International Human Rights Law in Time of Armed Conflict

Author(s):  
Derek Jinks

The Geneva Conventions of 1949 govern automatically warfare as well as international and non-international armed conflicts. The applicability of the ‘law of war’ was previously delimited by formal acts of state such as a declaration of war or a formal ‘recognition of belligerency’, a formalistic approach that was significantly revised by the Geneva Conventions. This chapter examines the relationship between IHL and international human rights law (IHRL). It first discusses the nature of the ‘armed conflict’ inquiry and considers IHL aslex specialisdisplacing or qualifying the application of IHRL. It then outlines three fundamental respects in which thelex specialisclaim misconstrues or distorts IHL: IHL and affirmative authorization, ‘armed conflict’ as determinant of regime boundaries, and reciprocity and humanitarian protection as inducement for compliance. It argues that the very notion of competing legal frameworks is incompatible not only with the text, structure, and history of the Geneva Conventions, but also with the institutional and behavioral foundations of contemporary IHL.

2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 220-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Marie Kamatali

Since the end of the Cold War, the world has experienced a decrease in international conflict and a significant increase in non-international armed conflict (niac). Despite this change, however, international law has been very slow in adapting its laws that initially were crafted with international armed conflict in mind to the new niac environment. There is a growing recognition that international humanitarian law (ihl) is not well equipped to deal with issues of human rights violations committed during niac. New efforts to make international human rights law (ihrl) applicable in such conflicts have, however, raised more questions than answers. There is still no consensus on whether international human rights law applies to niac. Furthermore, the question on whether non-international armed groups are bound by international human rights obligations remains controversial. This article tries to analyze where international law stands now of these questions. It proposes steps international law could follow to move from its current rhetoric to a more practical solution on these questions. The three solutions proposed are: individual agreements to respect human rights during armed conflict, the possibility of an icj advisory opinion and the option of a protocol additional to international human rights treaties relating to their application in niac.


2007 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 310-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cordula Droege

International human rights law and international humanitarian law are traditionally two distinct branches of law, one dealing with the protection of persons from abusive power, the other with the conduct of parties to an armed conflict. Yet, developments in international and national jurisprudence and practice have led to the recognition that these two bodies of law not only share a common humanist ideal of dignity and integrity but overlap substantially in practice. The most frequent examples are situations of occupation or non-international armed conflicts where human rights law complements the protection provided by humanitarian law.This article provides an overview of the historical developments that led to the increasing overlap between human rights law and humanitarian law. It then seeks to analyse the ways in which the interplay between human rights law and humanitarian law can work in practice. It argues that two main concepts inform their interaction: The first is complementarity between their norms in the sense that in most cases, especially for the protection of persons in the power of a party to the conflict, they mutually reinforce each other. The second is the principle of lex specialis in the cases of conflict between the norms.


2016 ◽  
Vol 65 (4) ◽  
pp. 791-827 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christof Heyns ◽  
Dapo Akande ◽  
Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne ◽  
Thompson Chengeta

AbstractThis article provides a holistic examination of the international legal frameworks which regulate targeted killings by drones. The article argues that for a particular drone strike to be lawful, it must satisfy the legal requirements under all applicable international legal regimes, namely: the law regulating the use of force (ius ad bellum); international humanitarian law and international human rights law. It is argued that the legality of a drone strike under the ius ad bellum does not preclude the wrongfulness of that strike under international humanitarian law or international human rights law, and that since those latter obligations are owed to individuals, one State cannot consent to their violation by another State. The article considers the important legal challenges that the use of armed drones poses under each of the three legal frameworks mentioned above. It considers the law relating to the use of force by States against non-State groups abroad. This part examines the principles of self-defence and consent, in so far as they may be relied upon to justify targeted killings abroad. The article then turns to some of the key controversies in the application of international humanitarian law to drone strikes. It examines the threshold for non-international armed conflicts, the possibility of a global non-international armed conflict and the question of who may be targeted in a non-international armed conflict. The final substantive section of the article considers the nature and application of the right to life in armed conflict, as well as the extraterritorial application of that right particularly in territory not controlled by the State conducting the strike.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 723-752 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simone Hutter

