INTERPRETASI INTERNATIONAL COURT of JUSTICE (ICJ) PADA PASAL VI PERJANJIAN NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 1968 (NPT)

It has been 50 years since the Non-Proliferation Treaty was made by America, England, and the Soviet Union to prevent the nuclear arms race in the future. However, Article VI of NPT consisted of ambiguity and has sparked long-lasting debate questioning NPT electiveness. Article VI at least has been examining twice by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1996 and 2014. Unfortunately, those examinations were unsatisfied regarding when Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) should cease and disarmament their nuclear weapon? If referring to “an early date,” it should be done years long ago and not taking more than 50 years with pathetic achievement. Finally, this article will examine the current development of NWS using a normative juridical method according to existing nuclear regulation, ICJ Commentary, which resulting in a suggestion when NPT 1968 parties should fulfil their obligation under Art VI NPT 1968.

On India as a Responsible Nuclear Weapon State: Does the ‘No First Use’ Doctrine Need a Review?

India conducted Operation Shakti (Pokhran II) nuclear tests during 11–13 May 1998 that ushered her into the cherished nuclear weapons club. It was well calibrated decision to formally choose the nuclear path through the first peaceful nuclear explosion, Smiling Buddha (Pokhran I) that was conducted on 18 May 1974. It was significant that without joining the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, India managed to gatecrash into the nuclear weapons capability. It led to articulation of the No First Use (NFU) doctrine on 4 January 2003 (Ministry of External Affairs [MEA], 2003). In the wake of 16 August 2019 pronouncement of the Indian Defence Minister on possible review of the NFU, this article seeks to probe the question: Does the NFU doctrine require any such review? It comprises the rational, the promise of NFU, counterforce strategies, NFU with respect to tactical nuclear weapons and associated problems with First Use and NFU.

Perspectives on the Implementation of the 2017 Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty

The adoption of The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) by the UN General Assembly in July 2017 is a real success for the international community in the fight against armaments and the danger of an apocalyptic war. Despite the scepticism of many, the treaty entered into force in January 2021, with its 50th ratification. Although this story seems to have come to a happy end, it is only now that the turmoil begins. No nuclear-weapon state has supported the adoption of the treaty and they refuse to recognize its legal power. The implementation of this treaty will be the hardest test for the UN. Nuclear states are the strongest and most decision-making, especially within the Security Council. In this context, the question arises whether the UN will succeed in finding an effective way to persuade nuclear states to give up these weapons or whether we will witness an international “putsch” of nuclear states.

Korean Nuclear Crises: Is There A Way Forward?

<p><i>North Korea’s nuclear programme remains a key foreign policy challenge for United States. After its first nuclear test in 2006, Pyongyang has made an impressive progress in developing a credible nuclear deterrent through series of nuclear and missile tests. The diplomatic efforts to dissuade North Korea’s nuclear ambitions have not yielded positive results so far, as Pyongyang has not only developed a credible deterrent but continues to expand and strengthen it. The failure of Hanoi Summit, latest in the series of diplomatic initiatives to end the series has depended pessimism regarding future negations. Experts are skeptical about finding a diplomatic solution to the crises and the demand to explore other alternatives ^_____ limited surgical strike, regime change, treating North Korea as de-facto nuclear weapon state ^_____ to end the crises has intensified in recent years. However, dealing with the threat though these tools is highly risky and diplomatic outreach is the most preferred course to end the crises.</i></p>

Korean Nuclear Crises: Is There A Way Forward?

<p><i>North Korea’s nuclear programme remains a key foreign policy challenge for United States. After its first nuclear test in 2006, Pyongyang has made an impressive progress in developing a credible nuclear deterrent through series of nuclear and missile tests. The diplomatic efforts to dissuade North Korea’s nuclear ambitions have not yielded positive results so far, as Pyongyang has not only developed a credible deterrent but continues to expand and strengthen it. The failure of Hanoi Summit, latest in the series of diplomatic initiatives to end the series has depended pessimism regarding future negations. Experts are skeptical about finding a diplomatic solution to the crises and the demand to explore other alternatives ^_____ limited surgical strike, regime change, treating North Korea as de-facto nuclear weapon state ^_____ to end the crises has intensified in recent years. However, dealing with the threat though these tools is highly risky and diplomatic outreach is the most preferred course to end the crises.</i></p>

Introduction

This introductory chapter discusses the factors which lead nonnuclear weapon state (NNWS) decision makers to discount the prospects for nuclear use and be willing to challenge or resist a nuclear-armed opponent. The NNWS is able to act because it can take advantage of various strategic and material inhibitions against the use of nuclear arms to minimize the likelihood of a nuclear strike. In essence, the NNWS identifies red lines and gambles that, by its not crossing those lines, the costs of nuclear weapon use for the nuclear-armed opponent will outweigh the benefits. The precise strategies available and pursued by the NNWS will vary across cases. In general, though, the more militarily capable the NNWS is relative to the nuclear weapon state (NWS), the more difficult it will be for the NNWS to reduce the incentives for nuclear strikes. This forces a powerful NNWS to behave in a consistently constrained manner, and wars in nuclear monopoly will tend to occur only in the face of large power asymmetries favoring the NWS. This book's argument thus shows that nuclear weapons are neither irrelevant, as some argue, nor do they dictate state behavior. Ultimately, there are a variety of tools available to an NNWS to challenge, resist, and even win limited victories in a war against nuclear opponents.

The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Monopoly

This chapter presents a framework to account for conflict in nuclear monopoly. It begins by outlining the benefits and costs of nuclear use in nuclear monopoly for the nuclear weapon state (NWS). This establishes the strategic environment that the nonnuclear weapon state (NNWS) confronts. NNWS leadership can act so long as it believes that the costs of nuclear use for its nuclear-armed opponent outweigh the benefits of nuclear use relative to conventional military alternatives. The more militarily capable the NNWS is relative to the NWS, the more the former must limit its behavior. As a result, wars in nuclear monopoly will tend to occur when the NWS has a large conventional military advantage. In all confrontations, the NNWS will highlight strategic factors that inhibit nuclear use and, when necessary, seek to reduce the benefits and raise the costs of nuclear use for the NWS.