3 Third Party Intervention

Author(s):  
Brealey Mark ◽  
George Kyla

This chapter focuses on the rights of third parties to intervene in competition proceedings in the High Court (and appellate courts) and in the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT). It first considers intervention by third parties in the High Court under Rule 19.2 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR), intervention in judicial review proceedings, and intervention in appeal proceedings. It then discusses intervention in CAT, placing emphasis on appeals and reviews (applying for permission to intervene, the time limit for making an application to intervene, the role played by intervener at the hearing). It also explains how compensation claims are made under CAT rule 16 before concluding with an analysis of intervention by competition authorities, namely the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) and the European Union Commission.

Author(s):  
Marek Świerczyński

Disputes arising from international data breaches can be complex. Despite the introduction of new, unified EU regulation on the protection of personal data (GDPR), the European Union failed to amend the Rome II Regulation on the applicable law to non-contractual liability and to extend its scope to the infringements of privacy. GDPR only contains provisions on international civil procedure. However, there are no supplementing conflict-of-law rules. In order to determine the applicable law national courts have to apply divergent and dispersed national codifications of private international law. The aim of this study is to propose an optimal conflict-of-law model for determining the applicable law in case of infringement of the GDPR’s privacy regime.


Author(s):  
Brealey Mark ◽  
George Kyla

This chapter discusses the special considerations that apply to identifying the relevant parties in competition litigation as well as the way that claimants may group together to commence collective proceedings. It first explains private actions in the High Court, with emphasis on the nature of claimant and defendant. It considers the category of claimant under Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and under the Competition Act 1998, along with the concept of ‘undertaking’, parent companies, subsidiary companies, and sister companies in relation to the defendants. The chapter also examines representative actions in the High Court during group litigation, collective proceedings in the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT), and settlement of collective proceedings. Different types of collective settlement are highlighted.


Author(s):  
Pietro Ortolani

One of the main purposes of private international law is the resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction in civil matters. In the European Union (EU), this goal is pursued by an articulate body of regulations, forming part of what is usually labelled as ‘European procedural law’ or ‘European civil procedure’. In criminal law, by contrast, no such system exists: although Eurojust aims at resolving conflicts of jurisdiction by facilitating the identification of the jurisdiction that should prosecute cross-​border crimes, no hard-​law instrument regulates this matter in a binding fashion.


2021 ◽  
pp. 613-648
Author(s):  
Ian Loveland

This chapter analyses the conduct and constitutional implications of the United Kingdom’s proposed withdrawal from the European Union. The chapter begins by examining the legal basis, conduct, and result of the withdrawal referendum. The chapter then assesses the High Court and Supreme Court decisions in the first of the two Miller judgments. It continues with a discussion on the extreme positions of ‘hard brexit’ and ‘soft brexit’ and the assesses the significance of the results of the unexpected 2017 general election. The chapter goes on to examine the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 and the subsequent fall of the May government and its replacement by an administration led by Boris Johnson. In the final part of the chapter the Miller (No 2) and Cherry litigation and its political aftermath are discussed in full, with a particular focus laid on the controversial way in which the Supreme Court deployed the notion of ‘justiciability’ in its judgment in Miller (No 2).


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 865-884
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Weiß ◽  
Cornelia Furculita

Abstract Considering the new focus of the European Union (EU) trade policy on strengthening the enforcement of trade rules, the article presents the proposed amendments to the EU Trade Enforcement Regulation 654/2014. It analyzes the EU Commission proposal and the amendments suggested by the European Parliament Committee on International Trade (INTA), in particular with regard to uncooperative third parties and the provision of immediate countermeasures. The amendments will be assessed in view of their legality under World Trade Organization (WTO), Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and general international law and in view of their political implications for the EU’s multilateralist stance. Finally, the opportunity to amend Regulation 654/2014 to use it for the enforcement of FTA trade and sustainable development chapters will be explored. The analysis shows that the shift towards more effective enforcement should be pursued with due care for respecting existing international legal commitments and with more caution to multilateralism.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 67-68
Author(s):  
Federico Ortino

Even when it comes to investment, despite appearances to the contrary, it does not seem to me that there is a shift to the non-discrimination principle. First, there is no doubt that absolute standards such as fair and equitable treatment or the provision on expropriation have by far overshadowed the relative standards, in particular national treatment. Second, while the MFN standard has, on the other hand, been a key provision in investment treaty arbitration, particularly as an instrument to expand the scope of the ISDS system (based on more favorable provisions found in third-party treaties), there are clear signs in recent investment treaties of the willingness to curtail the use of the MFN provision as a way to extend the procedural and substantive protections of investors. This seems to be the current position, for example, of both the United States and the European Union (EU). Third, when it comes to the apparent disappearance of the absolute standards of treatment in some of the treaties being negotiated by the European Union (such as with Japan), this is more simply due to a question of the nature of the EU external competence in commercial matters. In its recent opinion on the EU-Singapore FTA, the Court of Justice of the EU has determined that the EU does not have exclusive competence to conclude agreements covering non-FDI and ISDS. The EU has thus responded to such opinion by splitting investment protection (with ISDS) from the rest of the trade agreement, thus keeping investment liberalization (including market access and national treatment) in the latter. In this way, while the trade agreement will fall under the exclusive competence of the EU, the former will still require ratification by each member state. While it is not clear whether the backlash vis-à-vis investment protection and ISDS in some quarters within some of the member states will eventually lead to the end of EU investment treaties, a decision in this sense has not yet been taken by EU institutions.


1989 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-270
Author(s):  
Peter Kincaid

In a revolutionary but unsatisfactory recent decision, the High Court of Australia has allowed a third-party beneficiary of an insurance contract a right to sue the promisor. The decision casts doubt upon the whole doctrine of privity and ultimately upon bargain as the theoretical basis of promissory liability. The Trident case is unsatisfactory not because it allowed a third-party beneficiary a cause of action or because it challenges privity and bargain, but because it offers no satisfactory replacement for the theory of bargain. The reasons the court gave for recognising a right to sue are weak and inconsistent with the common law's approach to questions of civil liability. That approach is to give a plaintiff a cause of action against a defendant not solely because of something the defendant has done, but because there is a legally relevant link between what he has done and the plaintiff's condition. That is, the plaintiff must, in order to establish a right, satisfy some criterion for linking the defendant's behaviour to his complaint.


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