19. Freedom of Assembly and Association

2020 ◽  
pp. 527-558
Author(s):  
Bernadette Rainey ◽  
Pamela McCormick ◽  
Clare Ovey

This chapter examines the provisions for freedom of assembly and association in the European Convention on Human Rights, and discusses the provisions of Article 11, which covers the protection of political parties, other associations, and a bundle of trade union rights. It explains that the case-law under Article 11 can be divided into two categories: the first is concerned with political or democratic rights; and the second relates to the employment-based rights to join, or refuse to join, a trade union. It examines developments concerning the right to protest and trade union rights such as collective bargaining.

Author(s):  
Bernadette Rainey ◽  
Elizabeth Wicks ◽  
Andclare Ovey

This chapter examines the provisions for freedom of assembly and association in the European Convention on Human Rights, and discusses the provisions of Article 11, which covers the protection of political parties, other associations, and a bundle of trade union rights. It explains that the case-law under Article 11 can be divided into two categories: the first is concerned with political or democratic rights; and the second relates to the employment-based rights to join, or refuse to join, a trade union. It examines developments concerning the right to protest and trade union rights such as collective bargaining.


2014 ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Przemysław Florjanowicz-Błachut

The core function of the judiciary is the administration of justice through delivering judgments and other decisions. The crucial role for its acceptance and legitimization by not only lawyers, but also individulas (parties) and the hole society plays judicial reasoning. It should reflect on judge’s independence within the exercise of his office and show also judicial self-restraint or activism. The axiology and the standards of proper judicial reasoning are anchored both in constitutional and supranational law and case-law. Polish Constitutional Tribunal derives a duty to give reasoning from the right to a fair trial – right to be heard and bring own submissions before the court (Article 45 § 1 of the Constitution), the right to appeal against judgments and decisions made at first stage (Article 78), the rule of two stages of the court proceedings (Article 176) and rule of law clause (Article 2), that comprises inter alia right to due process of law and the rule of legitimate expactation / the protection of trust (Vertrauensschutz). European Court of Human Rights derives this duty to give reasons from the guarantees of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of European Convention of Human Rights. In its case-law the ECtHR, taking into account the margin of appreciation concept, formulated a number of positive and negative requirements, that should be met in case of proper reasoning. The obligation for courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions is also anchored in European Union law. European Court of Justice derives this duty from the right to fair trial enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Standards of the courts reasoning developed by Polish constitutional court an the European courts (ECJ and ECtHR) are in fact convergent and coherent. National judges should take them into consideration in every case, to legitimize its outcome and enhance justice delivery.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Léon E Dijkman

Abstract Germany is one of few jurisdictions with a bifurcated patent system, under which infringement and validity of a patent are established in separate proceedings. Because validity proceedings normally take longer to conclude, it can occur that remedies for infringement are imposed before a decision on the patent’s validity is available. This phenomenon is colloquially known as the ‘injunction gap’ and has been the subject of increasing criticism over the past years. In this article, I examine the injunction gap from the perspective of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I find that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights interpreting this provision supports criticism of the injunction gap, because imposing infringement remedies with potentially far-reaching consequences before the validity of a patent has been established by a court of law arguably violates defendants’ right to be heard. Such reliance on the patent office’s grant decision is no longer warranted in the light of contemporary invalidation rates. I conclude that the proliferation of the injunction gap should be curbed by an approach to a stay of proceedings which is in line with the test for stays as formulated by Germany’s Federal Supreme Court. Under this test, courts should stay infringement proceedings until the Federal Patent Court or the EPO’s Board of Appeal have ruled on the validity of a patent whenever it is more likely than not that it will be invalidated.


2009 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 353-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Hilson

Abstract The aim of this chapter is to provide an initial attempt at analysis of the place of risk within the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and, where appropriate, the Commission, focusing on the related issues of public concern and perception of risk and how the ECHR dispute bodies have addressed these. It will argue that, for quite some time, the Court has tended to adopt a particular, liberal conception of risk in which it stresses the right of applicants to be provided with information on risk to enable them to make effective choices. Historically, where public concerns in relation to particular risks are greater than those of scientific experts—nuclear radiation being the prime example in the case law—the Court has adopted a particularly restrictive approach, stressing the need for risk to be ‘imminent’ in order to engage the relevant Convention protections. However, more recently, there have been emerging but as yet still rather undeveloped signs of the Court adopting a more sensitive approach to risk. One possible explanation for this lies in the Court’s growing awareness of and reference to the Aarhus Convention. What we have yet to see—because there has not yet been a recent, post-Aarhus example involving such facts—is a case where no imminent risk is evident. Nevertheless, the chapter concludes that the Court’s old-style approach to public concern in such cases, in which it rode roughshod over rights to judicial review, is out of line with the third, access to justice limb of Aarhus.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 244-269
Author(s):  
Christine Carpenter

Abstract Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to freedom of religion and conscience. The language of Article 9(1) has been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights as including protections for acts of proselytism, when properly committed and respectful of the rights and freedoms of others. This was the view taken in the foundational Article 9 case of the Court, Kokkinakis v. Greece. In the decades since Kokkinakis, however, the view of the Court on proselytism appears to have shifted, in particular in Article 9 cases involving religious garments. This article seeks to determine whether the Court is consistent in its views on proselytism between these religious garment cases and earlier examples of Article 9 case law.


