11. Vertical Agreements

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Eu Competition Policy ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Academic Debate

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter, which discusses EU competition policy towards vertical agreements, begins by outlining the choices available to a supplier when deciding how best to market and sell its products or services to customers, and the impact that the competition rules may have on a supplier's choice. It then discusses the EU approach to vertical restraints; the application of Article 101(1) and Article 101(3) to vertical agreements; sub-contracting agreements; and the possible application of Article 102 to distribution agreements.

11. Vertical Agreements

2019 ◽  
pp. 736-808
Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin ◽  
Niamh Dunne
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
Parallel Trade ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Exclusive Dealing ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Eu Competition Policy ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Block Exemption ◽  
The Eu

This chapter, which discusses EU competition policy towards vertical agreements, begins by outlining the choices available to a supplier when deciding how best to market and sell its products or services to customers, and the impact that the competition rules may have on a supplier's choice, including the treatment of agency agreements. It then discusses the EU approach to vertical agreements, in the light of the Commission’s Verticals Guidelines of 2010, including exclusive dealing, single branding, franchising andselective distribution agreements, and the review of the 2010 regime. It considers the importance in EU law of parallel trade between Member States and how this has influenced policy towards vertical restraints. It analyses the application of Article 101(1) and Article 101(3) to vertical agreements, including the Verticals block exemption of 2010; sub-contracting agreements; and the possible application of Article 102 to distribution agreements.

scholarly journals The Constitutional Limits of EU Competition Law—United in Diversity

2019 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-283
Author(s):  
Chris Townley ◽  
Alexander H. Türk
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Eu Competition Policy ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
The Eu

The allocation of legislative and executive competences in multilevel governance structures affects who controls norms. Over the last two decades we see a general trend in EU law, towards “flexibility, mixity and differentiation.” Yet many think that EU competition policy and enforcement marches to a different tune. Competence is rarely discussed there and, when it is, most assume that uniformity is desirable. This article discusses the EU constitutional system as it relates to competition policy and enforcement. It investigates what choices the EU Treaties make about diversity. As with many constitutional arrangements, the EU Treaties sometimes leave space for others to decide. In these spaces we advocate answers, based on our understanding of the constitutional settlement between the EU and the Member States. This has major implications for, amongst others: the Commission’s power to relieve the Member States’ national competition authorities (NCAs) of their competence to apply Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); the vires of EU merger control outside of the remit of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU; Commission efforts to make the NCAs more independent of political influence; and the resolution of conflicts between EU and national competition rules.

scholarly journals Industry 4.0 Significance to competition and the EU competition policy

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 244-258
Author(s):  
Manuela Tvaronaviciene ◽  
Arunas Burinskas
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Industry 4.0 ◽  
Eu Competition Policy ◽  
The Eu

13. An introduction to EU competition policy and law

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Merger Policy ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Eu Competition Policy ◽  
The Eu

This chapter provides an introduction to Competition Policy and law in the European Union (EU). It covers the principal rules of EU competition law, namely Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and also considers the enforcement of the competition law regime and merger policy and regulation in the EU.

Competence Allocation in the EU Competition Policy System as an Interest-Driven Process

2005 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-337 ◽  
Author(s):  
OLIVER BUDZINSKI ◽  
ANDT CHRISTIANSEN
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Reform Process ◽  
Policy Enforcement ◽  
European Level ◽  
Business Associations ◽  
Policy System ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Eu Competition Policy ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Cartel Policy

This paper provides a positive analysis of the evolution of competence allocation within the EU Competition Policy System. In the EU, competition policy competences are ascribed both to the European level and to each Member State. In regard to securing a sound antitrust system, the allocation and delimitation of these competences plays a major role. Accordingly, competence allocation has been a major issue in the recent reforms of cartel policy enforcement and merger control. Instead of normatively analysing the characteristics of optimal competence allocation, we positively identify the self-interest of the interacting groups of agents – European Commission and Courts, national authorities, business associations –  as a major-driving force of the reform process. We show that, as a consequence, the interest-driven outcomes of this process are largely ineffective and deficient – even if evaluated against the background of the publicly announced reform goals. This stands in accordance with longer-term patterns in competence allocation evolution in the EU Competition Policy System.

10. Horizontal Cooperation Agreements

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin
Keyword(s):  
Research And Development ◽  
Joint Ventures ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Horizontal Cooperation ◽  
Eu Competition Policy ◽  
Academic Debate

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter discusses EU competition policy towards horizontal cooperation agreements. It covers joint ventures; the contents of the 2010 Guidelines; the general approach to horizontal cooperation agreements in the Guidelines; information agreements; research and development agreements; production agreements; purchasing agreements; commercialisation agreements; standardisation agreements; and agreements in particular sectors.

EU will be reluctant to change competition policy

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Global Economy ◽  
Rolling Stock ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Industrial Companies ◽  
Rise Of China ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Eu Competition Policy ◽  
Railway Engineering ◽  
The Rise Of China

Subject EU competition policy. Significance The European Commission will decide next month whether to allow a merger between the railway engineering businesses of Siemens (Germany) and Alstom (France), two of the largest European industrial companies. The proposed merger and the Commission’s oversight of it have reopened a debate about the relationship between competition policy and the strategic competitiveness of European firms in the global economy, with the rise of China a particular concern. Impacts The United Kingdoms' exit from the EU will be a blow to the Nordic countries and Ireland, all sceptical of EU competition rules. The transport market for new rolling stock and infrastructure may be hit by a global slowdown. Siemens could seek a merger with Canadian transport company Bombardier if the proposed Siemens-Alstom merger is prohibited.

The Impact of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the Georgian Legal System

2020 ◽  
pp. 241-262
Author(s):  
Gaga Gabrichidze
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Association Agreement ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
System P ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Eu

This chapter scrutinizes perception of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) by the Georgian courts and the Georgian Competition Agency. With the conclusion of the Association Agreement between the EU and Georgia in 2014, the Georgian legal system undoubtedly became more closely connected with EU law. Hence, approximation commitments under the Association Agreement made the case law of the CJEU of much more relevance for the Georgian courts and administrative authorities. However, in the wake of intensification of EU–Georgia relations, the impact of CJEU case law can be identified even in the time before conclusion of the Association Agreement. Analysis shows that several factors play a role with regard to the extent and frequency of mentioning CJEU case law in the decisions of the Georgian courts and Competition Agency. Judges refer to case law of the CJEU with the aim of either strengthening their own arguments or using it as a source of interpretation. Taking into consideration the ‘European’ roots of Georgia’s competition policy, the Competition Agency regards the case law of the CJEU as having a very important interpretative value for closing ‘gaps’ in the law.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document