Unfinished Business

2020 ◽  
pp. 299-334
Author(s):  
Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr.

In 2009, the U.S. and other G20 nations agreed on reforms designed to improve the regulation of systemically important financial institutions and markets. However, those reforms did not change the fundamental structure of the financial system, which continues to be dominated by universal banks and large shadow banks. Those giant institutions are too big, too complex, and too opaque to be effectively managed by their executives or adequately disciplined by market participants and regulators. In addition, government officials have failed to hold top executives accountable for widespread misconduct at financial giants during and after the financial crisis. The extensive networks linking capital markets, universal banks, and shadow banks create a strong probability that serious problems arising in one financial sector will spill over into other sectors and trigger a systemic crisis. Consequently, governments face enormous pressures to rescue universal banks and large shadow banks whenever a financial disruption occurs. There are serious doubts whether many governments and central banks will possess the necessary resources in the future to provide comprehensive bailouts similar to those arranged during the last crisis. Accordingly, the next systemic financial crisis might not be contained and could potentially lead to a second Great Depression.

2014 ◽  
pp. 84-96
Author(s):  
P. Zakharov

The financial crisis in the USA has led to major changes in the banking sector architecture. Many financial institutions went bankrupt and were absorbed by competitors, while others were compelled to change their business models. That has resulted in consolidation of the banking sector. Significant developments were also imposed by B. Obama’s financial regulation reform and unprecedented interference of the federal government in banking business.


Author(s):  
Willem H. Buiter

The economic and political importance of central banks has grown markedly in advanced economies since the start of the Great Financial Crisis in 2007. In this article it is argued that the preservation of the central bank’s legitimacy and independence requires that a clear line be drawn between the central bank’s provision of liquidity and the Treasury’s solvency support for systemically important financial institutions. Central banks should not be materially involved in regulation and supervision of the financial sector. All activities of the central bank that expose it to material credit risk should be guaranteed by the Treasury. In addition, central banks must increase their accountability by increasing the transparency of their lender-of-last-resort and market-maker-of-last resort activities. Central banks ought not to engage in quasi-fiscal activities. Finally, central banks should stick to their knitting and central bankers should not become participants in public debates and deeply political arguments about matters beyond their mandate and competence, including fiscal policy and structural reform.


2016 ◽  
Vol 02 (01) ◽  
pp. 135-152
Author(s):  
Xu Mingqi

Since the outbreak of the global financial crisis, a series of currency swap arrangements among central banks have been reached, and many short-term ad hoc mechanisms have been later transformed into permanent institutions, with the decentralized role of the USD and increasing significance of other currencies. It is important to note, however, that currency swaps by Western countries are generally not intended to reform but to maintain stability of the U.S.-dominated international financial system and the USD hegemony. The comprehensive currency swap arrangements made among six major developed economies since the financial crisis exemplify their resistance to the international financial reform. Meanwhile, developing countries have also laid out their own blueprints, highlighted by China’s currency swap arrangements with 33 foreign central banks and the accelerating RMB internationalization. The currency swaps promoted by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) between the RMB and other currencies would inject supplementary liquidity to a turbulent market and offset impact from the selective currency swaps of the U.S. Federal Reserve, thus proving beneficial to developing countries. While such currency swaps are far from replacing the IMF’s role in stabilizing the global financial market, they are posing both challenges and new opportunities to the reform of the international financial system.


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