scholarly journals 4 Competition (Law Enforcement) and Economic Growth

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cheng Thomas K
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Developing Country ◽  
Minimum Degree ◽  
Growth Models ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Conflicting Evidence ◽  
Overwhelming Evidence ◽  
High Degree

This chapter assesses whether competition promotes economic growth. In contemplating the design of competition policy in a developing country, the first question to be answered is whether a policy that aims to maximize competition with competition law enforcement will deliver economic growth and meet the development needs of a developing country. As indicated by all the growth models examined in the previous chapter, the key to economic growth is the ability to create more output for the economy with existing resources; it relies on productivity gains and innovation. The chapter then examines whether competition promotes productivity growth and innovation. Overall, there is overwhelming evidence that increased competition leads to higher productivity and economic growth. There is also very strong evidence that competition law enforcement promotes productivity and economic growth. However, it should be noted that at least one study concludes that competition law enforcement has negligible effect on economic growth. Meanwhile, there is some conflicting evidence as to whether a minimum degree of institutional capacity is needed to allow a country to benefit from the introduction of competition law. One other factor that has been traditionally given a high degree of importance for economic growth in developing countries is foreign direct investment.

8 A Proposed Approach

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cheng Thomas K
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Developing Countries ◽  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Developing Country ◽  
Industrial Policy ◽  
Growth And Development ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Competition Authority ◽  
Economic Growth And Development ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement

This chapter offers a coherent approach to competition law enforcement in developing countries. The promotion of economic growth and development should be the paramount objective of competition law enforcement in developing countries. However, ascribing the objective of the promotion of economic growth and development to competition law enforcement in developing countries does not require a detraction from a focus on promoting competition. In addition, competition law enforcement in developing countries must abide by the principle of causing no harm to the poor in society. If a developing country decides to pursue industrial policy, its competition authority may be asked to balance between competition and industrial policy objectives. Ultimately, competition law enforcement in developing countries must take into account the economic characteristics of developing countries as well as the enforcement capacity of developing country authorities.

Competition Law in Developing Countries

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cheng Thomas K
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Economic Development ◽  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Developing Country ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
The Relationship

This book explores the relationship between competition law and economic development, which takes on growing importance as more and more developing countries have adopted competition law in recent years. The work tackles two principal questions. The first is whether competition law enforcement promotes growth, which helps to determine how seriously developing countries should enforce their competition laws. The second is how developing countries should craft their competition law rules in light of the need to incorporate development concerns, the need to reflect the special economic characteristics of developing countries, and the need to improve the administrability of competition law rules to suit the enforcement capacity of developing country authorities.

A Solution to the Problems? Regulation 1/2003 and the modernization of competition procedure

2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Montag ◽  
Andreas Rosenfeld
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Radical Reform ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Ec Competition Law

Abstract On 16th December 2002 the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 on the implementation of rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. This Regulation will not only replace the 40-year-old Regulation 17/ 62 but constitutes a radical reform of EC competition law enforcement. The purpose of this article is to analyse the basic principles of the new Regulation and the implications for current and future competition proceedings.

Super platforms, big data, and competition law: the Japanese approach in contrast with the USA and EU

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toshiaki Takigawa
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Digital Platforms ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Essential Facility ◽  
Share Data ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Data Portability ◽  
Efficiency Effects

ABSTRACT This article examines antitrust issues concerning digital platforms equipped with big data. Recent initiatives by the Japanese competition agency are highlighted, comparing them with those by the USA and EU competition authorities. First examined is whether competition among platforms would result in a select few super platforms with market power, concluding that AI with machine learning has augmented the power of super platforms with strong AI-capability, leading to increased importance of merger control over acquisitions by platforms. Next scrutinized is the argument for utility-regulation to be imposed on super platforms, concluding that wide support is limited to data portability, leaving competition law as the key tool for addressing super platforms, its core tool being the provision against exclusionary conduct, enforcement of which, initially, concerns whether to order super platforms to render their data accessible to their rivals. Passive refusal-to-share data needs to be scrutinized under the essential facility doctrine. Beyond passive refusal, platforms’ exclusionary conduct requires competition agencies to weigh the conduct’s exclusionary effects against its efficiency effects. Finally addressed is exploitative abuse, explaining its relation to consumer protection, concluding that competition law enforcement on exploitative abuse should be minimized, since it accompanies risk of over-enforcement.

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