ECONOMETRIC EVIDENCE TO TARGET TACIT COLLUSION IN OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKETS

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 463-492 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Andreoli-Versbach ◽  
J.-U. Franck
2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Maier-Rigaud ◽  
Ulrich Schwalbe ◽  
Felix Forster

AbstractThis article focusses on the non-coordinated effects of minority shareholdings in oligopolistic markets. It is demonstrated that minority shareholdings even when they fall below the usual thresholds can lead to a significant impediment of effective competition (SIEC) on a purely non-coordinated basis. This is particularly likely in a market with differentiated products, when a firm partially acquires shareholdings in its closest competitor and when the next best alternative products are only weak substitutes.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Guillem Roig

Abstract When consumers have preference costs, two opposing effects need to be assessed to analyse the incentives of firms to set collusive prices. On the one hand, preference costs make a deviation from collusion less attractive, as the deviating firm must offer a large enough discount to cover the preference costs. On the other hand, preference costs lock in consumers and make punishment from rivals less effective. When preference costs are low, the latter of the two effects dominates and collusion is more challenging to sustain than in a situation with no preference costs. With high enough preference costs, collusion is a (weakly) dominant strategy. These results do not eventuate in a model with switching costs.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (9) ◽  
pp. 218
Author(s):  
Marek Gruszczyński

This paper discusses questions of the gender diversity of corporate boards vis-à-vis firm performance. Typically, researchers have asked if a female presence is associated with improved performance and more transparent governance. The paper’s first part reports on several econometric attempts in the quest to prove the existence of such an association. The primary outcome is that the results vary over geographical, cultural, and time settings. The study presented in the second part examines European firms’ annual reports from 2015. Binomial models, multiple regression, and quantile regression are applied resulting in the finding that female presence on a board is not significantly related to firm performance for this sample. Together with the picture that emerged from the paper’s first part, this result leads to the possibility that the search for an association between women on boards and company performance is not fundamental. Nevertheless, modern business societies worldwide may need to boost the female presence on managerial bodies. Current econometric evidence indicates that this is not harmful to corporate results.


1994 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald W. Cotterill

This paper reviews prior research by agricultural economists on the demand for food products using scanner data. Thereafter, a differentiated product's oligopoly model with Bertrand price competition is developed and used to specify brand level demand and oligopoly price reaction equations. The model has sufficient detail to estimate brand level price elasticities and price response elasticities which in turn can be used to estimate three indices of market power. The first index estimated is the familiar Rothschild Index. The paper develops estimates two new indexes, the observed index and the Chamberlin quotient for tacit collusion. It concludes with comments on how the proposed method for the measurement of market power in a differentiated oligopoly can be improved.


Author(s):  
Jayaram (Jay) K. Sankaran ◽  
Danny Samson ◽  
Terence (Terry) H. Wilson

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