Abstract Armed conflict can cause food shortages, which continue long after the fighting is over, and increase the chance that a famine may occur. When it occurs during the context of an armed conflict, death resulting from hunger is tolerated by the international community. Yet, the prevention or alleviation of famines, even within environmentally precarious regions, is often within human control. This gives rise to the following questions. Can a state use the outbreak of an armed conflict as an excuse to remain passive while starvation takes its course? Is it justified for a state to allocate most of its resources to its military operations, while claiming to have difficulties to collect sufficient resources to meet its minimum core obligations under international human rights law? This article aims to clarify these complex questions and elaborates on how the framework of human rights law includes provisions to prevent starvation in armed conflicts. With a focus on the right to food, this analysis scrutinizes the human rights-based obligations to respect, protect and fulfil, which impose clear duties on states with respect to famines. As it is generally accepted that international human rights law continues to apply in situations of armed conflict, both human rights law and international humanitarian law apply simultaneously in these scenarios. The analysis thus also examines the complex relationship between obligations under human rights law and humanitarian law and the influence of the former on the assessment of latter. Finally, the article touches upon the scope of obligations held by armed non-state actors.


2015 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne

AbstractThis article offers a fresh examination of the distinction drawn in international humanitarian law (IHL) between international and non-international armed conflicts. In particular, it considers this issue from the under-explored perspective of the influence of international human rights law (IHRL). It is demonstrated how, over time, the effect of IHRL on this distinction in IHL has changed dramatically. Whereas traditionally IHRL encouraged the partial elimination of the distinction between types of armed conflict, more recently it has been invoked in debates in a manner that would preserve what remains of the distinction. By exploring this important issue, it is hoped that the present article will contribute to the ongoing debates regarding the future development of the law of non-international armed conflict.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 337-370
Author(s):  
Frédéric Mégret ◽  
Chloe Swinden

Although the regime applicable to the return of remains of combatants in international armed conflict is well known, the regime applicable in non-international armed conflicts is less clear. This is particularly the case when the members of armed groups are deemed to be ‘terrorists’ by the State which then refuses to return them to their families. The article examines how a Russian law to that effect has been examined and found wanting by the European Court of Human Rights. It suggests that the return of remains following non-international armed conflicts raises characteristic issues for the debate on the simultaneous and competing applicability of international humanitarian and international human rights law.


Author(s):  
Paul David Mora

SummaryIn its recent decision in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that Italy had failed to respect immunities enjoyed by Germany under international law when the Italian courts allowed civil actions to be brought against Germany for alleged violations of international human rights law (IHRL) and the law of armed conflict (LOAC) committed during the Second World War. This article evaluates the three arguments raised by Italy to justify its denial of immunity: first, that peremptory norms of international law prevail over international rules on jurisdictional immunities; second, that customary international law recognizes an exception to immunity for serious violations of IHRL or the LOAC; and third, that customary international law recognizes an exception to immunity for torts committed by foreign armed forces on the territory of the forum state in the course of an armed conflict. The author concludes that the ICJ was correct to find that none of these arguments deprived Germany of its right under international law to immunity from the civil jurisdiction of the Italian courts.


Author(s):  
Sandesh Sivakumaran

This chapter examines international humanitarian law, the principal body of international law which applies in times of armed conflict, and which seeks to balance the violence inherent in an armed conflict with the dictates of humanity. International humanitarian law protects the civilian population from the ravages of conflict, and establishes limitations on the means and methods of combat. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 considers the nature of international humanitarian law and identifies some of its cardinal principles and key rules. Section 3 explores the similarities and differences between international humanitarian law and international human rights law, comparing and contrasting their historical origins and conceptual approaches. Given that international humanitarian law applies during armed conflict, Section 4 considers whether there is a need for international human rights law also to apply. Section 5 ascertains the relationship between the two bodies of law and Section 6 considers some of the difficulties with the application of international human rights law in time of armed conflict.


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