter evaluates the functioning of the decentralized public enforcement of EU competition law. The analysis focuses on the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement, which relies on Rule of Law principles. It has been argued that Rule of Law principles are a prerequisite for effective competition law enforcement. Aside from that, assessing the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement framework also takes account of the problems of multilevel governance which have emerged as a result of the decentralization of enforcement powers and the creation of parallel competences for the Commission and national actors which made it essential to guarantee uniform and consistent application of the EU competition rules. Centrifugal pulls from the Member States towards their national legal systems and centripetal pushes from the Commission create uniformity and consistency in this multilevel system. Analysing these bottom-up and top-down approaches allows us to analyse decentralized enforcement as a specific governance model.


Author(s):  
Matthew J. Homewood

This chapter focuses on Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Article 102 prohibits, as incompatible with the internal market, any abuse by undertakings in a dominant position within the internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. It should be noted at the outset that ‘dominance’ itself is not prohibited, but only when such dominance is accompanied with abusive behaviour that may affect trade. Like Article 101, Article 102 is enforced by the European Commission, national competition authorities, and national courts under powers conferred by Regulation 1/2003.


2014 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 143-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niamh Dunne

AbstractPrivate enforcement is an increasingly prominent element of EU competition law. The forthcoming Directive on damages actions aims to strengthen and, to a degree, harmonise procedures for private competition litigation, while recent case law of the Court of Justice reaffirms the centrality of the right to claim compensation for losses stemming from breach of the competition rules. Moreover, this right has been presented as an essentially unitary one, whereby any victim of any type of competition infringement has, in principle, the right to claim damages. This chapter reviews the evolving framework, and considers, specifically, the role for private enforcement within the overall system of EU competition law. Taking into account the Commission’s efforts to facilitate and increase private enforcement, the emerging EU public enforcement framework, as well as the substantive EU competition rules more generally, this chapter argues that, contrary to the rhetoric, private enforcement is a mechanism best adapted, and arguably most appropriate, for use only in the context of hard-core cartels. It is further suggested that the gap between rhetoric and reality is not problematic as such, yet difficulties may arise insofar as these divergences conflict with the principle of effectiveness.


2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (8) ◽  
pp. 1173-1189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Wurmnest

On July 1st, 2005, the 7th Amendment to the Law against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen – GWB) became effective. The modernization of the GWB was indispensable in bringing German law in line with Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003. Regulation 1/2003 decentralized the enforcement of EC competition rules and aimed to pave the way for effective private antitrust litigation in Europe. Thus far, private parties have invoked Art. 81 and 82 EC Treaty primarily as shield by arguing that certain agreements were void. Only in very few instances were those rules used as sword to sue infringers for injunctive relief or damages. To stimulate private enforcement, Regulation 1/2003 inter alia abolished the European Commission's exclusive power to exempt practices which are prohibited pursuant to Art. 81 (1) EC Treaty and entitled national competition authorities and courts to apply Art. 81 (3) EC Treaty. Moreover, it empowered the European Commission to make written submissions in antitrust cases pending before national courts. In line with the new European approach, the German legislature has overhauled the hitherto existing rules of German competition law considerably. This article will briefly describe the general changes brought by the reform and take a closer look at the amended rules relating to private antitrust litigation before German courts.


Author(s):  
Holzwarth Johannes

This chapter explores the cooperation between the European Commission and Member States’ courts that apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The risk of inconsistent interpretations of EU competition rules renders cooperation between the Commission and Member State courts crucial, particularly due to the role that such courts play when it comes to the effective enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU at the national level: in the era of decentralisation, it is the national courts that will ultimately be called upon to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU either directly, or when reviewing national authorities’ decisions based on those provisions. The central role that the Commission retains for the enforcement of EU competition law means that it has a particularly strong interest in ensuring effective cooperation with national courts. Moreover, the importance of cooperation between the Commission and Member State courts is further increasing due to the rise of private enforcement. This type of enforcement is generally associated with civil actions and damages awarded by national courts or tribunals.


Author(s):  
Elspeth Berry ◽  
Matthew J. Homewood ◽  
Barbara Bogusz

Titles in the Complete series combine extracts from a wide range of primary materials with clear explanatory text to provide readers with a complete introductory resource. This chapter discusses the enforcement of EU competition law. It covers the enforcement regime; burden of proof; the relationship between Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, and national competition laws; cooperation with national authorities; cooperation with national courts; the powers of the competition authorities of the Member States; the European Commission’s powers; safeguards for undertakings; the 2006 Leniency Notice; and private enforcement.


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