Offences Against the Administration of Justice and Public Interest

Author(s):  
Paul Connor

Once the conviction has been set aside, there could be no public policy objection to an action for negligence against the legal advisers. There could be no conflict of judgments. On the other hand, in civil, including matrimonial, cases, it would seldom be possible to say that an action for negligence against a legal adviser or representative would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Whether the original decision was right or wrong was usually a matter of concern only to the parties and had no wider implications. There was no public interest objection to a subsequent finding that, but for the negligence of his lawyers, the losing party would have won. But again there might be exceptions. The action for negligence might be an abuse of process on the ground that it was manifestly unfair to someone else. Take, for example, the case of a defendant who published a serious defamation which he attempted unsuccessfully to justify. Should he be able to sue his lawyers and claim that if the case had been conducted differently, the allegation would have been proved to be true? It seemed unfair to the plaintiff in the defamation action that any court should be allowed to come to such a conclusion in proceedings to which he was not a party. On the other hand, it was equally unfair that he should have to join as a party and rebut the allegation for a second time. A man's reputation was not only a matter between him and the other party. It represented his relationship with the world. So it might be that in such circumstances, an action for negligence would be an abuse of the of the court. Having regard to the power of the court to strike out actions which had no prospect ofsuccess, the doctrine unlikely in that context to be invoked very often. The first step in any application to strike out an action alleging negligence in the conduct of a previous action had to be to ask whether it had a real prospect of success. Lord Hope, Lord Hutton and Lord Hobhouse delivered judgments in which they agreed that the immunity from suit was no longer required in relation to civil proceedings but dissented to the extent of saying that the immunity was still required in the public interest in the administration of justice in relation to criminal proceedings. Comment This decision is of major and historic importance in the English legal system for several reasons. It can be seen as a bold attempt by the senior judiciary to drag the legal profession (often a metonymy for the whole legal system) into the 21st century world of accountability and fair business practice. In his judgment, Lord Steyn makes this dramatic observation:

2012 ◽  
pp. 506-508

1979 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 329-366
Author(s):  
Garth Nettheim

Individuals and organisations are frequently required to provide public agencies with information about their affairs which they would not wish disseminated to others. Income tax returns represent one illustration. From time to time attempts are made to compel the recipient public agencies to produce such material as evidence in court proceedings. The agency may resist disclosure on the basis of a statutory secrecy provision and/or a claim to Crown privilege. The court is thus required to resolve a conflict between competing public interests: the public interest in the proper administration of justice, and the public interest in the ability of the agency to maintain the confidentiality of information entrusted to it. Professor Nettheim considers a number of decided cases and concludes that, on the whole, the courts have failed to develop a body of principles adequate to deal with the situation. In particular, established Crown privilege doctrines about waiver and secondary evidence are inappropriate in this context. The author puts forward a suggested model of principles and procedures, and notes that similar issues may arise for adjudication under Freedom of Information legislation, particularly in the form of the “reverse FOIA lawsuit”.


2005 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-83
Author(s):  
Chris Taylor

This article examines recent developments in the law of public interest immunity (PII), a mechanism for the non-disclosure of sensitive material to the defence which continues to cause concern as a potential source of injustice. The article considers the lessons to be learned from recent decisions, most notably the London City Bond cases which saw a large number of prosecutions tainted by misuse of PII. This series of cases illustrated the ethical dilemma faced by investigators anxious to preserve covert intelligence sources, primarily informants, and the way in which the courts may be misled during PII applications in order to avoid jeopardising the prosecution. The article then considers a number of recent domestic and European decisions which have sought to refine the procedure for considering PII applications in order to evaluate their impact on the trial process and the administration of justice.


2012 ◽  
pp. 503-503

1997 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Forsyth

Public Interest Immunity—previously known as Crown privilege—is an exclusionary rule of evidence. When it applies, it excludes relevant evidence (usually but not exclusively documents) from production in court. Thus when the rule applies the public interest in the due administration of justice has given way to a greater public interest that calls for the evidence in question to remain secret. It has been much discussed recently, not least in the Scott Report which made several suggestions for reform and, more significantly, revealed in detail how PII claims were used by the government in litigation. The government has responded by announcing important reforms. A review of developments is thus appropriate.


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