Standard of Causality in Abuse of Dominance Cases Regarding Terms and Conditions in Multi-Sided Markets

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Abuse Of Dominance

Excessive Data Collection as a Form of Anticompetitive Conduct: The German Facebook Case

2021 ◽  
pp. 0003603X2199702
Author(s):  
Anne C. Witt
Keyword(s):  
Data Collection ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
Digital Platforms ◽  
High Profile ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Federal Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance

In a high-profile decision of February 6, 2019, the German Federal Cartel Office prohibited Facebook’s data collection policy as an abuse of dominance for infringing its users’ constitutional right to privacy. The case triggered a remarkable interinstitutional dispute between the key players in German competition law. Conflicting rulings by the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court and the German Federal Court of Justice further illustrate how deeply divided the antitrust community is on the role of competition law in regulating excessive data collection and other novel types of harm caused by dominant digital platforms. This contribution discusses the original prohibition decision, the ensuing court orders, and legislative reform proposals in the broader context of European Union and U.S. competition law.

5. Article 102

2021 ◽  
pp. 180-223
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Single Market ◽  
Substantial Part ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Dominant Firms ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance

This chapter discusses the main features of Article 102 of the Treaty of Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which is concerned with the abusive conduct of dominant firms. It begins by discussing the meaning of ‘undertaking’ and ‘effect on trade between Member States’ in the context of Article 102. It then considers what is meant by a dominant position and looks at the requirement that any dominant position must be held in a substantial part of the internal market. Thereafter it discusses some general considerations relevant to the concept of abuse of dominance, followed by an explanation of what is meant by ‘exploitative’, ‘exclusionary’ and ‘single market’ abuses. It then discusses possible defences to allegations of abuse, and concludes by considering the consequences of infringing Article 102.

17. Abuse of dominance (1): non-pricing practices

2021 ◽  
pp. 715-752
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Case Law ◽  
Single Market ◽  
Exclusive Dealing ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu

This chapter considers abusive non-pricing practices under Article 102 TFEU and the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998. It deals in turn with exclusive dealing agreements; tying; refusals to supply; abusive non-pricing practices that are harmful to the single market; and miscellaneous other non-pricing practices which might infringe Article 102 or the Chapter II prohibition. Reference is made to the case-law of the Court of Justice and the Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings

18. Abuse of dominance (2): pricing practices

2021 ◽  
pp. 753-806
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Single Market ◽  
High Price ◽  
Parallel Imports ◽  
Predatory Pricing ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
The Eu

This chapter considers abusive pricing practices under Article 102 TFEU and the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998. It first discusses various cost concepts used in determining whether a price is abusive. It then deals in turn with excessive pricing; conditional rebates; bundling; predatory pricing; margin squeeze; price discrimination; and practices that are harmful to the single market. This taxonomy is over-schematic, in that the categories overlap with one another: for example price discrimination may be both exploitative and exclusionary, and an excessively high price may in reality be a way of preventing parallel imports or of excluding a competitor from the market; nevertheless this division may provide helpful insights into the way in which the law is applied in practice. In each section the application of Article 102 by the European Commission and by the EU Courts will be considered first, followed by cases in the UK. Reference will be made where appropriate to the Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document