Institutions, Power, and Institutional Balance

Institutional balance, as opposed to strict separation of powers, characterized the disposition of legislative and executive power in the EEC from the outset. The chapter is divided into four temporal periods. The initial period runs between the Rome Treaty and the Single European Act 1986 (SEA). The discussion begins with the initial disposition of institutional power in the Rome Treaty, and charts the way in which this shifted during the first thirty years. The second section covers the period between the SEA and the Nice Treaty, in which there was growing consensus in normative terms as to the appropriate disposition of primary legislative power, but continuing contestation as to power over secondary rule-making and the locus of executive authority. These tensions were readily apparent in the third period, which covers the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty. The fourth period runs from the advent of the Lisbon Treaty to the present. The EU has been beset by a series of crises, which had implications for the powers of the respective EU institutions and the institutional balance between them.

Due diligence as a secondary rule of general international law

The conventional understanding of due diligence in international law appears to be that it is a concept that forms part of primary rules. During the preparatory stages in creating the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), the International Law Commission (ILC) focused on due diligence as though it could have formed part of secondary rules. Despite this process, no due diligence provision forms part of the ARSIWA. Yet a number of the final provisions are based on primary rules. This is because the ILC relied on the method of extrapolation in attempts to create secondary rules. Extrapolation is a method of international law-making by which the output of an analytical process is reproduced in a different form following an examination of its content that exists in other forms. In using this method, the ILC attempted to create secondary rules by extrapolating from primary rules. Yet it did not do so with respect to due diligence. However, due diligence can be formulated and applied differently by using this same method. This article analyses the steps of this process to construct a vision of where international legal practice should venture in the future. In learning from and amalgamating the dominant trends in different areas of international and domestic law, this article proposes that due diligence could exist as a secondary rule of general international law. By formulating and applying due diligence as a secondary rule, there is potential to develop the general international law applicable to determining state responsibility for the conduct of non-state actors.

Defences in International Criminal LawExceptions in International Law?

This chapter analyses the concept of defences in international criminal law. It starts off with some general conceptual remarks defining defences, on a meta level, as exceptions to the (secondary) rule expressed by the respective offence; as such, they do not invalidate this rule—the prohibition sub poena by the offence—but entail its non-application. In the main part, the chapter proposes a systematization along the lines of a substantive/procedural distinction (substantive reasons to exclude individual criminal responsibility versus procedural obstacles/bars to criminal prosecution) and further distinguishing between full and partial defences, justifications and excuses, failure of proof defences, and alibi. On the basis of this classification, a hierarchy of defences is suggested.

Self-Defence against Non-state Actors: The Interaction between Self-Defence as a Primary Rule and Self-Defence as a Secondary Rule

This article examines the law of self-defence as applied to non-state attacks in light of the coalition air strikes against ISIL in Syria. It critiques the two current interpretations of the law of self-defence – one based on attribution and the other on the ‘unable or unwilling’ test – for failing to address adequately the security threat posed by non-state actors or for not addressing convincingly the legal issues arising from the fact that the self-defence action unfolds on the territory of another state. For this reason, it proposes an alternative framework which combines the primary rule of self-defence to justify the use of defensive force against non-state actors, with the secondary rule of self-defence to excuse the incidental breach of the territorial state's sovereignty.

The ‘Responsibility Not to Veto’, Secondary Rules, and the Rule of Law

In this article I argue that the concept of secondary rules provides a useful tool for analysing the interplay of politics and law in the evolution of the ‘responsibility not to veto’, which represents an attempt to subject the Security Council to the rule of law. Secondary rules help to maintain the law’s overall coherence, thereby bolstering its legitimacy and hence its ability to effectively govern human conduct. Most accounts of secondary rule-making overstate the role of power while underestimating the need for powerful states to argue within the parameters set by the law itself. This contribution, by contrast, explores the interaction of power and law, and the role of secondary rules therein. It shows that the international legal order currently lacks coherence as there is no consensus on overarching principles. Hence, the legitimacy crisis of the Security Council is at the same time a legitimacy crisis of international law.

‘Rules about rules’ and the endogenous dynamics of international law: Dissonance reduction as a mechanism of secondary rule-making

We can observe some developments that indicate a further strengthening of human rights and the rule of law even after 2001. These developments are puzzling as they occurred despite largely unfavourable scope conditions. This article offers an account of these developments that focuses on dynamics endogenous to the law. These internal dynamics provide a causal mechanism that sets in once a certain threshold of legalization has been reached. We employ the Hartian notion of secondary rules which we think is an especially helpful conceptual tool to analyse the endogenous dynamics of legal systems. To the extent that law is programmed towards consistency, secondary rules become necessary in an environment of rapidly increasing legal density to govern the complexity resulting from this proliferation of norms. Upholding consistency is necessary to maintain the autonomy of law in a Luhmannian sense and the ‘morality’ of the legal system in a Fullerian sense. Our goal is to show this and at the same move beyond an argument of system or normative functionality by identifying causal mechanisms that can explain the law’s built-in drive towards secondary rules, and that are in accordance with broader social science theory. We use some insights from cognitive psychology to develop these causal mechanisms further. While testing these causal mechanisms would be beyond the scope of this paper, we hope to provide the conceptual tools for future empirical research on the dynamics of secondary rule-making and offer some empirical illustrations to demonstrate how dissonance reduction operates in practice.

The Notion of Consent in Part One of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility

For over three decades, it has been the International Law Commission's position that the circumstance of consent involves something other than the consent which, through the rule pacta sunt servanda, imparts objective force to international agreements. During the tenure of the second Special Rapporteur on the law of state responsibility, Roberto Ago, the Commission adopted the view that the former suspends the international obligations which are incumbent on states whereas the latter functions to create, modify, or extinguish the rules whence such obligations stem forth. However, as the result of the study carried out by its last Special Rapporteur, James Crawford, the Commission has now come to distinguish between the circumstance of consent defined as a justification for non-performance of subsisting obligations, and consent defined as a requirement for the application of obligations. In this contribution, it is argued that both analyses are problematic. The former gives succour to a mistaken view of the sources of international law. The latter is based on a misunderstanding of the primary-rule–secondary-rule terminology; it justifies itself by referring to an ill-conceived definition of the notion of peremptory norms, and no less importantly undermines the purposefully cumbersome mechanism envisaged in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties for suspension of multilateral treaties as between certain of the contracting parties only.