Foreign Aid, Development, and US Strategic Interests in the Cold War

Author(s):  
James Lee

Abstract Scholars have argued that during the Cold War, the United States gave aid to its allies to reward them for maintaining an anti-Communist foreign policy rather than to promote their economic development. This finding is mostly based on data starting in the 1970s and does not accurately characterize US grand strategy before the 1970s,  when the United States used aid to promote development among its allies in order to strengthen them against Communism. Using original data collected from historical editions of USAID's “Greenbook,” this article identifies the amount of unconditional aid in the United States’ foreign-aid programs in the period 1955–1970. This type of aid was designed to be politically attractive rather than to be developmentally effective. This article also develops an original measure of aid recipients’ geopolitical alignment that draws on hand coding of 466 diplomatic documents. Using these data, this article finds that there was more unconditional aid in the United States’ aid programs to neutral and nonaligned countries than in the United States’ aid programs to its allies and security partners—a counterintuitive finding that shows how different the first half of the Cold War was from the second.1

2007 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 64-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew L. Johns

This article explores a key period in the relationship between the United States and Iran in the shadow of the Vietnam conflict and the overarching Cold War. It shows how U.S.-Iranian relations shifted considerably from early 1965—when the shah of Iran stepped up his efforts to reduce his dependence on the United States—to November 1967, when U.S. economic development assistance to Iran formally ended. The Johnson administration's overwhelming concern with the Vietnam conflict led to the neglect of potentially critical foreign policy issues and allies, but the lack of success in Vietnam simultaneously accentuated the importance of maintaining key alliance relationships, especially with Iran. The article underscores the centrality of domestic political considerations in forming and understanding foreign policy, both in the United States and in other countries. It also suggests that Third World leaders understood the nature of the Cold War and used the superpower conflict to their advantage to a much greater degree than previously recognized.


This book uses trust—with its emotional and predictive aspects—to explore international relations in the second half of the Cold War, beginning with the late 1960s. The détente of the 1970s led to the development of some limited trust between the United States and the Soviet Union, which lessened international tensions and enabled advances in areas such as arms control. However, it also created uncertainty in other areas, especially on the part of smaller states that depended on their alliance leaders for protection. The chapters in this volume look at how the “emotional” side of the conflict affected the dynamics of various Cold War relations: between the superpowers, within the two ideological blocs, and inside individual countries on the margins of the East–West confrontation.


Author(s):  
Anne Searcy

During the Cold War, the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union developed cultural exchange programs, in which they sent performing artists abroad in order to generate goodwill for their countries. Ballet companies were frequently called on to serve in these programs, particularly in the direct Soviet-American exchange. This book analyzes four of the early ballet exchange tours, demonstrating how this series of encounters changed both geopolitical relations and the history of dance. The ballet tours were enormously popular. Performances functioned as an important symbolic meeting point for Soviet and American officials, creating goodwill and normalizing relations between the two countries in an era when nuclear conflict was a real threat. At the same time, Soviet and American audiences did not understand ballet in the same way. As American companies toured in the Soviet Union and vice versa, audiences saw the performances through the lens of their own local aesthetics. Ballet in the Cold War introduces the concept of transliteration to understand this process, showing how much power viewers wielded in the exchange and explaining how the dynamics of the Cold War continue to shape ballet today.


Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-115
Author(s):  
Jon Brook Wolfsthal

America survived the nuclear age through a complex combination of diplomatic and military decisions, and a good deal of luck. One of the tools that proved its value in both reducing the risks of nuclear use and setting rules for the ongoing nuclear competition were negotiated, legally binding, and verified arms control agreements. Such pacts between the United States and the Soviet Union arguably prevented the nuclear arms racing from getting worse and helped both sides climb off the Cold War nuclear precipice. Several important agreements remain in place between the United States and Russia, to the benefit of both states. Arms control is under threat, however, from domestic forces in the United States and from Russian actions that range from treaty violations to the broader weaponization of risk. But arms control can and should play a useful role in reducing the risk of nuclear war and forging a new agreement between Moscow and Washington on the new rules of the nuclear road.


1982 ◽  
Vol 89 ◽  
pp. 74-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu-ming Shaw

Reverend John Leighton Stuart (1876–1962) served as U.S. ambassador to China from July 1946 until August 1949. In the many discussions of his ambassadorship the one diplomatic mission that has aroused the most speculation and debate was his abortive trip to Beijing, contemplated in June–July 1949, to meet with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Some students of Sino-American relations have claimed that had this trip been made the misunderstanding and subsequent hostility between the United States and the People's Republic of China in the post-1949 period could have been avoided; therefore, the unmaking of this trip constituted another “lost chance in China” in establishing a working relationship between the two countries. But others have thought that given the realities of the Cold War in 1949 and the internal political constraints existing in each country, no substantial result could have been gained from such a trip. Therefore, the thesis of a “lost chance in China” was more an unfounded speculation than a credible affirmation.


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