Obedient rebellion: conceiving the African nuclear weapon-free zone

Why do nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZs)—areas which prohibit nuclear weapons—emerge in some contexts, and not others? Focusing on the African case, this article introduces the concept of ‘obedient rebellion’ to explain the African NWFZ's early conception. ‘Obedient rebellion’ is an attitude of ambivalence toward global nuclear order. To newly-decolonizing African states, the African NWFZ symbolized both postcolonial anti-nuclear solidarity and nuclear responsibility; it represented both ‘obedience’ to—and ‘rebellion’ against—global nuclear order. This ambivalence, between ‘obedience’ and ‘rebellion’, paradoxically accommodated multiple conflicting audiences simultaneously, thereby stabilising the zone. The African NWFZ's ambiguous meanings made it viable, even though those meanings conflicted. The zone's early conception offers insight into the complex, contending forces that continue to bind the world's NWFZs—and indeed nuclear order itself—to the present. NWFZs epitomize the tensions which stabilize nuclear order: between sovereign equality and nuclear inequality; between local solidarities and global loyalties; and between contestation and compromise. At first, these tensions seem to imperil NWFZs; in fact, these tensions stabilize NWFZs. The African zone also poses challenges to the African blind spot that continues to exist in International Relations theory.

Challenges in Nuclear Posture and Deterrence from India’s Perspective

South Asia comprises eight countries, among which India and Pakistan are two nuclear weapon powers marked by strained relations. Within this dynamic, this essay examines India’s nuclear path, in spite of its staunch support for a nuclear-weapon-free world. It covers Pakistan’s nuclear journey through proliferation and the logic for it to perpetrate state-sponsored terrorism against India, arguing that this serves as a major factor that could lead to war. Despite this potential, it also explains why South Asia is not the most dangerous nuclear flashpoint in the world. In addition to India and Pakistan, five other nuclear nations are present in the region, namely China, Russia, Israel, North Korea and the United States. As such, this essay discusses positive and negative effects of each of these powers on nuclear dynamics of the region. It concludes with recommendations for fostering strategic stability in South Asia.

Narrative and nuclear weapons politics: the entelechial force of the nuclear origin myth

This paper contributes a novel way to theorise the power of narratives of nuclear weapons politics through Kenneth Burke's concept of entelechy: the means of stating a things essence through narrating its beginning or end. The paper argues that the Manhattan Project functions narratively in nuclear discourse as an origin myth, so that the repeated telling of atomic creation over time frames the possibilities of nuclear politics today. By linking Burke's work on entelechy with literature on narrative and eschatology, the paper develops a theoretical grounding for understanding the interconnection of the nuclear past, present, and future. The paper supports its argument by conducting a wide-ranging survey of academic and popular accounts of the development of the atomic weapon in the US Manhattan Project. It reveals a dominant narrative across these accounts that contains three core tropes: the nuclear weapon as the inevitable and perfected culmination of humankind's tendency towards violence; the Manhattan Project as a race against time; and the nuclear weapon as a product of a fetishized masculine brilliance.

INTERPRETASI INTERNATIONAL COURT of JUSTICE (ICJ) PADA PASAL VI PERJANJIAN NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 1968 (NPT)

It has been 50 years since the Non-Proliferation Treaty was made by America, England, and the Soviet Union to prevent the nuclear arms race in the future. However, Article VI of NPT consisted of ambiguity and has sparked long-lasting debate questioning NPT electiveness. Article VI at least has been examining twice by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1996 and 2014. Unfortunately, those examinations were unsatisfied regarding when Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) should cease and disarmament their nuclear weapon? If referring to “an early date,” it should be done years long ago and not taking more than 50 years with pathetic achievement. Finally, this article will examine the current development of NWS using a normative juridical method according to existing nuclear regulation, ICJ Commentary, which resulting in a suggestion when NPT 1968 parties should fulfil their obligation under Art VI NPT 1968.

The Inevitable Consequences of Nuclear Armament: An Urgent Call for Nuclear Disarmament

Advancement in technology and growth in human wisdom and knowledge has become a boom and at the same time, a bane to the continued survival of mankind. Despite been born free, mankind has become enslaved to the products of their hands. The invention of weapons of human destruction (nuclear weapons), which remains the most destructive form of armory ever created, with the capacity to inflict a large-scale disaster in the shortest time, in just a strike. These weapons and their mass destructive capacity were first experienced in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombing in the year 1945, from that moment on the world, have seen an increase in nuclear testing, nuclear armory, and nuclear race among nuclear-weapon states. The mere presence of nuclear weapons poses a serious threat to the earth's environment and its inhabitants. Many islands have become inhabitable or declared a no-go zone due to the high presence of radiation and radioactivity in those places which is a direct result of years of nuclear testing. As a consequence, many people have been displaced from their ancestral lands, while some victims have lost their time to radiation-induced diseases such as cancer and its various variation. This article, therefore, will focus on the global threat to humanity posed by nuclear armament.

Norm Exemption in States’ NPT Nuclear Disarmament Obligations

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is highly appreciated for its ability to stop further nuclear proliferation in the world. Since its existence, this treaty has been said to be successful in preventing potential states from possessing weapons of mass destruction. At least, there are more than 40 states who have the capability to develop their own nuclear programmes, although such programmes are restrained from coming to fruition. However, this successful story has not taken place in the area of nuclear disarmament. None of its nuclear weapon-owning members seem to proceed with realising a full disarmament aim. This raises the question of why the NPT is unable to achieve success in the field of nuclear disarmament as it has in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. The NPT does not only contain the idea of nuclear non-proliferation, but also the idea of nuclear disarmament. In understanding this question, using a political psychology approach, this study finds that nuclear-weapon states face the so-called moral dilemma between the desire to achieve national interests and the desire to fulfil social demands required by the international norm. By taking advantage of the shortcomings in the NPT narrative as well as relevant world situations, these states attempt to be exempted from dismantling nuclear weapons under their possession.

On India as a Responsible Nuclear Weapon State: Does the ‘No First Use’ Doctrine Need a Review?

India conducted Operation Shakti (Pokhran II) nuclear tests during 11–13 May 1998 that ushered her into the cherished nuclear weapons club. It was well calibrated decision to formally choose the nuclear path through the first peaceful nuclear explosion, Smiling Buddha (Pokhran I) that was conducted on 18 May 1974. It was significant that without joining the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, India managed to gatecrash into the nuclear weapons capability. It led to articulation of the No First Use (NFU) doctrine on 4 January 2003 (Ministry of External Affairs [MEA], 2003). In the wake of 16 August 2019 pronouncement of the Indian Defence Minister on possible review of the NFU, this article seeks to probe the question: Does the NFU doctrine require any such review? It comprises the rational, the promise of NFU, counterforce strategies, NFU with respect to tactical nuclear weapons and associated problems with First Use and NFU.