Penggunaan Bukti Tidak Langsung Dan Penerapan Leniency Program Di Kasus Kartel Indonesia

Cartels as a Form of Unfair Business Competition KPPU often has difficulty proving it through direct evidence in accordance with Law No. 5/1999, so the alternative used by KPPU to obtain evidence is indirect evidence, and in practice this indirect evidence It is also not easy because it has not been regulated in Law No. 5/1999 so that the Supreme Court has not given any information regarding indirect evidence. The research method used by the author is normative research using library research to obtain data, and there is a need for clarity regarding procedural law from the KPPU. And the Authority of the KPPU in order to facilitate the handling of the KPPU on the Cartel Problem in Indonesia and amid the uncertainty of indirect evidence, the leniency of the program can also be used as an alternative in proving the occurrence of cartel actions carried out by business actors, and the application of evidence is not This directly was also adopted by other countries as well as the leniency program, and Indonesia also needs to follow this step to reduce cartels in Indonesia.

Leniency and Damage Liability for Cartel Members in Brazil

A recent debate on leniency policies is the interplay between the public and the private competition law enforcement. The lack of a well-established set of rules regarding damage claims may be harming the effectiveness of the Brazilian Leniency Program, either by discouraging the wrongdoers from applying for leniency in already formed cartels or by not being threatening enough to deter the cartel formation. The paper objective is to analyze the best policies for leniency applicants regarding the damage liability in Brazil. We conclude that the optimal policy is providing immunity to the leniency applicant, and after that the damage claim lawsuits can be encouraged with no undesirable effects. Extensions confirm the following: the immunity is even more effective when there is risk of betrayal; the immunity is the best policy in the case of ex-post leniency; the immunity is the optimal policy when there is no bankruptcy, otherwise the applicant liability should be the minimum necessary to avoid the bankruptcy; immunity regarding criminal sanctions for individuals is the optimal policy; for international cartels, the optimal policy is a combination of immunity regarding damage claims in all jurisdictions. JEL codes: L13; L41; L44

Optimal destabilization of cartels

This paper introduces an oligopoly model that includes three actors: a cartel (comprising two or more firms that operate like one merged company), a group of competing fringe firms, and a welfare maximizing antitrust authority. The cartel is the Stackelberg quantity leader and the fringe firms are in Cournot competition with respect to the residual demand. The cartel is internally stable if none of its member firms finds it profitable to become a fringe firm. The antitrust authority can destabilize the cartel in the sense of making the cartel internally instable. To this end, the antitrust authority has three policy instruments at its disposal: its own effort, a fine for detected cartels, and a leniency program for cartel members that cooperate with the authority. Taking into account that the use of these instruments is not costless for society, a unique optimal antitrust policy is derived. The analysis reveals that both, the optimal force and mix of the antitrust authority’s policy depend on market characteristics such as the efficiency of the authority’s operations, the public respect for the rule of law, the ethical standards of the firms’ managers, the market volume, and the number of firms operating on the market.

Upaya Pemberantasan Kartel dengan Pemberlakuan Leniency Program

This research is intended to explain whether the leniency program can be applied in Indonesia. In accordance with Law No. 5 of 1999, Indonesia currently has not implemented a leniency program in terms of cartel empowerment efforts. The Leniency Program is expected to be a solution to reduce and be able to open a veil of cartel that has been difficult to prove. Research method in this paper using normative method with the analysis of regulations and comparative law. The results of this study show that the leniency program that has been launched by the developed state can reduce and open cartel cases significantly. Even so, the application needs to be considered according to the needs of the country. In a number of other studies, developing countries that apply the leniency program only duplicate those that have been implemented by other countries so that their application is less effective. The amendment to the competition law is needed to applied leniency program

Direito antitruste, Lei Anticorrupção e acordo de leniência

The Brazilian Competition Defense System, built by Law 12,529 / 2011, received, in 2013, an important contribution from the Anti-Corruption Law (Law 12,846). In one of the aspects in common, the laws stipulate the Leniency Program or Agreement, aimed at recognizing the economic infraction and the corruptive business practice, facilitating the investigation of infractions, as well as any co-authors, in exchange for benefits regarding the punitive aspects. This essay intends, at first, to understand the origin and historical evolution of “leniency” in Brazil, differentiating the institutes foreseen in the CADE Law and in the Anticorruption Law. And, in a second step, to outline an analysis of the leniency agreement entered into by Odebrecht due to practices found in the scope of Operation Lava Jato. The investigation has a deductive method, starting from the analysis of legal institutes towards a practical case, rising from bibliographic analysis and the terms of the agreement in question.

ATTITUDES TOWARD COLLUSION IN CHILE

ABSTRACT In the last two decades, competition agencies around the world have increasingly directed their attention to enforcement against cartels. With the encouragement of the antitrust authorities of the United States, and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, various countries have introduced leniency programs, and sanctions for individuals found guilty of colluding. Critics are concerned, however, that these measures are not backed by broad public support, which could jeopardize their enforcement. This paper explores public attitudes toward cartels in Chile, an emerging economy that introduced a leniency program in 2009 and criminal sanctions in 2016, by presenting the results of a public opinion survey conducted in this country in August–September 2019. The results of the survey show high awareness of cartels and the harm they cause, and high public disapproval of cartel conduct among the Chilean respondents. In particular, up to 70 percent of the respondents support prison sentences against individuals found guilty of colluding. Such strong public support for anti-cartel measures could be considered positive from the perspective of enforcement. The results also emphasize the importance of continued competition advocacy directed at the society to explain and gain public support for the anti-cartel agenda.