Most-Favored-Nation Clauses

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jordi Bonet
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
General Purpose ◽  
Equal Treatment ◽  
International Treaties ◽  
Most Favored Nation ◽  
Intergovernmental Cooperation ◽  
Treaty Provision ◽  
Most Favored Nation Clause ◽  
International Law Commission ◽  
Law Commission

A most-favored-nation clause (MFNC) is a specific treaty provision “whereby a State [the granting State] undertakes an obligation towards another State [the beneficiary State] to accord most-favored treatment in an agreed sphere of relations” (Article 4 of the draft on most-favored-nation clauses adopted by the International Law Commission at its thirtieth session in 1978). The general purpose of a MFNC is to grant most favored treatment (MFNT) within spheres of relations generally connected to areas of bilateral or multilateral intergovernmental cooperation varying in scope. MFNT is a standard of treatment accorded by the granting state to the beneficiary state, or to persons or things in a determined relationship with that state; this means that MFNT could also be employed to benefit persons or things that have an identified link with the beneficiary state (for example, citizenship or product origin) and not only in reciprocal interstate relationships. The International Law Commission (ILC) points out that MFNT involves granting treatment not less favorable than treatment extended by the granting state to a third state or to persons or things in the same relationship with that third state; the ILC prefers the wording “not less favorable” to the alternative “equal treatment” because it is the phrase commonly used in MFNCs and because MFNCs cannot prevent the granting state from bestowing on the beneficiary state additional advantages to those applied to the most-favored third state. In sum, the purpose of MFNCs is to maintain fundamental equality among all the states concerned in the relevant fields. On the other hand, even if MFNT could theoretically arise from the unilateral conduct of states, whether or not based on reciprocity or on nonbinding instruments (as political agreements), conventional MFNCs inserted in international treaties have become the most effective tool to ensure MFNT and its reciprocal extension to all parties since unilateral clauses granting such treatment are, if in use at all, rather exceptional nowadays.

The Twenty-Fifth Session of the International Law Commission

1974 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 454-474 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard D. Kearney
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Limited Time ◽  
Most Favored Nation ◽  
Forced Draft ◽  
Most Favored Nation Clause ◽  
International Law Commission ◽  
Fourth Session ◽  
Law Commission

At its Twenty-Fifth Session the International Law Commission determined to allot some of its limited time to each of the active subjects on its agenda. The decision was the child of necessity. The Draft Articles on the Representation of States in Their Relations with International Organizations had taken up most of the Commissions sessions in 1969, 1970, and 1971, and the Twenty-Fourth Session in 1972 had, under forced draft, produced the draft articles on the Succession of States to Treaties and on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Diplomatic Agents and Other Internationally Protected Persons. The inevitable byproduct was a mounting pressure, both within the Commission and from the General Assembly, for intensive examination of the draft articles and commentaries on State Responsibility, Succession of States in Matters Other Than Treaties, the Most-Favored-Nation Clause, and the Report on Treaties Concluded Between States and International Organizations.

scholarly journals Treaty-Making Capacity of  Components of Federal States from the Perspective of the Works of the UN International Law Commission

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 9
Author(s):  
Karol Karski ◽  
Tomasz Kamiński
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Federal State ◽  
Vienna Convention ◽  
International Treaties ◽  
Federal States ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law ◽  
Formed Part ◽  
International Law Commission ◽  
Law Commission

The submitted paper concerns the treaty-making capacity of components of federal (non-unitary) states. As the division of powers in respect to the conclusion of international treaties between a federal state and its components is based on the provisions of internal federal law, the authors decided to start the consideration of the topic with the presentation of selected appropriate internal law regulations of federal states. Although the study concentrates on an analysis of Swiss and German constitutional rules on the subject, the provisions of i.a. Belgian, US and Canadian law are also commented upon. Therefore it apparently seems to be an important legal question.The treaty-making capacity of components of federal (non-unitary) states was comprehensively discussed during the International Law Commission preparatory works on the regulation on the law of treaties. The provisions dedicated to that issue formed part of the reports prepared by each of the ILC Special Rapporteurs on the subject. The paper presents the draft propositions submitted by them, the views of ILC members, and responses received from states.The final draft of ILC articles on the law of treaties contained a paragraph concerning the issue at stake (than art. 5 § 2 of the draft) stipulating that member states of a federal union may possess such capacity only if such capacity is admitted by the federal constitution and within the scope defined therein. Nevertheless, this issue was omitted in the 1969 Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties (VCLT). Art. 6 of the VCLT on the capacity of States to conclude treaties does not mention the rights of components of federal states. It consists of one paragraph simply stating that every State possesses the capacity to conclude treaties. And the term ‘state’ for the purposes of that regulation possesses the same meaning as i.a. in the Charter of the United Nations, that is a State for the purposes of international law, or a state in the international meaning of that term.This does not mean however that territorial units forming a part of a federal state cannot conclude international agreements. But, this issue depends both on the provisions of internal law of the given state and on the practice of the states recognising the potential rights of the components of the federal (non-unitary) states in respect to conclusion of the treaties.

