Central banks

Author(s):  
Willem H. Buiter

The economic and political importance of central banks has grown markedly in advanced economies since the start of the Great Financial Crisis in 2007. In this article it is argued that the preservation of the central bank’s legitimacy and independence requires that a clear line be drawn between the central bank’s provision of liquidity and the Treasury’s solvency support for systemically important financial institutions. Central banks should not be materially involved in regulation and supervision of the financial sector. All activities of the central bank that expose it to material credit risk should be guaranteed by the Treasury. In addition, central banks must increase their accountability by increasing the transparency of their lender-of-last-resort and market-maker-of-last resort activities. Central banks ought not to engage in quasi-fiscal activities. Finally, central banks should stick to their knitting and central bankers should not become participants in public debates and deeply political arguments about matters beyond their mandate and competence, including fiscal policy and structural reform.

Author(s):  
Ioana Plescau

The aim of our paper is to analyze the conventional and unconventional monetary policy in Romania, in the context of the recent financial crisis. We study the relationship between interest rates and credit risk, but also the non-standard monetary measures that were adopted by the National Bank of Romania and their impact on the banking system. Our results point to a decrease of interest rates in the years after the crisis, which is in line with the majority of central banks that have reduced monetary rates in order to sustain the economy and the credit activity.


Author(s):  
Zekayi Kaya ◽  
Erkan Tokucu

During the historical process, application of the monetary policies and the roles of the central banks have changed within the framework of the developments in the world economy, problems encountered and the economic policies as a solution to these problems. The financial crises after 1990 and the recent financial crisis as the biggest experienced one after 1930s, caused an increase in the importance of the task of providing financial stability besides price stability and in this context in the function of “lender of last resort” of the central bank. The crisis required using new policy instruments in addition to interest rate instrument which was not sufficient enough in providing financial stability and the roles of the central banks in providing financial stability changed. In this study, applications of monetary policies and the changing role of the central banks will be examined. Within this framework, traditional and non-traditional instruments will be explained and the problems that can be confronted by a central bank when providing price stability besides financial stability will be remarked.


2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (24) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Emre Alper ◽  
Lorenzo Forni ◽  
Marc Gerard ◽  
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2020 ◽  
pp. 299-334
Author(s):  
Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr.

In 2009, the U.S. and other G20 nations agreed on reforms designed to improve the regulation of systemically important financial institutions and markets. However, those reforms did not change the fundamental structure of the financial system, which continues to be dominated by universal banks and large shadow banks. Those giant institutions are too big, too complex, and too opaque to be effectively managed by their executives or adequately disciplined by market participants and regulators. In addition, government officials have failed to hold top executives accountable for widespread misconduct at financial giants during and after the financial crisis. The extensive networks linking capital markets, universal banks, and shadow banks create a strong probability that serious problems arising in one financial sector will spill over into other sectors and trigger a systemic crisis. Consequently, governments face enormous pressures to rescue universal banks and large shadow banks whenever a financial disruption occurs. There are serious doubts whether many governments and central banks will possess the necessary resources in the future to provide comprehensive bailouts similar to those arranged during the last crisis. Accordingly, the next systemic financial crisis might not be contained and could potentially lead to a second Great Depression.


2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacqueline Best

There has been little discussion of central bank accountability in recent decades because monetary policy has been seen as an essentially technical problem. Yet, during the 2008 financial crisis and the economic dislocations that ensued, central banks gained considerably in authority—bailing out failing institutions, using unorthodox monetary tools, and wading into sovereign debt crises. At the same time, the financial crisis and the slow recovery that has followed have revealed just how uncertain and volatile the global economy can be—a situation that poses new dilemmas for monetary policy. This article looks at the existing model of central bank accountability and finds it wanting in this new, more uncertain environment. Because the principle of central bank independence involves a very narrow set of objectives—generally focused on an inflation target—and very few opportunities for sanction, the main mechanism for accountability is that provided by the publication of information about the bank's deliberations and activities. In an era of increased economic uncertainty, when central bankers themselves admit that simple rules and models are no longer adequate, a narrow, transparency-based form of accountability is not sufficient. I suggest that we need a thicker, more robust form of accountability that fosters more deliberation and debate, ensures that central banks are answerable to their publics, and broadens the standards by which they are judged.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 315-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Diessner ◽  
Giulio Lisi

Abstract The rise of central bankers to the status of new ‘masters of the universe’ has been matched by mounting allegations of political overreach. In the Eurozone, for instance, the European Central Bank has increasingly been accused of straying into the fiscal realm. Why do politically independent central banks engage intensely and publicly with government policies, thereby threatening the neat separation between monetary and fiscal policy that was meant to protect central banks themselves from interference? While existing political economy accounts have focused squarely on the issues of government debt and central bankers’ fears of fiscal dominance, we argue for the emerging role of ‘financial dominance’ throughout the crisis, thereby shedding light on the structural forces that master the new masters of the universe. To this end, we pursue a mixed-methods approach, combining quantitative text analysis techniques with a qualitative understanding of the context in which central banks communicate on fiscal policy.


2013 ◽  
pp. 152-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Senchagov

Due to Russia’s exit from the global financial crisis, the fiscal policy of withdrawing windfall spending has exhausted its potential. It is important to refocus public finance to the real economy and the expansion of domestic demand. For this goal there is sufficient, but not realized financial potential. The increase in fiscal spending in these areas is unlikely to lead to higher inflation, given its actual trend in the past decade relative to M2 monetary aggregate, but will directly affect the investment component of many underdeveloped sectors, as well as the volume of domestic production and consumer demand.


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