1. What is equity?

Author(s):  
Robert Pearce ◽  
Warren Barr

This chapter defines equity. Equity is both a different system of law which recognizes rights and obligations that the common law does not, and a system which seeks to address the inherent gaps which can exist in following any set of rules. Equity plays a large, but largely hidden, role in all our lives. For instance, buying houses with a partner, borrowing money, investing in private or company pensions, making complex arrangements in a will, or preventing human rights abuse all use some form of mechanism developed in equity, such as trust. Thus, equity, even if we do not always appreciate it, intrudes into many parts of our lives.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Erin Matariki Carr

<p>The eminent case of Aguinda v Chevron Corporation, currently in its twentieth year of litigation, represents a growing phenomenon in international commercial litigation between multinational corporations and victims of human rights abuse from developing nations. In 2011 Aguinda awarded approximately US$18 billion against Chevron for extreme environmental and human rights abuse from oil contamination in the Amazon region of Ecuador. Chevron has removed its assets from Ecuador’s jurisdiction leaving the plaintiffs without remedy. This paper traces Aguinda to Canada where the plaintiffs’ action in Yaiguaje to enforce the judgment to satisfy their debt is stayed. This paper critiques this decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice as being unprincipled and failing to consider the wider implications of its decision on the struggle for developing nations to remedy human rights abuses by multinational corporations. This paper argues that the common law doctrine of foreign judgment enforcement must evolve to reflect the needs of modern society. The paper does this by incorporating the “Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights” report released by the United Nations in 2011.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Erin Matariki Carr

<p>The eminent case of Aguinda v Chevron Corporation, currently in its twentieth year of litigation, represents a growing phenomenon in international commercial litigation between multinational corporations and victims of human rights abuse from developing nations. In 2011 Aguinda awarded approximately US$18 billion against Chevron for extreme environmental and human rights abuse from oil contamination in the Amazon region of Ecuador. Chevron has removed its assets from Ecuador’s jurisdiction leaving the plaintiffs without remedy. This paper traces Aguinda to Canada where the plaintiffs’ action in Yaiguaje to enforce the judgment to satisfy their debt is stayed. This paper critiques this decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice as being unprincipled and failing to consider the wider implications of its decision on the struggle for developing nations to remedy human rights abuses by multinational corporations. This paper argues that the common law doctrine of foreign judgment enforcement must evolve to reflect the needs of modern society. The paper does this by incorporating the “Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights” report released by the United Nations in 2011.</p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Kirby

This article examines the decision in Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562. It revisits the suggested ‘heresy‘ that international human rights law may influence the interpretation of the Australian Constitution and other legal texts. Accessing universal human rights law, including in constitutional adjudication, was endorsed in the Bangalore Principles on the Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms 1988. The author suggests that interpreting statutory language in this way is not dissimilar to the common-law principle of interpreting statutes so as to uphold basic rights. But should an analogous approach be permissible in deciding the meaning of constitutional language? Although arguably invoked by the majority of the High Court in Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, in the context of declaring the common-law, so far this approach has not been accepted for constitutional elaboration in Australia. But should this be so in the age of global problems and internationalism?


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-145
Author(s):  
Paula Giliker

Abstract In this paper, I will examine the extent to which the common law of tort in England and Wales imposes a duty to prevent harm on public authorities and private individuals. As will be seen, the starting point for the common law is that such liability should, in both cases, be regarded as exceptional. This must, however, be weighed against duties to prevent harm that arise under the torts of negligence and breach of statutory duty. Public authorities may also face claims that their failure to prevent harm is in breach of ECHR arts 2 or 3. While the law is complex, this paper identifies three key arguments that explain the current legal position at common law, namely that: (i) tort law should treat private and public parties alike: (ii) human rights claims should be treated as distinct from private law claims and (iii) libertarian concerns signify that a duty to prevent harm should be exceptional and needs to be justified. While these arguments provide both an explanation of and a justification for the current law, this article questions to what extent the treatment of public authority liability may be regarded as unduly harsh on vulnerable claimants.


1999 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth J Keith

The Right Honourable Sir Kenneth Keith was the fourth speaker at the NZ Institute of International Affairs Seminar. In this article he describes and reflects upon the role of courts and judges in relation to the advancement of human rights, an issue covered in K J Keith (ed) Essays on Human Rights (Sweet and Maxwell, Wellington, 1968). The article is divided into two parts. The first part discusses international lawmakers attempting to protect individual groups of people from 1648 to 1948, including religious minorities and foreign traders, slaves, aboriginal natives, victims of armed conflict, and workers. The second part discusses how from 1945 to 1948, there was a shift in international law to universal protection. The author notes that while treaties are not part of domestic law, they may have a constitutional role, be relevant in determining the common law, give content to the words of a statute, help interpret legislation which is in line with a treaty, help interpret legislation which is designed to give general effect to a treaty (but which is silent on the particular matter), and help interpret and affect the operation of legislation to which the international text has no apparent direct relation. 


2021 ◽  
pp. 528-578
Author(s):  
Ian Loveland

This chapter analyses some of the leading cases in which the courts addressed different aspects of the Human Rights Act 1998, and draws out the constitutional implications of the courts’ initial conclusions. The discussions cover the interlinked issues of the extent to which the courts have recognised a distinction between Convention articles and Convention Rights, the approach taken to statutory interpretation mandated by s 3, and the use of Declarations of Incompatibility under s 4; the doctrine of judicial ‘deference’ to legislative policy decisions; the ‘horizontality’ of the Act and its impact on the development of the common law; and the status of proportionality as a ground of review of executive action. The chapter concludes with an assessment of whether the Act has triggered a shift in understandings on the proper scope of the doctrines of the sovereignty of Parliament and the rule of law within the modern constitutional order.


2013 ◽  
pp. 21-41
Author(s):  
Gillian S. Howard

The English legal system is based on the common law. The common law system in England and Wales developed from the decisions of judges whose rulings over the centuries have created precedents for other courts to follow and these decisions were based on the ‘custom and practice of the Realm’. The system of binding precedent means that any decision of the Supreme Court—the new name for the former House of Lords (the highest court in the UK)—will bind all the lower courts, unless the lower courts are able to distinguish the facts of the current case and argue that the previous binding decision cannot apply, because of differences in the facts of the two cases. However, since the UK joined the European Union (EU), the decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) now supersede any decisions of the domestic courts and require the English national courts to follow its decisions. (Scotland has a system based on Dutch Roman law, and some procedural differences although no fundamental differences in relation to employment law.) The Human Rights Act 1998 became law in England and Wales in 2000 (and in Scotland in 1998) in order to incorporate the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law. The two most important Articles applicable to employment law are Article 8(1), the right to respect for privacy, family life, and correspondence, and Article 6, the right to a fair trial.


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