More on the Depositary of International Treaties

1970 ◽  
Vol 64 (5) ◽  
pp. 838-852 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shabtai Rosenne
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
International Law ◽  
Previous Article ◽  
Vienna Convention ◽  
International Treaties ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The Law ◽  
International Law Commission ◽  
Law Commission ◽  
Made In

The purpose of this article is to bring up to date the present writer’s previous article on “The Depositary of International Treaties” published in this Journal, in the light of the deliberations of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties in 1968 and 1969 and the changes there made in the texts. The relevant provisions now appear as Articles 76, 77 and 78 of the so-called Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, corresponding to Articles 71, 72 and 73 of the draft articles on the law of treaties of the International Law Commission.

The Depositary of International Treaties

1967 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
pp. 923-945 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shabtai Rosenne
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
International Law ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Special Rapporteur ◽  
International Treaties ◽  
International Treaty ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The Law ◽  
International Law Commission ◽  
Law Commission

The Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties completed in 1966 by the International Law Commission and submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations, on the basis of proposals by the Special Rapporteur, Sir Humphrey Waldock, contain, in Part VII (entitled “Depositaries, Notifications, Corrections and Registration”), three articles—Articles 71, 72 and 73—dealing directly with the depositary of an international treaty; and throughout the Draft Articles are to be found other provisions which directly or indirectly relate to the same institution of contemporary international law and relations.

On the Road to Vienna

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Bruns
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
International Law ◽  
The Road ◽  
Progressive Development ◽  
History Of ◽  
On The Road ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
International Law Commission ◽  
Law Commission

This chapter focuses on the negotiations that preceded the 1961 Vienna Conference (which led to the conclusion of the VCDR). The author challenges the view that the successful codification was an obvious step and refers in this regard to a history of intense negotiation which spanned fifteen years. With particular reference to the International Law Commission (ILC), the chapter explores the difficult task faced by ILC members to strike a balance between the codification of existing practice and progressive development of diplomatic law. It reaches the finding that the ILC negotiations were crucial for the success of the Conference, but notes also that certain States supported a less-binding form of codification. The chapter also underlines the fact that many issues that had caused friction between the Cold War parties were settled during the preparatory meetings and remained largely untouched during the 1961 negotiations.

Approaches for Analysing Norm Relationships

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Resolution ◽  
Intellectual Property ◽  
International Law ◽  
Structure Building ◽  
Analytical Structure ◽  
Rules And Principles ◽  
Logical Order ◽  
International Law Commission ◽  
Rule Systems ◽  
Law Commission

This chapter discusses conflict-resolution tools and develops an analytical structure building on rules and principles in international intellectual property (IP) treaties, other rule-systems, and general international law to define norm relationships of interpretation and of conflict. Several tools are taken from the ‘toolbox’ developed in the Fragmentation Report of the International Law Commission and other fragmentation literature. Depending on the type of relationship at stake, the most appropriate legal tools to address them may vary. The ILC Report and Conclusions provide for some of the tools and to some extent for an analytical structure, a logical order for examining these relationships. As the chapter shows, for some types of legal relations other approaches are more adequate. They hence complement the ILC principles and need to be integrated in the set of tools available.

Due diligence as a secondary rule of general international law

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Richard Mackenzie-Gray Scott
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Due Diligence ◽  
Legal Practice ◽  
Formed Part ◽  
International Law Commission ◽  
Domestic Law ◽  
Secondary Rule ◽  
Law Making ◽  
Law Commission ◽  
Do So

Abstract The conventional understanding of due diligence in international law appears to be that it is a concept that forms part of primary rules. During the preparatory stages in creating the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), the International Law Commission (ILC) focused on due diligence as though it could have formed part of secondary rules. Despite this process, no due diligence provision forms part of the ARSIWA. Yet a number of the final provisions are based on primary rules. This is because the ILC relied on the method of extrapolation in attempts to create secondary rules. Extrapolation is a method of international law-making by which the output of an analytical process is reproduced in a different form following an examination of its content that exists in other forms. In using this method, the ILC attempted to create secondary rules by extrapolating from primary rules. Yet it did not do so with respect to due diligence. However, due diligence can be formulated and applied differently by using this same method. This article analyses the steps of this process to construct a vision of where international legal practice should venture in the future. In learning from and amalgamating the dominant trends in different areas of international and domestic law, this article proposes that due diligence could exist as a secondary rule of general international law. By formulating and applying due diligence as a secondary rule, there is potential to develop the general international law applicable to determining state responsibility for the conduct of non-state actors.

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