9. Legal Professional Privilege

2021 ◽  
pp. 204-228
Author(s):  
Andrew L-T Choo
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Legal Advice ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Legal Adviser ◽  
Legal Professional

Chapter 9 focuses on the doctrine of legal professional privilege. Technically, this encompasses two separate privileges: legal advice privilege, which protects communications between client and legal adviser; and litigation privilege, which protects communications between client or legal adviser and a third party, so long as preparation for litigation is the dominant purpose of the communication. Legal advice privilege, unlike litigation privilege, is regarded as ‘absolute’ and incapable of being overridden. The chapter also briefly looks at ‘without prejudice privilege’, aspects of which the House of Lords and Supreme Court have considered in relatively recent years.

9. Legal Professional Privilege

Evidence ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew L-T Choo
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Legal Advice ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Legal Adviser ◽  
Legal Professional

Chapter 9 focuses on the doctrine of legal professional privilege. Technically, this encompasses two separate privileges: legal advice privilege, which protects communications between client and legal adviser; and litigation privilege, which protects communications between client or legal adviser and a third party, so long as preparation for litigation is the dominant purpose of the communication. Legal advice privilege, unlike litigation privilege, is regarded as ‘absolute’ and incapable of being overridden. The chapter also briefly looks at ‘without prejudice privilege’, aspects of which the House of Lords and Supreme Court have considered in relatively recent years.

Legal Privilege and Third Party Disclosure: A Comparative Analysis of UK and the US Rules

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zia Akhtar
Keyword(s):  
Research Question ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Weight Of Evidence ◽  
Legal Proceedings ◽  
Legal Advice ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Us ◽  
Privileged Communication ◽  
Legal Professional ◽  
The Uk

Abstract The rules of evidence in common law courts rely on the weight of evidence that is deduced by the court based on its admissibility and credibility. This is subject to the evidence that has been disclosed by the client to their lawyer either before or after the litigation is commenced in court. The availability of legal professional privilege is a substantive legal right (not a procedural rule) and it enables a person to refuse to disclose certain documents in a wide range of situations. There can be no adverse inference that can be drawn from a valid assertion of legal professional privilege on evidential grounds by the court. Under English law, privilege applies to the advice given by external lawyers and in-house lawyers (acting in their capacity as lawyers) in the case or in contemplation of litigation. Privilege in the US is broader than in the UK and may vary over time and according to locations/context but a privileged communication under UK law may not be privileged in the US. The Attorney-client confidentiality and work-product doctrine are the most common US types of privilege and this will protect investigation material if its primary purpose is to provide information to obtain a legal advice (i. e. if it is not for a business purpose). The research question in this paper is to what extent internal investigations need to be disclosed where the client confidentiality is not applicable and the court orders disclosure. It compares the framework under which privilege can be exercised, and how in the US a different interpretation allows greater margin for client confidentiality when investigations include another party if documents are compiled in contemplation of legal proceedings.

The constitutional influence of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on the UK apex court: institutional proximity and jurisprudential divergence?

2020 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 285-302
Author(s):  
Roger Masterman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
Proportionality Test ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Relationship

It is often claimed that the constitutional role of the UK’s apex court is enriched as a result of the experiences of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as interpreter of constitutions within its overseas jurisdiction. This paper considers the relationship between the House of Lords/UK Supreme Court and the Judicial Committee and its effect on the importation of external influences into the UK’s legal system(s), further seeking to assess how far the jurisprudence of the Judicial Committee has influenced constitutional decision-making in the UK apex court. While ad hoc citation of Privy Council authorities in House of Lords/Supreme Court decisions is relatively commonplace, a post-1998 enthusiasm for reliance on Judicial Committee authority – relating to (i) a ‘generous and purposive’ approach to constitutional interpretation and (ii) supporting the developing domestic test for proportionality – quickly faded. Both areas are illustrative of a diminishing reliance on Judicial Committee authority, but reveal divergent approaches to constitutional borrowing as the UK apex court has incrementally mapped the contours of an autochthonous constitutionalism while simultaneously recognising the trans-jurisdictional qualities of the proportionality test.

the other parties to a related contract. As will be seen below, some of these relationships, although not all, will be covered by the provisions of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 and may, more easily be regarded as giving rise to enforceable contractual rights in favour of a third party. In Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd, Dew & Co, a firm of motor factors agreed to distribute Dunlop tyres. Part of the agreement was that Dew would adhere to a price maintenance structure set out by Dunlop and that Dew would require any subsequent purchaser from them of Dunlop tyres also to adhere to that price maintenance structure. Dew sold Dunlop tyres to Selfridge, who then proposed to sell those tyres at a price lower than had been stipulated by Dunlop. The contract between Dew and Selfridge provided that Selfridge would adhere to Dunlop’s minimum prices and the question arose whether Dunlop could enforce the relevant term in their favour, despite the fact that they were not parties to the contract which contained the relevant term. The House of Lords held that as no consideration moved from Dunlop to Selfridge, the contract was unenforceable by Dunlop against Selfridge: Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1915] AC 847, HL, p 853

1995 ◽  
pp. 753-755
Keyword(s):  
Third Parties ◽  
The Other ◽  
Third Party ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Relevant Term ◽  
Contractual Rights ◽  
Price Maintenance

11. The Interpretation of Contracts

Contract Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 363-379
Author(s):  
Ewan McKendrick
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Compensation Scheme ◽  
Building Society ◽  
Ordinary Meaning ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Supreme Court

This chapter focuses on the principles applied by the courts when interpreting contracts, as set out by the House of Lords in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v. West Bromwich Building Society and the Supreme Court in Arnold v. Britton and Wood v. Capita Insurance Services Ltd. The chapter discusses the scope of these principles (in particular, the ‘factual matrix’, the exclusion of pre-contractual negotiations, the meaning of words, ‘corrective interpretation’, and the balance to be struck between the natural and ordinary meaning of the words and giving to the words a commercial sensible construction.

11. The Interpretation of Contracts

Contract Law ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ewan McKendrick
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Compensation Scheme ◽  
Building Society ◽  
Ordinary Meaning ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Supreme Court

This chapter focuses on the principles applied by the courts when interpreting contracts, as set out by the House of Lords in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v. West Bromwich Building Society and the Supreme Court in Arnold v. Britton and Wood v. Capita Insurance Services Ltd. The chapter discusses the scope of these principles (in particular, the ‘factual matrix’, the exclusion of pre-contractual negotiations, the meaning of words, ‘corrective interpretation’, and the balance to be struck between the natural and ordinary meaning of the words and giving to the words a commercial sensible construction.

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