scholarly journals Behavioral Economics and Abuse of Dominance – A Fresh Look at the Article 102 TFEU Case-Law

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolas Petit ◽  
Norman Neyrinck
Keyword(s):  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu

17. Abuse of dominance (1): non-pricing practices

2021 ◽  
pp. 715-752
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Case Law ◽  
Single Market ◽  
Exclusive Dealing ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu

This chapter considers abusive non-pricing practices under Article 102 TFEU and the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998. It deals in turn with exclusive dealing agreements; tying; refusals to supply; abusive non-pricing practices that are harmful to the single market; and miscellaneous other non-pricing practices which might infringe Article 102 or the Chapter II prohibition. Reference is made to the case-law of the Court of Justice and the Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings

LOYALTY REBATES AND ABUSE OF DOMINANCE

2018 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-28
Author(s):  
Mark Friend
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
Missed Opportunity

THE recent judgment of the Court of Justice in Intel v Commission (Case C-413/14 P, EU:C:2017:632) deserves a cautious welcome for signalling a move to a more economics-based approach to the assessment of loyalty rebates under Article 102 TFEU, and for modulating the rigid legal presumptions that have characterised nearly four decades of case law. Yet it also represents a missed opportunity to provide a comprehensive analytical framework for one of the more unsatisfactory areas of EU competition law.

18. Abuse of dominance (2): pricing practices

2021 ◽  
pp. 753-806
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Single Market ◽  
High Price ◽  
Parallel Imports ◽  
Predatory Pricing ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
The Eu

This chapter considers abusive pricing practices under Article 102 TFEU and the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998. It first discusses various cost concepts used in determining whether a price is abusive. It then deals in turn with excessive pricing; conditional rebates; bundling; predatory pricing; margin squeeze; price discrimination; and practices that are harmful to the single market. This taxonomy is over-schematic, in that the categories overlap with one another: for example price discrimination may be both exploitative and exclusionary, and an excessively high price may in reality be a way of preventing parallel imports or of excluding a competitor from the market; nevertheless this division may provide helpful insights into the way in which the law is applied in practice. In each section the application of Article 102 by the European Commission and by the EU Courts will be considered first, followed by cases in the UK. Reference will be made where appropriate to the Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings.

18. Abuse of dominance (2): pricing practices

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Single Market ◽  
High Price ◽  
Parallel Imports ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
The Eu

This chapter considers abusive pricing practices under Article 102 TFEU and the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998. It discusses cost concepts used in determining whether a price is abusive and deals with excessive pricing; conditional rebates; bundling; predatory pricing; margin squeeze; price discrimination; and practices harmful to the single market. Price discrimination may be both exploitative and exclusionary and an excessively high price may be a way of preventing parallel imports or excluding a competitor from the market; but the division may provide helpful insights into the way in which the law is applied in practice. In each section the application of Article 102 by the European Commission and the EU Courts is considered, followed by cases in the UK. Where appropriate, reference is made to the Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings.

Platforms as regulators

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niamh Dunne
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Business Models ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Digital Platforms ◽  
Digital Era ◽  
Commission Report ◽  
Special Responsibility ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu

Abstract The proposition that certain digital platforms act as ‘regulators’ within their own business models is a key pillar of the European Commission report on Competition Policy for the Digital Era, and the basis upon which its authors build a wide-ranging duty for dominant platforms to secure competition that is ‘fair, unbiased and pro-users’. This article seeks to shed light on this novel contention, exploring its meaning and the implications for platform operators. It considers the rationale provided within the report and compares the approach with established Article 102 TFEU case law, specifically the ‘special responsibility’ doctrine. Consideration is further given to whether the platforms-as-regulators notion aligns with alternative modes of regulation within the digital sphere. The aim is to explore whether this approach is coherent, and actually useful, as a means by which to frame and direct future enforcement against digital platforms.

17. Abuse of dominance (1): non-pricing practices

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Single Market ◽  
Exclusive Dealing ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu

This chapter considers abusive non-pricing practices under Article 102 TFEU and the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998. It deals in turn with exclusive dealing agreements; tying; refusals to supply; abusive non-pricing practices that are harmful to the single market; and miscellaneous other non-pricing practices which might infringe Article 102 or the Chapter II prohibition. Reference is made where appropriate to the Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings.

scholarly journals Recent EU Case Law Developments: Article 102 TFEU

2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 138-147
Author(s):  
R. Subiotto ◽  
F. Malone ◽  
D. R. Little ◽  
C. de Brosses ◽  
S. Suciu
Keyword(s):  
Case Law ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu

scholarly journals Abuse of Dominance in the Case-law of the Hungarian Competition Authority – a Historical Overview

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (21) ◽  
pp. 99-128
Author(s):  
Ákos Réger ◽  
András M. Horváth
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Cost Allocation ◽  
Law And Economics ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Competition Authority ◽  
Historical Overview ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance

This paper provides a historical overview of the case-law and practices applied by the Hungarian Competition Authority (HCA) in abuse of dominance cases. The paper is co-written by practitioners of complementing antitrust fields, which ensures that both legal and economic considerations are explored. The paper identifies the unique characteristics of Hungarian legislation and case-law and critically evaluates them in light of EU competition law and economics principles. We analyse (i) the reasons for the high number of exploitative cases before 2010, (ii) the general principles applied by the HCA in exclusionary cases, (iii) the cost allocation assessments in dominance cases, and (iv) the issue of significant market power of retailers. The general starting point is that, judging by the number of dominance investigations, there is less antitrust enforcement by the HCA in recent years. However, the article concludes that less enforcement does not mean weaker enforcement. In fact, the quality of dominance cases, considering both legal and economic aspects, has increased over time. This tendency has also led to higher legal certainty in Hungary, which is beneficial for market players. Stronger criticism is only formulated against the concept of significant market power of retailers.

4 Abuse of Dominance

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Layne-Farrar Anne ◽  
Petit Nicolas
Keyword(s):  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Relevant Market ◽  
Dominant Firm ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Dominant Firms ◽  
Economic Tools ◽  
Firm Conduct ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu

This chapter focuses on Article 102 TFEU, which prohibits dominant firms from abusing their dominant position. Two elements need to be present for Article 102 to apply to a given firm conduct: (i) that firm must be dominant on one or several markets and (ii) it must have abused that dominant position. The first step in the assessment of dominance is to define the relevant market(s). Once such markets have been defined, various economic tools can be used to determine the extent to which one or several firms are dominant on them. For Article 102 to apply, it must be demonstrated that the dominant firm has committed one or several abuses on the market(s) in question. Article 102 prohibits two main categories of abuses: exclusionary abuses (Art 102(b) and (d)) and exploitative abuses (Art 102(a)). Article 102 also prohibits certain forms of price discrimination.

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