17. Abuse of dominance (1): non-pricing practices

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Single Market ◽  
Exclusive Dealing ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu

This chapter considers abusive non-pricing practices under Article 102 TFEU and the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998. It deals in turn with exclusive dealing agreements; tying; refusals to supply; abusive non-pricing practices that are harmful to the single market; and miscellaneous other non-pricing practices which might infringe Article 102 or the Chapter II prohibition. Reference is made where appropriate to the Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings.

17. Abuse of dominance (1): non-pricing practices

2021 ◽  
pp. 715-752
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Case Law ◽  
Single Market ◽  
Exclusive Dealing ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu

This chapter considers abusive non-pricing practices under Article 102 TFEU and the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998. It deals in turn with exclusive dealing agreements; tying; refusals to supply; abusive non-pricing practices that are harmful to the single market; and miscellaneous other non-pricing practices which might infringe Article 102 or the Chapter II prohibition. Reference is made to the case-law of the Court of Justice and the Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings

18. Abuse of dominance (2): pricing practices

2021 ◽  
pp. 753-806
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Single Market ◽  
High Price ◽  
Parallel Imports ◽  
Predatory Pricing ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
The Eu

This chapter considers abusive pricing practices under Article 102 TFEU and the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998. It first discusses various cost concepts used in determining whether a price is abusive. It then deals in turn with excessive pricing; conditional rebates; bundling; predatory pricing; margin squeeze; price discrimination; and practices that are harmful to the single market. This taxonomy is over-schematic, in that the categories overlap with one another: for example price discrimination may be both exploitative and exclusionary, and an excessively high price may in reality be a way of preventing parallel imports or of excluding a competitor from the market; nevertheless this division may provide helpful insights into the way in which the law is applied in practice. In each section the application of Article 102 by the European Commission and by the EU Courts will be considered first, followed by cases in the UK. Reference will be made where appropriate to the Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings.

18. Abuse of dominance (2): pricing practices

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Single Market ◽  
High Price ◽  
Parallel Imports ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
The Eu

This chapter considers abusive pricing practices under Article 102 TFEU and the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998. It discusses cost concepts used in determining whether a price is abusive and deals with excessive pricing; conditional rebates; bundling; predatory pricing; margin squeeze; price discrimination; and practices harmful to the single market. Price discrimination may be both exploitative and exclusionary and an excessively high price may be a way of preventing parallel imports or excluding a competitor from the market; but the division may provide helpful insights into the way in which the law is applied in practice. In each section the application of Article 102 by the European Commission and the EU Courts is considered, followed by cases in the UK. Where appropriate, reference is made to the Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings.

5. Article 102

2021 ◽  
pp. 180-223
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Single Market ◽  
Substantial Part ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Dominant Firms ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance

This chapter discusses the main features of Article 102 of the Treaty of Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which is concerned with the abusive conduct of dominant firms. It begins by discussing the meaning of ‘undertaking’ and ‘effect on trade between Member States’ in the context of Article 102. It then considers what is meant by a dominant position and looks at the requirement that any dominant position must be held in a substantial part of the internal market. Thereafter it discusses some general considerations relevant to the concept of abuse of dominance, followed by an explanation of what is meant by ‘exploitative’, ‘exclusionary’ and ‘single market’ abuses. It then discusses possible defences to allegations of abuse, and concludes by considering the consequences of infringing Article 102.

LOYALTY REBATES AND ABUSE OF DOMINANCE

2018 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-28
Author(s):  
Mark Friend
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
Missed Opportunity

THE recent judgment of the Court of Justice in Intel v Commission (Case C-413/14 P, EU:C:2017:632) deserves a cautious welcome for signalling a move to a more economics-based approach to the assessment of loyalty rebates under Article 102 TFEU, and for modulating the rigid legal presumptions that have characterised nearly four decades of case law. Yet it also represents a missed opportunity to provide a comprehensive analytical framework for one of the more unsatisfactory areas of EU competition law.

4 Abuse of Dominance

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Layne-Farrar Anne ◽  
Petit Nicolas
Keyword(s):  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Relevant Market ◽  
Dominant Firm ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Dominant Firms ◽  
Economic Tools ◽  
Firm Conduct ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu

This chapter focuses on Article 102 TFEU, which prohibits dominant firms from abusing their dominant position. Two elements need to be present for Article 102 to apply to a given firm conduct: (i) that firm must be dominant on one or several markets and (ii) it must have abused that dominant position. The first step in the assessment of dominance is to define the relevant market(s). Once such markets have been defined, various economic tools can be used to determine the extent to which one or several firms are dominant on them. For Article 102 to apply, it must be demonstrated that the dominant firm has committed one or several abuses on the market(s) in question. Article 102 prohibits two main categories of abuses: exclusionary abuses (Art 102(b) and (d)) and exploitative abuses (Art 102(a)). Article 102 also prohibits certain forms of price discrimination.

7. Article 102 TFEU: Conduct Which Can Be an Abuse

2019 ◽  
pp. 359-581
Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin ◽  
Niamh Dunne
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Digital Economy ◽  
Exclusive Dealing ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Legal Proceedings ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
The Eu

This chapter discusses the difficult concept of what constitutes an ‘abuse’ of a dominant position for the purposes of Article 102 and whether conduct should be condemned on account of the form it takes or only for its effects. It considers the case law of the EU Courts, the decisional practice of the Commission, and the Commission’s Guidance Paper on enforcement priorities, and the problem of distinguishing competition on the merits from illegimate conduct. The chapter looks at the different classifications of abuse, particularly exclusionary and exploitative abuses; the distinction between form- and effects-based approaches to types of abuse; the leveraging of market power between distinct markets as a theory of harm; the objective justification defence; and general issues in respect of abuses concerning prices, including the ‘as efficient competitor’ test. The chapter then examines the application of Article 102 to various forms of conduct, including: price discrimination; predatory pricing; selective low pricing; margin squeeze; exclusive dealing;; tying and bundling; refusal to supply; self-preferencing; malicious pursuit of legal proceedings; ‘regulatory gaming’; discrimination abuses; unfairly high and low pricing; hindering inter-Member State trade; and more novel claimed abuses within the digital economy.

Article 102 TFEU: Exclusive Dealing and Rebates

2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Peeperkorn ◽  
E. Rousseva
Keyword(s):  
Exclusive Dealing ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu
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