Functional Justiciability and the Existence of a Dispute: A Means of Jurisdictional Avoidance?

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 599-621
Author(s):  
Manuel Casas

Abstract In the recent Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament string of cases the International Court of Justice declined jurisdiction by holding that there was no dispute between the parties. This Article examines the Court’s treatment of the existence of a dispute (‘EoD’) jurisdictional objection; it does not purport to analyze the Court’s broader reliance on jurisdictional doctrines as a general means of avoiding cases. From a doctrinal perspective, this Article argues that the Court's interpretation of the EoD objection in those cases is unpersuasive. Instead, the Article contends that the Court has relied on the existence of a dispute objection as a covert or functional justiciability doctrine. That is, as a ground for discretionarily declining jurisdiction or, to borrow a term from private international law, as an escape device. The Article considers that such jurisdictional avoidance may be normatively justified as a form of principled avoidance. Normatively, the decision to rely on a procedural technicality to avoid going into the merits of a potentially explosive case may be seen as a valid exercise of judicial self-restraint—something that can aid the Court navigate the tensions created by increased skepticism of international adjudication. And policy-wise, avoiding a case on a sensible subject-matter, that touches on core aspects of defense and national security, could be accepted as a way of side-stepping potential backlash.

2017 ◽  
Vol 76 (01) ◽  
pp. 1-4
Author(s):  
Federica I. Paddeu

ON 5 October 2016, the International Court of Justice handed down its decision in the three parallel proceedings involving the Marshall Islands (as applicant) and India, Pakistan and the UK (as respondents): Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v India). The Marshall Islands claimed that the respondent states had failed to meet their obligation to negotiate the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament in good faith, either under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (claim against the UK) and/or customary law (against all three respondents). All three respondents formulated objections to jurisdiction and admissibility. In all three cases, they objected that a “dispute” did not exist between them and the applicant. The Court, by a narrow majority (extremely narrow in the case against the UK: by the casting vote of the President), declined to exercise jurisdiction on the basis that no dispute existed between the parties.


2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
Devesh Awmee

The International Court of Justice recently gave judgment in Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament. The case concerned three parallel claims brought by the Marshall Islands against India, Pakistan and the United Kingdom for their alleged failure to fulfil obligations concerning negotiations relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament under art VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and customary international law. The Court in all three proceedings dismissed the claims at the preliminary objections phase on the sole ground that a legal dispute did not exist between the parties. In determining whether a legal dispute existed, the Court appears to have deviated from the objective determination taken in its previous jurisprudence by introducing, for the first time, a new requirement of "awareness". The Court also failed to address the other preliminary objections brought by the United Kingdom such as the Monetary Gold principle, which appears to have been a more credible avenue for the Court to dismiss the case. The case illustrates the failure by the Court to yet again confront the issue of nuclear weapons.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 449-472
Author(s):  
Jonathan Black-Branch

Abstract The International Court of Justice rulings in cases from the Marshall Islands against India, Pakistan and the UK not only failed to answer important questions regarding obligations to negotiate a nuclear cessation treaty and to disarm, but also raise new questions relating to the existence of a dispute under general international law. The Respondents objected to the Court’s jurisdiction to hear the case on the grounds that there was no justiciable dispute between them and the Marshall Islands, arguing that the issues should not be adjudicated within this forum. The Court agreed, finding there was not sufficient evidence of a dispute, per se, and consequently did not have jurisdiction to hear these cases on their merits as the Respondents were not aware of contentious issues. In the case of the UK, in particular, it was decided by a narrow majority, raising important questions about the Court’s strictly formalistic, and more importantly, unprecedented, approach regarding the existence of a dispute under international law. More significantly, the ruling avoided answering important questions relating to long-standing international obligations regarding disarmament and negotiations toward a treaty to cease the arms race pursuant to Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968. This article provides an overview and analysis of the Marshall Islands cases, examining the main legal issues and arguments, focusing on the Court’s reasoning and highlighting the division within the Court on substantive matters pertaining to obligations of nuclear-armed states.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 75-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
George R. B. Galindo

The International Court of Justice (ICJ)’s 2016 judgments on the three cases Obligations concerning negotiations relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament show the omnipresence of the dichotomy between form and substance in the Court's case-law. Commentators and several dissenting judges have stressed that the judgments represent a landmark in the sense that the Court has radically departed from the consideration of flexible standards in applying procedural rules to the determination of the issue of identification of a legal dispute. In other words, it made form prevail over substance.


2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 86-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lesley Dingle

AbstractThis article, written by Lesley Dingle, is based upon an in-depth interview with Dame Rosalyn Higgins in March 2014. It highlights particular elements that characterise her contribution to legal scholarship and international adjudication, and should be read in the context of the biography presented in the Eminent Scholars Archive: http://www.squire.law.cam.ac.uk/eminent_scholars/dame_rosalyn_higgins.php. Dame Rosalyn Higgins was born in Kensington in 1937. She grew up in London during the Blitz and her matter-of-fact account of these times epitomised her later career: application to the task in hand, and a lack of a sense of expectation. After the War, she passed successively through grammar school, Girton College, Yale and the Royal Institute of International affairs, steadily immersing herself over fifteen years in the work of the United Nations during its formative period. It was on the UN's role as the global peace-keeper and international law-maker that she became the acknowledged authority. There followed a long period of formal academia (1978–95: Kent and LSE), during which she rose to high office. This experience further honed her scholarly and administrative instincts, and she was honoured in 1995 with a DBE. Later that year Dame Rosalyn was appointed to the Bench of the International Court of Justice – the first woman to rise to this position, and in 2006 was elected its President. She retired in 2009.


Arena Hukum ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 349-367
Author(s):  
Taufik Nugraha

It has been 50 years since the Non-Proliferation Treaty was made by America, England, and the Soviet Union to prevent the nuclear arms race in the future. However, Article VI of NPT consisted of ambiguity and has sparked long-lasting debate questioning NPT electiveness. Article VI at least has been examining twice by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1996 and 2014. Unfortunately, those examinations were unsatisfied regarding when Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) should cease and disarmament their nuclear weapon? If referring to “an early date,” it should be done years long ago and not taking more than 50 years with pathetic achievement. Finally, this article will examine the current development of NWS using a normative juridical method according to existing nuclear regulation, ICJ Commentary, which resulting in a suggestion when NPT 1968 parties should fulfil their obligation under Art VI NPT 1968.


1996 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 491-532 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Kwiatkowska

Abstract"On the whole, the World Court has a distinguished record of achievement-even if that record is not as extensive or exemplary as one might wish. It is one of the principal tasks of the student and practitioner of international law, and, for that matter, of people the world over who are concerned with promoting a more peaceful and less lawless world, to give their critical but constructive support to the strengthening of the institutions of international adjudication, and especially the only universal such institution, the International Court of Justice." S.M. Schwebel, Justice in International Law-Selected Writings of Judge Stephen M. Schwebel (1994)


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