10. An Introduction to EU Competition Policy and Law

2021 ◽  
pp. 353-394
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

The idea of competition lies at the heart of the capitalist system and at the heart of European Union (EU) economic law. The broad policy objective remains to maintain and encourage competition for the benefit of the EU and its citizens. This chapter discusses EU competition law and covers the basic outline of EU competition policy; Art 101 TFEU; Art 101(2) TFEU and the consequence of a breach; Art 101(3) TFEU exemptions; Art 102 TFEU and the abuse of a dominant position; the relationship between Arts 101 and 102 TFEU; the enforcement of EU competition law; conflict of EU and national law, state aid; and EU merger control.

Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter discusses EU competition law. It covers the basic outline of EU competition policy; Article 101 TFEU; Article 101(2) TFEU and the consequence of a breach; Article 101(3) TFEU exemptions; Article 102 TFEU and the abuse of a dominant position; the relationship between Arts 101 and 102 TFEU; the enforcement of EU competition law; conflict of EU and national law, state aid; and EU merger control.


2019 ◽  
pp. 352-392
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter discusses EU competition law. It covers the basic outline of EU competition policy; Article 101 TFEU; Article 101(2) TFEU and the consequence of a breach; Article 101(3) TFEU exemptions; Article 102 TFEU and the abuse of a dominant position; the relationship between Articles 101 and 102 TFEU; the enforcement of EU competition law; conflict of EU and national law; state aid; and EU merger control.


Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter provides an introduction to Competition Policy and law in the European Union (EU). It covers the principal rules of EU competition law, namely Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and also considers the enforcement of the competition law regime and merger policy and regulation in the EU.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 78-88
Author(s):  
Noel Beale ◽  
Paschalis Lois

The Trade and Cooperation Agreement broadly sets out the nature of the relationship contemplated between UK and EU competition law and policy following Brexit. The question is whether the UK will capitalize on its newfound discretion to deviate its competition policy from the EU in the future. This article considers some of the potential new directions that might be taken within the UK's competition law landscape, specifically in relation to merger control, antitrust and subsidy control. It explores some of the problems and opportunities created in the wake of Brexit, as well as the legal and practical ramifications of future divergences between UK and EU competition policy. Furthermore, it considers how the Competition and Markets Authority may fare in enforcing new policy, as well as its potential interactions with regimes both within and outside the EU.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 27-46
Author(s):  
Afroza Bilkis ◽  
Supravat Halder

When a dominant company exploits its market power and that harms fair competition in the marketplace, average consumers remain in the most vulnerable condition having vital influence on but no active participation in the functioning of the market. The actions of a business that has market power can have serious effects on the operation of a market. An undertaking in a dominant position may use its market power in several ways, the most common being exploiting consumers by artificial scarcity and increasing prices. Moreover, there may be diverse interpretation as to the nature of an undertaking while considering market power abuse cases for the purposes of European Union (EU) Competition law. It is significant to consider the status of consumers in a market to see if dominant entities are abusing their powers and therefore test the level of commercialization.Northern University Journal of Law Vol.IV 2013; p.27-46


Author(s):  
Matthew J. Homewood

This chapter focuses on Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Article 102 prohibits, as incompatible with the internal market, any abuse by undertakings in a dominant position within the internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. It should be noted at the outset that ‘dominance’ itself is not prohibited, but only when such dominance is accompanied with abusive behaviour that may affect trade. Like Article 101, Article 102 is enforced by the European Commission, national competition authorities, and national courts under powers conferred by Regulation 1/2003.


EU Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1072-1125
Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing students with a stand-alone resource. EU competition law covers anti-competitive agreements between firms, abuse of a dominant position, and mergers. Article 101 TFEU is the principal vehicle for the control of anti-competitive agreements. This chapter examines its key features. These include: the meaning given to the terms agreement and concerted practice; the relationship between Article 101(1) and (3); the extent to which economic analysis does and should take place within Article 101(1); and the interpretation accorded to Article 101(3), including whether non-economic factors can be taken into account. The discussion then shifts to more detailed examination of vertical agreements, followed by an outline of the reform of the enforcement regime for Articles 101 and 102. The UK version contains a further section analysing issues concerning EU competition law and the UK post-Brexit.


EU Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1034-1086
Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing students with a stand-alone resource. EU competition law covers anti-competitive agreements between firms, abuse of a dominant position, and mergers. Article 101 TFEU is the principal vehicle for the control of anti-competitive agreements. This chapter examines its key features. These include: the meaning given to the terms agreement and concerted practice; the relationship between Article 101(1) and (3); the extent to which economic analysis does and should take place within Article 101(1); and the interpretation accorded to Article 101(3), including whether non-economic factors can be taken into account. The discussion then shifts to more detailed examination of vertical agreements, followed by an outline of the reform of the enforcement regime for Articles 101 and 102. The UK version contains a further section analysing issues concerning EU competition law and the UK post-Brexit.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (14) ◽  
pp. 265-277
Author(s):  
Sandra Marco Colino

On 17th December 2015, the General Court of the European Union (GC) confirmed a fine of over EUR 127 million imposed by the European Commission (hereinafter the Commission) on the Polish telecommunications company Orange Polska (hereinafter OP), formerly known as Telekomunikacja Polska. According to the fining decision, issued in 2011 (hereinafter the Commission decision), OP abused its dominant position by refusing access to its wholesale broadband services to new entrants, acting in contravention of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).


Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. EU competition law covers anti-competitive agreements between firms, abuse of a dominant position, and mergers. Article 101 TFEU is the principal vehicle for the control of anti-competitive agreements. This chapter examines its key features. These include: the meaning given to the terms agreement and concerted practice; the relationship between Article 101(1) and (3); the extent to which economic analysis does and should take place within Article 101(1); and the interpretation accorded to Article 101(3), including whether non-economic factors can be taken into account. The discussion then shifts to more detailed examination of vertical agreements, followed by an outline of the reform of the enforcement regime for Articles 101 and 102.


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