Author(s):  
Bernadette Rainey ◽  
Elizabeth Wicks ◽  
Andclare Ovey

This chapter examines the protection of the right to free elections in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It discusses the provisions of Article 3 of Protocol 1 and highlights the increasing number of complaints of violations of this Article, which indicates that the Strasbourg Court is giving fresh emphasis to this provision as essential to the foundations of democratic legitimacy of the State. The chapter also discusses case-law on the nature of the legislature, electoral systems, the right to vote, and the right to stand for election.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 342-362
Author(s):  
Ergul Celiksoy

In November 2018, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in the case of Beuze v Belgium. Relying on Ibrahim and Others v the United Kingdom, the Grand Chamber held that the Salduz principles require a two-stage test of analysis, and hence, ruled out that systematic statutory restriction of a general and mandatory nature would in itself constitute an automatic violation of Article 6 § 3(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the Beuze judgment appears to be very controversial, since the Grand Chamber failed to put forward any convincing reason why it departed from previous case law, particularly Dayanan v Turkey and other judgments against Turkey. In their separate opinion, the concurring Judges in Beuze were concerned that the Beuze judgment overruled ‘ Salduz itself and all other cases that have applied the Salduz test’, and thus, ‘actually distorts and changes the Salduz principle and devalues the right that the Court established previously’. This article analyses the Beuze judgment in the light of the Court’s recent jurisprudence in order to examine whether it contradicts and dilutes the principles previously set out. Further, it discusses the implications of the new standards established in Ibrahim and Others and in subsequent cases, particularly Beuze. Particular attention is paid to the questions of how ‘fair’ is the application of overall fairness assessment in every case, how may the Court’s changing direction of approach concerning the right to access to a lawyer affect the increasing trend of recognition thereof, as a rule, by the contracting states, and finally, to what extent the new principles, especially those established in Beuze, comply with Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer.


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 335-369
Author(s):  
Lieneke Slingenberg ◽  
Louise Bonneau

Abstract Across European cities, migrants without access to state facilities, resort to living in ‘makeshift camps’ or squats. These settlements are usually evacuated and demolished by state authorities. Instead of discussing the state’s positive obligation to provide decent housing, this article focusses solely on the state’s negative obligations under the right to respect for a home as laid down in Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (echr). Drawing upon the cases of Calais and Amsterdam, this article scrutinizes domestic case law about evictions from (in)formal migrant settlements and compares that to case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). We argue that the ECtHR case law provides a relevant framework that should be used to evaluate the legitimacy of evictions and destructions of (in)formal migrants’ settlements. Despite the fact that applying this framework would not entail a complete ban on evictions, it would provide some welcome (procedural and substantive) protection for migrants.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-86
Author(s):  
Bas van Zelst

Unilateral option arbitration clauses (UAC) are clauses under which the parties bound by it are restricted to bringing proceedings in a particular jurisdiction, while at the same time providing one or more parties the option to elect that a dispute be referred to arbitration. The latter right is unilateral in that it may only be invoked by the beneficiary party or parties that are designated in the UAC. This article submits that the concept of a UAC is compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). More particularly it argues that UACs meet the requirements – developed through the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) – that the waiver of the right to access to an impartial and independent court established by law is agreed upon freely and unequivocally. It is concluded that there is nothing in the ECtHR’s case law to suggest that a UAC conferring the choice for arbitration or litigation only to the beneficiary of the UAC would be contrary to these requirements.


1998 ◽  
Vol 13 (S3) ◽  
pp. 101s-106s ◽  
Author(s):  
AM Dougin

SummaryThe European Convention of Human Rights recognises a certain number of rights and freedoms for persons within States' jurisdiction. For those confined in psychiatric hospitals, this legal protection concerns first of all the lawfulness of deprivation of liberty, which must conform to the conditions laid down by the Convention as interpreted by the case-law of the Convention organs (the Commission and Court of Human Rights). The Convention also guarantees to person deprived of their liberty further rights: the right to information, the right to appear before a court, the right to compensation and also the right to the respect of privacy and correspondence.


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