scholarly journals When Governments Promise to Prioritize Public Debt: Do Markets Care?

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-74
Author(s):  
Mitu Gulati ◽  
Ugo Panizza ◽  
W Mark C Weidemaier ◽  
Gracie Willingham

Abstract During the European sovereign debt crisis of 2011–13, some nations faced with rising borrowing costs adopted commitments to treat bondholders as priority claimants. That is, if there were a shortage of funds, bondholders would be paid first. In this article, we analyse the prevalence and variety of these types of commitments and ask whether they impact borrowing costs. We examine a reform that was widely touted at the height of the Euro sovereign debt crisis in 2011, in which Spain enshrined in its constitution a strong commitment to give absolute priority to public debt claimants. We find no evidence that this reform had any impact on Spanish sovereign bond yields. By contrast, our examination of the US Commonwealth of Puerto Rico suggests that constitutional priority promises can have an impact, at least where the borrower government is subject to supervening law and legal institutions.

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Nicoletta Layher ◽  
Eyden Samunderu

This paper conducts an empirical study on the inclusion of uniform European Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in sovereign bond contracts issued from member states of the European Union, introduced as a regulatory result of the European sovereign debt crisis. The study focuses on the reaction of sovereign bond yields from European Union member states with the inclusion of the new regulation in the European Union. A two-stage least squares regression analysis is adopted in order to determine the extent of impact effects of CACs on member states sovereign bond yields. Evidence is found that CACs in the European Union are priced on financial markets and that sovereign bond yields do respond to the inclusion of uniform CACs in the European Union.


2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 212-225 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norbert Gaillard

Purpose – This paper aims to shed new light on the inability of credit rating agencies (CRAs) to forecast the recent defaults and so-called quasi-defaults of rich countries. It also describes how Moody’s sovereign rating methodology has been modified – and could be further improved – to solve this problem. Design/methodology/approach – After converting bond yields into yield-implied ratings, accuracy ratios are computed to compare the respective performances of CRAs and market participants. Then Iceland’s and Greece’s ratings at the beginning of the Great Recession are estimated while accounting for the parameters included in the new methodology implemented by Moody’s in 2013. Findings – Market participants outperformed Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s in terms of anticipating the sovereign debt crisis that hit several European countries starting in 2008. However, the new methodology implemented by Moody’s should lead to more conservative and accurate sovereign ratings. Originality/value – The chronic inability of CRAs to anticipate public debt crises in rich countries is dangerous because the countries affected – which are generally rated in the investment-grade category – are substantially downgraded, amplifying the sovereign debt crisis. This study is the first to demonstrate that Moody’s has learned from its recent failures. In addition, it recommends ways to detect serious threats to the creditworthiness of high-income countries.


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