Whether the Patent Right Transferred before the Invalidation Trial Recovers without Assignee’s Knowing Invalid Grounds - Focused on the Supreme Court Decision 2020Hu10087 Decided on May 14th 2020, and on Securing the Third-party -

2021 ◽  
Vol 67 ◽  
pp. 49-94
Author(s):  
Daeheon Bae ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Patent Right

scholarly journals Third Party Consent Searches Following the Search and Surveillance Act

2012 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 447
Author(s):  
Sam McMullan
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Living Arrangements ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
The United States ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
The Supreme Court

Many New Zealanders live in shared living arrangements. The result of this is that reasonable expectations of privacy are becoming more limited. State officials may conduct a lawful search where a person consents to such a search if that person has the authority to consent. Where people live in shared living arrangements, several people may have authority to consent to a search of the same property. This article explores the extent of a third party's power to consent to property searches where more than one person has authority to consent to a search under the Search and Surveillance Act 2012. It argues that the question of reasonable expectations of privacy should not be assessed by reference to property rights. It also considers the concept of "apparent" authority which has arisen in New Zealand from the Court of Appeal's decision in R v Bradley as well as the concept of a present and objecting occupant which has arisen in the United States in the Supreme Court decision of Georgia v Randolph.

scholarly journals The Similarities and Differences between the Arbitration and Judgement Verdicts in Iran’s Laws

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 261
Author(s):  
Amir Mehdi Ghorbanpur ◽  
Sara Khakestarian
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Correspondence Principle ◽  
Relative Effect ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
Res Judicata ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Final Sentence ◽  
Similarities And Differences ◽  
The Third Party

The main purpose of current research is to determine the similarities and differences between the arbitration and judgement verdicts in Iran’s laws. The results of current research indicate that there are many differences and similarities in the arbitration and judgement field in Iran’s laws. General similarities, attributes of judge and arbitrator from religious jurisprudence’s view, verdicts in Iran’s internal laws, investigation with reasons, and final sentence in the arbitration and judgement verdicts can be mentioned as some of these similarities. Also about the differences, some cases like: observance of the principles and adducing to the legal articles at the time of composing the verdict, observance of the formalities and judgement provisions in issuance of verdict, verdicts in terms of requesting for the revision, ability to appeal to the Supreme Court, rehabilitation, jurisdiction, protestation, issuance of verdict by judges and arbitrators, procedural conditions in composing the verdict, regard to recite the verdict in terms of being revisable or non-revisable, third-party entry ability, attracting the third-party, features of verdicts in terms of the ability to prove, possibility to issue the request for garnishee and temporary commandment, correction of verdict, the features of verdicts in terms of the res judicata, competence for issuance of reformatory report, competence for issuance of preliminary (interlocutory) decree, moratorium for objecting about the verdict, the third-party’s ability to object about the verdict, having the relative effect, changing the verdict (judge exemption, arbitrator exemption), communication of verdict, the manner of judgement investigation with courts, investigation dependent on provisions of civil judgement rules, investigation dependent on judgement principles (correspondence principle, observance of the defense right of parties), competence for investigation of the legal affairs, start to investigate, the investigation range, the investigation place, being overt or non-overt, investigation and transmission to the another person, difference between arbitration and judgement in the religious jurisprudence and judge and arbitrator positions from the religious jurisprudence are some results obtained at current research.

scholarly journals EKSEKUSI JAMINAN PERORANGAN (BORGTOCHT) DALAM PENYELESAIAN KREDIT MACET MELALUI KEPAILITAN (ANALISIS PUTUSAN MAHKAMAH AGUNG RI NOMOR 2960 K/Pdt/2010)

Jurnal MINUTA ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 14-19
Author(s):  
Evi Retno Wati
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Right

Generally collateral is divided into two, namely personal guarantee (persoonlijke zekerheid) and corporeal guarantee (zakerlijke zekerheid). On Personal collateral, what given by debtor was not an object but a statement made by the third party who has no interest at all both toward debtor or creditor. In the case that was reviewed in this research to wit The supreme court of Republic of Indonesia decree No. 2960 K/Pdt/2010 PT. Pertamina Dana Ventura (first named PT. Pertamina Saving & Investment), as a creditor filed a confiscation guarantee claim toward Kairudin Nur who is the guarantor of the debt of PT. Goro Bata Sakti (in bankruptcy) as a debtor. Guarantor in Indonesian Civil Code (later stated as KUHPer) is given a privilege which is stated in article 1831 KUHPer which given right to the guarantor to reject payment to creditor before the creditor’s property confiscated first and sold in order to pay the debts. If after the debtor’s property confiscated and sold are not enough to pay the debts, then in this case the guarantor is responsible for fulfilling the debts toward creditor. In The supreme court of Republic of Indonesia decree No. 2960 K/Pdt/2010, the guarantor right as ruled in KUHPer is violated. Therefore the law protection that can be given to the guarantor is the guarantor is given the right to accelerate the management and settlement toward debtor’s assets which were under curator supervision.

scholarly journals Third Party Fraud inducing Material Mistake Slip Knot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd v du Toit 2011 4 SA 72 (SCA)

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (7) ◽  
pp. 186
Author(s):  
Chris James Pretorius
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
General Rule ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Slip Knot

In Slip Knot Investments v Du Toit 2011 4 SA 72 (SCA) the Supreme Court of Appeal had to determine if the material mistake of a contractual party induced by the fraud of an independent third party could sustain a plea of iustus error raised by the mistaken party. The position prior to this decision was uncertain and characterised by inconsistency, mostly occasioned by the application of the iustus error doctrine together with fault. The Supreme Court of Appeal found that in the circumstances the mistaken party was liable, despite the fraud of the third party, on the basis of the reliance theory. The decision is commendable for bringing a measure of certainty to the law of mistake on this point and indicating that the reliance theory (as opposed to the iustus error doctrine) is the appropriate means to resolving such cases. Nevertheless, it is suggested that although the general rule implied by the court's approach is entirely apposite, there may well be exceptional instances where on the basis of relevant policy considerations the reliance theory should not prevail and the mistaken party should be absolved from contractual liability. In this manner reliance, which at first seems reasonable for being induced by the conduct of the contract denier, may upon further reflection be regarded as unreasonable based on the consideration of risk creation at the hand of the contract assertor, for instance. Admitting exceptions in appropriate circumstances would also provide a degree of consonance with earlier case law, where, even if the court's approach was open to theoretical criticism, a court has intuitively felt that liability should not lie.

Public Financing after the Supreme Court Decision

1976 ◽  
Vol 425 (1) ◽  
pp. 134-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
George E. Agree
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Public Funding ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Political Life ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
Public Financing ◽  
Public Subsidies ◽  
Private Money ◽  
The Supreme Court

The Supreme Court decision in Buckley v. Valeo assures that large amounts of private money will con tinue to play an important role in political financing in America. By thus altering the environment in which public subsidies were intended to operate, the decision foreshadows that public funding will shift toward the objective of providing financial floors under candidates rather than implementing ceilings over them. The problem of third party candidates, the several methods of allocating public funds, the feasibility of administration and enforcement, and the suitability of the check-off as an appropriation device may all be affected. Yet it seems inevitable that public financing will become a perma nent feature of American political life.

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