Ambiguity and long-run cooperation in strategic games

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Rojas ◽  
Damián Vergara
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Parametric Model ◽  
Strategic Games ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Noncooperative Equilibrium ◽  
Ex Ante

Abstract We study the effects of ambiguity on long-run cooperation in infinitely repeated strategic games. Using a simple parametric model of ambiguity, we study conditions for sustaining cooperative equilibria in the long-run. We apply our framework to the prisoner’s dilemma and duopoly models. We find that (i) ambiguity may affect the game’s structure eventually making the noncooperative equilibrium ex ante preferred; (ii) higher levels of ambiguity make long-run cooperation less likely since it makes punishment schemes less effective; and (iii) large levels of ambiguity may preclude the possibility of mutually beneficial long-run agreements, even when cooperation is beneficial from an ex ante perspective.

scholarly journals Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with one-dimensional local interaction and imitation

2009 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 154-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hsiao-Chi Chen ◽  
Yunshyong Chow
Keyword(s):  
Convergence Rate ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Local Interaction ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Action Dynamics ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Full Cooperation ◽  
Long Run Equilibrium

In this paper we explore the impact of imitation rules on players' long-run behaviors in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games. All players sit sequentially and equally spaced around a circle. Players are assumed to interact only with their neighbors, and to imitate either their successful neighbors and/or themselves or the successful actions taken by their neighbors and/or themselves. In the imitating-successful-player dynamics, full defection is the unique long-run equilibrium as the probability of players' experimentations (or mutations) tend to 0. By contrast, full cooperation could emerge in the long run under the imitating-successful-action dynamics. Moreover, it is discovered that the convergence rate to equilibrium under local interaction could be slower than that under global interaction.

The Effect of Incentives: The Value of Reputation

2021 ◽  
pp. 99-118
Author(s):  
Jason Brennan ◽  
William English ◽  
John Hasnas ◽  
Peter Jaworski
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Reputation Effects

It is useful to model the temptation to act wrongly using the prisoner’s dilemma, one of the most important games in game theory. The prisoner’s dilemma appears to show that the pursuit of self-interest can paradoxically lead to situations in which everyone makes choices they know will undermine their self-interest. However, introducing the possibility of repeated, self-sorting prisoner’s dilemmas with reputation effects reveals something important about the connection between self-interest and morality: We have strong incentives not to cheat because in the long run, we do best by developing the reputation for being honest. However, unfortunately, this also introduces an incentive to exaggerate our moral goodness and to engage in moral grandstanding.

scholarly journals Payoff Control in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dong Hao ◽  
Kai Li ◽  
Tao Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Control Strategies ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Feasible Region ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Game Player ◽  
New Strategies ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

Repeated game has long been the touchstone model for agents’ long-run relationships. Previous results suggest that it is particularly difficult for a repeated game player to exert an autocratic control on the payoffs since they are jointly determined by all participants. This work discovers that the scale of a player’s capability to unilaterally influence the payoffs may have been much underestimated. Under the conventional iterated prisoner’s dilemma, we develop a general framework for controlling the feasible region where the players’ payoff pairs lie. A control strategy player is able to confine the payoff pairs in her objective region, as long as this region has feasible linear boundaries. With this framework, many well-known existing strategies can be categorized and various new strategies with nice properties can be further identified. We show that the control strategies perform well either in a tournament or against a human-like opponent.

scholarly journals Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with one-dimensional local interaction and imitation

2009 ◽  
Vol 41 (01) ◽  
pp. 154-176
Author(s):  
Hsiao-Chi Chen ◽  
Yunshyong Chow
Keyword(s):  
Convergence Rate ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Local Interaction ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Action Dynamics ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Full Cooperation ◽  
Long Run Equilibrium

In this paper we explore the impact of imitation rules on players' long-run behaviors in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games. All players sit sequentially and equally spaced around a circle. Players are assumed to interact only with their neighbors, and to imitate either their successful neighbors and/or themselves or the successful actions taken by their neighbors and/or themselves. In the imitating-successful-player dynamics, full defection is the unique long-run equilibrium as the probability of players' experimentations (or mutations) tend to 0. By contrast, full cooperation could emerge in the long run under the imitating-successful-action dynamics. Moreover, it is discovered that the convergence rate to equilibrium under local interaction could be slower than that under global interaction.

Zu brav oder zu böse? Mobbing-Opfer und Abgelehnte im Prisoner's Dilemma-Paradigma

1999 ◽  
Vol 30 (2/3) ◽  
pp. 179-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beate Schuster
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma

Zusammenfassung: Der soziometrische Status und der Viktimisierungsstatus von 5. bis 11. Klässlern wurde ermittelt, der Status hypothetischer InteraktionspartnerInnen sowie deren angebliche Wahlen variiert, und die Reaktionen im Gefangenendilemma erfaßt. Die Reaktionen wurden sowohl durch die experimentell vorgegebenen als auch durch die erwarteten Wahlen der InteraktionspartnerInnen bestimmt: Kooperative Zuege wurden eher kooperativ, und kompetitive Zuege eher kompetitiv beantwortet. Darüber hinaus vermieden Mobbingopfer kompetitive Züge, während zwei Untergruppen der Abgelehnten gegensätzliche Strategiepräferenzen aufwiesen: Versuchspersonen, die sowohl Ablehnung als auch Mobbing erfahren («Viktimisiert-Abgelehnte») verhielten sich besonders kooperativ; abgelehnte ProbandInnen, die nicht viktimisiert werden («Nicht-viktimisiert-Abgelehnte») dagegen vergleichsweise kompetitiv. Die kooperativen Wahlen viktimisierter Versuchspersonen wurden nicht erwidert: Die Versuchspersonen reagierten gegenüber den Viktimisierten kompetitiver als sich die Viktimisierten ihrerseits gegenüber ihren InteraktionspartnerInnen verhielten. Diese Befunde bestätigen die Notwendigkeit, bei «Abgelehnten» zwei Untergruppen auf der Basis der Viktimisierungsdimension zu unterscheiden. Die Befunde werden ferner vor dem Hintergrund der Hypothese diskutiert, daß die Submissivität potentieller Opfer mit zu ihrer Viktimisierungs-Erfahrung beiträgt.

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