20. Human Rights IV: The Impact of the Human Rights Act 1998

2021 ◽  
pp. 528-578
Author(s):  
Ian Loveland

This chapter analyses some of the leading cases in which the courts addressed different aspects of the Human Rights Act 1998, and draws out the constitutional implications of the courts’ initial conclusions. The discussions cover the interlinked issues of the extent to which the courts have recognised a distinction between Convention articles and Convention Rights, the approach taken to statutory interpretation mandated by s 3, and the use of Declarations of Incompatibility under s 4; the doctrine of judicial ‘deference’ to legislative policy decisions; the ‘horizontality’ of the Act and its impact on the development of the common law; and the status of proportionality as a ground of review of executive action. The chapter concludes with an assessment of whether the Act has triggered a shift in understandings on the proper scope of the doctrines of the sovereignty of Parliament and the rule of law within the modern constitutional order.

Author(s):  
Ian Loveland

This chapter analyses some leading cases wherein the courts addressed different aspects of the Human Rights Act 1998, and draws out the constitutional implications of the courts’ initial conclusions. The discussions cover the interlinked issues of the extent to which the courts have recognised a distinction between Convention articles and Convention Rights, the approach taken to statutory interpretation mandated by s 3, and the use of Declarations of Incompatibility under s 4; the doctrine of judicial ‘deference’ to legislative policy decisions; the ‘horizontality’ of the Act and its impact on the development of the common law; and the status of proportionality as a ground of review of executive action. The chapter concludes with an assessment of whether the Act triggered a shift in understandings on the proper scope of the doctrines of the sovereignty of Parliament and the rule of law within the modern constitutional order.


Author(s):  
Matthew Williams

This chapter examines whether the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) has been able to correct indeterminacies in other laws. It first provides an overview of the underlying theory of the HRA and traces its development since October 2000 before discussing its impact on the feasibility and desirability of indeterminate legislation. It also considers whether the HRA has provided means for agents of Parliament, particularly judges, to construct a logic of communication — that is, whether the HRA's new rules of construction filled the various gaps identified in contemporary law. The results show that the HRA has not considerably enhanced either the feasibility or the desirability of legislative language. Furthermore, the HRA has made explicit what had been implicit: that the common law was underpinned by the principles of individual rights; these principles clarified the rule of law where statutory language is indeterminate.


Legal Skills ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 85-103
Author(s):  
Emily Finch ◽  
Stefan Fafinski

Case law can be broken down into common law, equity, and custom. This chapter begins with a discussion of common law and equity, including a brief history on how these sources came into being. It then turns to custom as a further source of law. It also provides an overview of the court system to illustrate how the various courts in the system link together in a hierarchy. It concludes with a discussion of the European Court of Human Rights and the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on case law.


Author(s):  
Emily Finch ◽  
Stefan Fafinski

Case law can be broken down into common law, equity, and custom. This chapter begins with a discussion of common law and equity, including a brief history on how these sources came into being. It then turns to custom as a further source of law. It also provides an overview of the court system to illustrate how the various courts in the system link together in a hierarchy. It concludes with a discussion of the European Court of Human Rights and the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on case law.


2012 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-152
Author(s):  
Carol Brennan

WHO HAS FIRST CLAIM ON “THE LOYALTY OF THE LAW”?Smith v Chief Constable of the Sussex Police (hereafter Smith) was heard by the House of Lords at the same time as Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police v Van Colle and another because they had two uniting factors. First, they both concerned the recurring question of the ambit of police liability in the situation described by Lord Bingham thus: “…if the police are alerted to a threat that D may kill or inflict violence on V, and the police take no action to prevent that occurrence, and D does kill or inflict violence on V, may V or his relatives obtain civil redress against the police, and if so, how and in what circumstances?”2  Secondly, considering the cases together highlighted the wider issue of the relationship between decisions under the Human Rights Act 1998 (hereafter the HRA) and the development of the common law. The Law Lords embarked on a more extensive examination of these issues in Smith and thus that case will be the exclusive focus of this note.  In addition, the study of Smith raises questions regarding proposals for law reform as well as about judicial perceptions of policy priorities. 


Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth

This chapter considers a further source of the UK constitution: the law made by the judicial branch of government as a result of the cases heard by the courts. Today it is widely accepted that judge-made law is a reality. It takes two main forms: the development of the common law; or the interpretation of statutes. The two main approaches of the courts to interpretation of Acts of Parliament—the literal approach and the purposive approach—are discussed. The interpretative obligation imposed on the courts by s 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 is also reviewed.


Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth

This chapter considers a further source of the UK constitution: the law that is made by the judicial branch of government as a result of the cases heard by the courts. Today it is widely accepted that judge-made law is a reality. It takes two main forms: the development of the common law; or the interpretation of statutes. The two main approaches of the courts to interpretation of Acts of Parliament—the literal approach and the purposive approach—are discussed. In addition, the interpretative obligation imposed on the courts by s 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 is also reviewed.


Author(s):  
Thomas E. Webb

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in R (on the application of Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26, House of Lords. This case considered whether a blanket policy excluding prisoners from cell searches was a proportionate response that was necessary to achieve the aim of that policy. There is also discussion of whether the common law could provide an alternative system of rights protection to that under the Human Rights Act 1998. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.


2021 ◽  
pp. 94-113
Author(s):  
Emily Finch ◽  
Stefan Fafinski

Case law can be broken down into common law, equity, and custom. This chapter begins with a discussion of common law and equity, including a brief history on how these sources came into being. It then turns to custom as a further source of law. It also provides an overview of the court system to illustrate how the various courts in the system link together in a hierarchy. It concludes with a discussion of the European Court of Human Rights and the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on case law.


Author(s):  
Thomas E. Webb

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in R v Lord Chancellor, ex parte Witham [1998] QB 575, High Court (Queen’s Bench Division). This case concerns the constitutionality of fees payable to access court processes where the applicant’s limited financial means render them unable to pay those fees. More generally it concerns the capacity of the common law to provide rights protections, notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.


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